AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES' SECURITY POLICY TOWARDS A THIRD WORLD STATE DURING THE COLD WAR ERA:

CASE STUDY OF US-IRAN RELATIONS

by

Hyun Sang YOO

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YOO, Hyun Sang

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ABSTRACT

For an understanding of security relationships between superpowers and Third World states in world politics, it traces the main theories and looks at the characteristics of US security policy and the institutions that are significant in formulating the policy.

Subsequently the case study examines the influence of a particular sort of international relationship known as cliency on the domestic politics of the client state. The features of this relationship are flows of military and economic aid, security agreements, and overt or covert interventions by the patron on behalf of the client government. For the national security, the superpower supports the client government vis-à-vis domestic political groups, thus contributing to authoritarianism and reducing the prospects for democracy in the client state. This also causes the state to become more domestically autonomous in the sense that it can more easily resist political pressures from domestic societal groups.

The US-Iran security relationship of cliency can be dated from August 1953, when the Iranian Prime Minister was overthrown in a CIA-supported coup. US performed a significant role in this coup, and in the subsequent consolidation of power by the shah. Following the coup, military and economic aid was given to Iran under the relationship. US also provided extensive training for Iran's armed forces and the SAVAK. US military and economic aid was instrumental in helping the shah consolidate his dictatorship. The US-Iran relationship had profound influence on Iran's domestic politics. The long-term implications of this policy for Iranian politics and for US interests are discussed in the conclusion of this study.

No material offered has previously been submitted by me for a degree in this or any other university

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DEDICATION

This research study is dedicated to **my parents** - to ***my mother*** who has been incapacitated through illness for five years and ***my father*** who has been devoting most of his time to nursing her instead of his sons and their wives.

GLOSSARY

Bazaar	An oriental market or exchange
de facto	actual, if not rightful or regally recognised.
the Fadayan-i-Islam	the Devotees of Islam. One of the extremist religious organisation
Firman	A decree or judicial decision.
Gendamerie	An armed police force in Iran
In Camera	In secret; in private.
Majles	Parliament of Iran
MI6	The counterintelligence agency of the British Government
National Front	Iranian political party organised in 1949 to protest against the shah's attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections
Qajar	The dynasty that united and ruled Iran from 1779 to 1925.
Rials	Unit of Iranian Currency
Shah	King of Iran(Persia)
Tudeh party	Iranian political party supported by the urban lower class and the industrial working class

ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC	Atomic Emerge Commission
AID	The Agency for International Development
AIOC	The Anglo-Iranian Oil company
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIG	Central Intelligence Group
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DDS&T	Directorate of Science and Technology
DOD	Department of Defense
DPRC	The Defense Program Review Committee
IDCA	International Development Co-operation Agency
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIA	National Intelligence Authority

NIE	National Intelligence Estimates
NSC	National Security Council
OCB	Operations Co-ordinating Board
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PRC	Petroleum Reserves Corporation
SALT	The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAVAK	Sazman-e Attelaat va Amniyat-a Kishvar - Intelligence and Security Organisation of the Country
SNA	National Security Agency
SRG	Senior Review Group
USIA	The United States Information Agency

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INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War era, one of the most important intellectual lessons of the collapse of US influence in Iran is the need for deeper understanding of security relationships between Great Powers and Third World states in world politics. The major idea of this study was initially conceived during the Iranian revolution which gave a big impact to the researcher, who was then a young Army field grade officer in the Republic of Korea involved with the US-Korean military strategic mission. Due to the US president Carter's Human Rights policy, the two US client authoritarian regimes in Third World - Iran and South Korea, faced violent resistance from domestic opposition groups. Consequently, in 1979, the shah of Pahlavi was expelled from Iran by revolutionary groups and president Park who had ruled the country since he took power in the coup of May 1961, was assassinated by his one of close cabinet member, the director of KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency). Despite the two dictators' long terms in power and also their dedication to programmes of economic development, they were not able to legitimise their rule. However, after 1979 US influence in Iran collapsed, but in Korea, her influence was maintained in close security relations. The desire to examining the differences in US security policy toward Iran and Korea compelled researcher to initiate this study on US-Iran security relations.

This introductory chapter will discuss the purpose of the research, the concept of National Security, an overview of US global strategic concepts during Cold War era, and the importance, and major questions of this study and structure of the research.

The objective of this study is to examine the great powers and Third World states' security relationship during the Cold War era through the case study of US-Iran relations. However, this study concentrates mainly on great power's policy making procedures and its characteristics as the thesis title indicates. The study focuses on the following four areas. First the chief aim is examining how US security policy

established the international cliency relationship with the strategically important Third World states for National Security interest. Secondly, tracing the characteristics of the philosophy of US policy making. Analysing and studying of the American heritage in foreign relations is vital to understanding the strengths and weakness of US foreign and security policy. Thirdly, studying the institutions that are significant in formulating US security policy towards Third World countries. Finally, examining how the client state's domestic politics, including conflicts between the shah dictatorship and the opposition group, was affected by US security policy. Through examining these four aims, this study fundamentally attempts to provide an appraisal of the US security policy toward a Third World state. This study also provides some recommendations for alternative strategic concepts which may applicable to US policy makers to achieve the National Security interests.

The primary concern of a state, whether it is either a great power state or a small power state is, and will be, how it can guarantee its own security. The term "national security" has been coined and widely used as a rhetorical phrase for politicians and a conceptual term for security analysts and social scientists in describing policy objective. Traditionally, national security has been defined in terms of a nation's ability to protect its own entity and values against external threats.[1] The term was also defined in a collective sense encompassing both security and foreign relations of a nation, that is, the condition provided by a militarily advantageous position of a nation over another, or politically favourable position of one nation over another, or both.[2] In this context, the definition of the term national security has been meaningful when it deals with the ability of a nation, whether to protect itself or to foster a favourable condition for itself, in the light of the relations of the nation with other nations.

The capabilities that together serve as the foundation for a nation's security are always relative to the capabilities of other nations. Thus an understanding of the elements of national security should begin with an examination of the international context within which national security must be shaped. This setting determines the

security problems and prospects that face any nation and also limits the choices available. A small self-sufficient island-state faces problems different from those of a landlocked, underdeveloped but resource-rich state bordered by both strong enemies and friends. The internal structure of a state must also be considered because, for some countries, principal threats may be almost totally internal as different ethnic, cultural, religious, or political groups fight for control of that government.

Before focusing on the specific aspects of the US security policy towards Iran, it is essential to gain an overview of US global strategic concepts and domestic affairs. Until President Woodrow Wilson involved the United States in "world" (European) affairs as a war partner, "isolationism" (non-involvement in European affairs) had prevailed. From World War I, the government began to change policy as the United States became a global power. Before then, the majority of the US public generally had accepted wars as just or, at least, as cruelly necessary. But after World War I, in which 125,000 US troops died for what seemed a remote cause, there was a reaction. The US population suspected that it had not been told the real reasons for US entry into World War I, and through Congress, public opinion forced the state to pull back and confine its intervention to Latin America and Asia.[3]

After the United States emerged from World War II as the strongest economic and military power in the world, key government and industrial leaders saw the opportunity for a world empire. Urged on by the business elite, which sought to maintain and expand its advantaged status, US leaders constructed, from the expansionist past and the World War II organisation, a national security state to deal with global affairs. The concept of national security, which was never defined clearly or explained, became the overriding concern of the state, at the expense of other long-held traditions and practices. The concept also became dominant in domestic affairs; it governed political debate and rationalised restrictions on the individual's constitutional freedoms. The National Security Act of 1947 (which was secret at the time) and subsequent amendments and decrees placed the governance of critical foreign security

policies in the hands of new institutions: a national security apparatus run by national security managers. As a political term, "the national security" has been used so broadly, that the implications of the undefined notion means the president simply announces that a crisis exists and US national security requires him to commit armed forces to, for example, Iran, Greece, or Korea. The president did not explain "why" because clear explanations might violate another national security requirement: secrecy.[4]

Melvyn Leffler suggests that the US-Iranian relationship and US-Middle Eastern oil policy fit into a global conception of national security which defence planners adopted in the Cold War era. Several of the factors he analyses influenced the State Department's decision to support an Iranian alliance. Technological advances associated with the war - especially long-range bombers and the atom bomb - necessitated a strategy of "defence in depth". To guarantee its security, the United States would have to maintain a string of overseas bases as well as military air transit and landing rights. Budgetary and political constraints would at times force planners "to rely on private airlines, which had to be persuaded to locate their operations designated essential to military air transit rights". Iran's location along air and land routes to Asia and the Soviet Union led the State Department to define these air routes as one important aspect of US-Iran relations.[5]

More importantly, by the end of World War II, US strategic planners had become convinced that the United States could not allow any potential enemy to control the Eurasian land mass. Huge reserves of natural resources, industry, and manpower were at stake. Middle Eastern oil was the one resource available to the Soviet Union and greatly extended the Russians "defence in depth". Soviet Union bases in Europe and the Middle East could undermine the effectiveness of US strategic air power upon which planners had increasingly come to rely. The domino theory adopted during the 1945-46 crisis designated Iran as the first line of defence. The fall of Iran might lead to the loss of the entire Asian subcontinent, which was one reason the State Department

insisted on maintaining US military and police advisers in Iran after the war had ended.[6] Leffler, also, argues that the American assessment of Soviet intentions underwent a transformation from the fall of 1945 to the spring of 1946. As the war ended, diplomatic and military planners were willing to concede that the Soviet Union had some legitimate security concerns and that negotiations might still achieve some useful accommodations. But events in Eastern Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, Asia, and Iran led to a reformation of American assumptions about Soviet intentions. Soviet behaviour no longer seemed to be based on rational security considerations. American policymakers came to believe that Stalin had set out to control the Eurasian land mass, to destroy capitalism, and to extend Soviet-directed communism throughout the world.[7]

George Kennan's "Long Telegram" established the conceptual framework in which American leaders came to understand Soviet policy. What was most striking about Kennan's analysis was his assumption that paranoia or irrational fear underlay Soviet expansion. The United States could not reach useful accommodations with such a foe in an ordinary manner. Only through military strength, constant vigilance, and support from its allies - through a policy of containment - could the United States frustrate Soviet ambitions. Kennan's analysis, undertaken as the World War II alliance deteriorated, confirmed the widely held assumption that the Soviet Union had, as its ultimate aim "Russian domination of a communist world". That belief became embedded in national security thinking. By 1948 NSC-7 stated what had became an American cold war gospel: "The ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world".[8]

The containment of Soviet power which originated as a result of the Iran-Azerbaijan crisis during 1945 to 1946 and was formulated by the Truman administration, became the centrepiece of post-war US foreign and security policy. A broad consensus emerged and underlay American policy until Vietnam: the central conflict in the world was the one between the Soviet-led Communist world (which after 1950 was seen as including Communist China) and the American-led "free world"; any

Communist gain of influence was a loss of influence for America and its allies and friends; it was the task of the West, in general, to oppose such expansion, and in particular that of the United States. When the cold war was replaced by *détente*, the policy changed from one of containment to an era of strategic parity, with on one side the Sino-Soviet schism and, above all, on the other a period of pseudo-isolationism in the United States.

Until the early 1970s, the United States experienced a world pre-eminence that only a few nations throughout history have enjoyed. During these years America reigned as the world's foremost military and economic power. The US forged a network of alliances that committed her to come to the defence of over fifty Third World states if they were subject to attack. When she chose to intervene somewhere with military force, she did so at will. For over twenty-five years, she maintained a military force of over a half-million men stationed overseas. Through her nuclear might she faced down her foremost adversary in their singular test of wills over Cuba in 1962. Through the sheer size and dynamism of her economy, she generated an economic presence throughout the world that left few areas untouched. She was and still remains the world's biggest single national market for the sale of manufactured goods and raw materials. Her multinational corporations dominated the economies of some nations and significantly affect those of many others. For hundreds of millions of non-Americans, the American standard of living was the yardstick by which to measure progress. With the exemption of the Vietnam War, America's foreign policy for over thirty years, as measured by the objectives she set for herself, was mostly a string of success, not a series of failures, 'The Age of Pax Americana, was brief but brilliant.

By the early 1970s, the US had passed the zenith of her power. It was not that she was becoming weaker absolutely, but rather that others were becoming stronger in relation to her and were thereby narrowing the gap between their power and hers. By 1972 the Soviet Union had effectively closed the gap between her strategic nuclear forces and those of the United States. In signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Accords

of 1972, America publicly accepted this fact and gave to the Russians something that had become central to their foreign policy objectives - official recognition by America of their coequality in nuclear armaments. Although not yet possessing conventional forces as transportable and flexible as those of the United States, the Soviet Union was rapidly developing the sea and air transport capabilities that would enable her to act, not merely as a regional, but also as a global power.

While the SALT Accord of 1972 officially marked the end of America's nuclear pre-eminence, the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 symbolically marked the passing of America's overarching economic dominance. No longer the fixed bedrock of international economic dealings, the dollar became subject to the same type of pressures that had caused other currencies before it to be devalued. Underlying the dollars devaluation was a host of structural changes in the non-communist international economy, but prime among them was the revived prosperity of Western Europe and Japan, her two erstwhile dependants, which experienced extremely rapid growth throughout the 1960s. Reflective of America's recognition of this fact was the dual nature of the 1974 Trade Reform Act: it provided both for the lowering or virtual elimination of tariff and quota barriers and their reimposition should foreign competition prove too severe for American industry.

If the United States had passed the zenith of her power by the early 1970s, she nevertheless remained quite powerful. Among the four power centres of the world, the United States still retained the pre-eminent position. The Soviet Union could not match America's economic strength; Western Europe could not match her military strength; Japan could match neither. But because the gap between her power and that of the other three was narrowing, America could no longer command the same degree of obedience from her allies nor the same degree of restraint from her prime adversary that she once could. While still pre-eminent, the United States could no longer convert that pre-eminence into the virtual dominance she once held.

Before entering the main chapters of the thesis, it will be helpful to discuss the fact that although in most respects Iran qualifies as a Third World state, there are differences that distinguish it from most others. First, Iran is the neighbour of a Great Power, sharing about 1,200 miles of boundaries with the former Soviet Union. The fact that so much of the East-West global and regional competition for power and influence has centred on the Middle East and South-western Asia after World War II partly distinguishes Iran, which straddles both regions, from most other Third World states. Second, unlike most Third World states, Iran is an oil-rich state, and it is also the only such state that physically dominates the world's most vital oil chokepoint. The Strait of Hormuz through which over 55 percent of the world oil trade flows. Third, unlike most Third World states, Iran is not a former colony of Western imperial powers, although its independence was nominal during most of the nineteenth century and part of the twentieth. The list of differences between Iran and most other Third World states can be extended. Nevertheless, there are many similarities that justify a number of theoretical propositions based on the Iranian experience that may be relevant to the study of influence relationships between the United States and other Third World states.

While there was a reluctant willingness by the Carter Administration and by many Americans to accept some US complicity in building up the shah, there was neither a precedent in the dominant American political consciousness nor a theoretical framework for understanding how a cliency relationship such as the one maintained with Iran could affect the domestic politics. Vietnam was not a useful guide. To focus on the consequences of US involvement in Vietnam for that country's domestic politics seemed to miss the most important points. In any case, the Vietnam experience was regarded by most Americans as a nightmarish aberration. Nor did US policy on Latin America, the region of the third world in which the United States has traditionally been most deeply involved, seem to offer many insights. Although the US impact on Latin American politics has been blatant, it has been of a very different form. US interests in Latin America have been primarily commercial rather than strategic. US economic

penetration of Latin America, studied so insightfully in the dependency literature, has been of greater consequence than state-to-state security relations.

Despite the absence of literature on this subject, the phenomenon seemed worth studying. Iranians had suffered for twenty-five years under a dictatorship supported by the United States. This was one of reasons which caused the revolution and a more autonomous position in the global system. US national security interests in the Persian Gulf and throughout the world had been seriously damaged. The situation in Iran examined by this study may also provide useful insights for other US allies of Third World states. Also the importance of the case study of Iran as US client state is considered as follows. First, Iran was the original place for Cold War and the implementation US containment policy after World War II. Second, Iran is a prime target of Soviet aggression during the Cold War era. Third, as the linchpin of US defence arrangements in the Middle East. And finally, as a vital source of petroleum and markets for American exports including arms.

Six major questions have influenced this study. First, what historical precedents and philosophical roots have affected current US security and foreign policymaking? Second, what is the nature of constitutional and institutional structures which are the action channels and set the rule parameters within which security policy is formally made? Third, did the US security policy actually promote dictatorship in Iran during the period of the shah's reign? If so, how? Fourth, what were the US security and foreign policy goals that led to such an outcome? Fifth, how has the US association with the shah regime, as a cliency security relationship, affected the Iranian domestic politics? Sixth, assuming that these goals were considered vital to US national security, could alternatives to the policies have been followed which would have safeguarded US interests without producing such disastrous consequences for Iran?

This study is divided into two parts with eight chapters in addition to this introduction and conclusion. Part one is the theoretical frameworks with four chapters.

The main theories developed in chapters one and two guide the subsequent case study analysis in the second part. Chapter one discusses the main theories of international relationship including an analysis of great power-small power and definitions of patron and client state. Chapter two provides the concepts of the client state including the relations between the state and society. Chapter three is concerned with answering the first of the six questions. Chapter four examines the institutions that are significant in formulating US security policy: the Presidency, the National Security and Foreign Affairs agencies, the Congress, and Public Opinion and the Media in order to answer the second question. Even though this chapter is not directly relevant to the US-Iran case study of part two, it is still regarded as a significant portion of this study. The US formal institutions which depend upon a constitution, legal customs, and administrative precedent, establishes a framework which directly affects the more abstract and informal aspects of philosophical thought, personal style, role perception, force of circumstance, interpersonal relations, inter-institutional conflicts and even crisis decision making. The formal institution of US foreign policymaking by the prerequisites of democratic control are clearly present in every aspect - legally, philosophically, and politically. Part two is the case study of the US and Iran relationship. This case study covers the period from the 1940s to the 1970s but mainly focuses on the time of Coup of August 1953, and its aftermath on US - Iran relations. It is divided into four chronologically defined chapters. Most of this case study efforts are concerned with answering the third of the questions. Chapter five examine Iran's domestic politics and great power influence in World War II and the early Post War period. Chapter six discusses the Oil and US interest in Iran. Chapter seven and eight examine US policy in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s and its domestic political consequences. Chapter seven discusses the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis and the Coup of August 1953. Chapter eight as the final chapter, discusses the consolidation of a client state. This chapter focuses especially on the importance of the US-Iran security is relationship relative to the other structural factors that affected Iranian politics, and is

the answer of the fifth question. The fourth major question pursued by this study is dealt with in general terms in chapter one and more specifically in the context of Iran in parts of chapters six to eight. The sixth question is considered in the conclusion of this study with providing some applicable recommendations for alternative US security policies.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1 "National Security," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. 11 (The Macmillan Company and the Free Press. 1974), pp. 40-45.

2 'National Security', US Department of Defence. *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (1989), p. 244.

3 Saul Landau, *The Dangerous Doctrine in National Security and US Foreign Policy*, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1988), pp. 2-5.

4 Ibid.

5 Melvyn Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War," *American Historical Reviews*, 89, 2 (April 1984): 346-88. I am indebted to Professor Leffler for this global view of American defence planning. It confirmed my own view that the definition of the American stake in Iran was conceived in the context of a fundamental redefinition of national security.

6 Ibid., pp. 349-56.

7 Ibid., pp. 365-72.

8 John Lewis Gaadis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York, 1982) pp. 19-53.

PART ONE - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

CHAPTER I

MAIN THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND US SECURITY POLICY

This chapter, will attempt to lay out the relevant main theories of international relationships which will guide this study in order to understand US security policy toward Iran as a Third World country. It begins by analysing central concepts of the great power-small power relationship. Their implications for the client's domestic politics are discussed in chapter 5 as part of the case study. Consequently this chapter shall discuss the definitions of cliency.[1] The motives which bring the patron and client together and the goods and services which transpire under a cliency relationship are then discussed. Next, the concept of cliency is further illustrated by contrasting it with several related concepts. This chapter concludes with a brief descriptive overview of US cliency relationships in the post-War era.

1.1. Analysis Of Great Power-Small Power Relations

1.1.1. Concepts of Security Relations

The problem of security is the principal concern of this study. Security is the central goal of all nation-states, whether pursued unilaterally or within an alliance framework. Every nation-state employs all means at its disposal for its own security.

National security is defined as the ability of a nation to protect its internal values from internal and external threat.[2] The security of the nation involves not only its foreign relations and its military posture but also the state of its economy.[3] Thus, national security policy is defined as the military, diplomatic, and economic measures taken by a government to provide for national protection. In this sense, national

security policy can be viewed as the most significant national policy.[4]

It is only very recently that social scientists have begun to examine the nature of national security as an analytic concept. There are several advantages of national security as an organising concept over foreign policy:

(1) It focuses on common elements and uniformity in the external policies of all national actors.

(2) It provides a convenient frame of reference which opens up possibilities of comparison between superficially disparate matters and which can help organise the welter of comparative data produced by the historical foreign policy approach.

(3) It also adds a dimension to the concern of traditional foreign policy with conflict situations.

(4) It makes room, conceptually, for the consideration of common international interests, which could result in a simultaneous increase of security for all the international system and thus becomes a legitimate goal of national security policy.

(5) It focuses on the underlying unity of internal and external activities of states by explicitly recognising that external behaviour is an integral part of the total behaviour pattern of the national system. It therefore avoids the misleading dichotomy between domestic and foreign policy, and joins the two by envisaging both as designed to protect the same set of values and, ultimately, to maintain the national and even the international system.[5]

Thus, as an organising concept, national security is different from the conventional meaning of national interest and power. Traditionally, most foreign policy studies rested heavily on the concept of national interest based on the "power" explanations of "political realism." According to Hans J. Morgenthau, international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Therefore, he defines national interest in terms of power,[6] and argues that the "objective of a foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest."[7] However, while it is true that every nation seeks power

to attain its policy objectives, relationships, processes, and quantities of power, he concludes that "this formulation of power concept will not be useful for all aspects of the study of international relations."[8] Thus, the power proposition of the national interest may not explain the behaviour of a nation.

Unlike the concept of power, national security is an instrumental goal whose satisfaction does not necessarily deny similar satisfaction to other states. Today, in the nuclear age, the primary goal of security is that one state's survival depends upon the survival of other friendly states. In this sense, the study of national security is an important contribution to peace strategy and peace research.[9]

The categorisation of classification of states according to size has long been a part of international politics, but the focus of academic literature has generally been upon the role of great powers in international politics. However, a tremendous increase in newly independent small states in the last five decades has stimulated growth in the number of scholarly works on the phenomenon of small states.[10]

It is generally agreed that based on the scope of foreign policy interest, small powers have limited interests in international politics. Their politics, consequently, are designed for the achievement of limited objectives of the security of their own territory. Big powers' interests are not limited to their own territory and particular regions, and are concerned with the problems of the world at large.

There are some difficulties in a clear-cut definition and classification of a nation-state as the "small power " or the "great power", because the "small" and "great" are relative concepts,[11] subject to great differences in interpretation.[12]

Maurice A. East categorised the small powers based on one or more of the following conditions: (1) small land area, (2) small total population, (3) small total GNP (or other measures of total productive capability), and (4) a low level of military capabilities.[13]

However, the definition of the small power based on capabilities of nation-states in terms of tangible components is not accurate without considering intangible

elements. Robert Rothstein rejected a definition of small power based on purely an "objective or tangible criteria" and developed a definition with a psychological as well as a material dimension:

> "A small power is a state which recognises that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other state, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power 's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics."[14]

He points to three unique aspects of the small power's situation: (1) outside help is required, (2) the state has a narrow margin of safety, with little time for correcting mistakes, and (3) the state's leaders see its weakness as essentially unalterable. He is concerned only with a limited category of small powers, those that "feel they are potentially or actually threatened by the policies of the great powers",[15] i.e., those states which are within an area of big power confrontation "or which fear that confrontation will affect their interest significantly."[16] Thus, Rothstein focuses on a particular category of small power and its security dilemma. Rothstein argues that "neutrality or nonalignment is a dangerous security policy for small powers which are exposed to a great power threat."[17] However, he concludes that:

> "Small power ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances. They provide the most benefits in terms of security and political influence. If unavailable, they probably should choose a small power alliance in preference to an unequal, bilateral alliance, particularly if the small power s do not fear an immediate threat to their security, and if their goals in allying are primarily political. An alliance with a single great power ought to be chosen only if the other alternatives are proscribed, and if the small power s fear

an imminent attack - and even then only in hopes of improving their deferent stance."[18]

Rothstein's dim view of alliance with a single great power applies not only to bilateral ties but also to alliances between several small powers and one great power. An alliance with several great powers is desirable but very difficult to achieve practically. Thus, the freedom of choice of a small power may be restricted.

For the definition, alliance is also an elusive term, permitting widely divergent definitions by scholars.[19] It is variously considered as "techniques of statecraft, international organisations one or more of regulating mechanism in the balance of power."[20] Robert E. Osgood define it as :

> "A formal agreement that pledges states to co-operate in using their military resources against a specific state or states and usually obligates one or more of the signatories to use force, or to consider the (unilaterally or in consultation with allies) the use of force, in specified circumstances."[21]

In this sense, an alliance is considered as an instrument of national security highly dependent upon military capability and policy. This is the case because the primary purpose of alliance formation is to deter external threat, rather than national strength or weakness, and for national security rather than out of a sense of community.[22]

There are four general functions of alliances: (1) aggregation of power; (2) interallied control or restraint of allies, (3) promotion of international order; and (4) international security.[23] As a vehicle for the aggregation of power, an alliance serves to maximise military capabilities so as to offset the fear of insecurity. Interallied control is the most prominent function of alliances, and is used to maximise surveillance over an otherwise undependantable power. Since alliance partners share common orientations,

it is their mutual interest to restrain any member from pursuing extremist policies. Generally, four methods of control of alliance partners are used: (1) staying great power's troops on the territory of small powers; (2) foreign aid; (3) military intervention; and (4) designating political leaders of the small partner or working closely with internal opposition groups. International order or even international government is the broadest and the least attainable function of an alliance.

The last function, internal security, is especially important for a small power . Sometimes, alliances may be intended to enhance the security or stability of an ally's government or regime by legitimising material assistance or military intervention against internal opposition.[24]

Most treaties of alliance contain a fundamental commitment of response in the event of military contingency; such contingencies have been identified either as "aggression" or "armed attack." The commitment is well defined in the National Commitment Resolution adopted by the US Senate in the 91st Congress:

> "Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it *Resolved,* that (1) a national commitment of the Armed Forces of this resolution means the use of the Armed Forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country, government, or people by the use of the Armed Forces or financial resources of the Untied States, either immediately or upon the happening of certain events, and (2) it is the sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States results only from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government by means of a treaty, statute, or concurrent resolution of both Houses of Congress specifically providing for such commitment."[25]

Significantly, commitment is implemented through the two principal methods of military force and financial resources. For the purpose of US security policy, Roland Paul has provided a precise definition of security commitment:

> "any pre-existing relationship between this country and another that would significantly tend to lead this country toward the use of force even if, at the movement of crisis, it were not otherwise American policy to use it."[26]

This definition is restrictive in that it considers only commitment of aid from one country to its allies. In this sense, US commitments to Iran before the US-Iran Security Alliance of 1953 were not considered as a security commitment.[27]

Paul classified commitments into seven types of commitment:
(1) treaties; (2) security agreements; (3) stationing of troops in a foreign country; (4) unilateral government declaration; (5) moral commitment; (6) obligations arising from a general identification between one country and the governing order, broad political programmes or society of another country; and (7) other obligations over the course of time resulting from the accumulation of many small contributions to the defence, survival, and well-being of another country.[28]

1.1.2. Motivations and Interrelationships of Great Power-Small Power

According to Liska, the overall purpose of an alliance is to act as "the institutional link between the politics of the balance of power and the politics of preponderance or empire."[29] As an international device, alliances are used as an instrument of augmenting one's insufficient power and of controlling the ally's use of power even while supplementing it.[30] The great power and the small power's motives for joining alliances can be understood in this context.

The principal motives of great powers to enter into alliances are: (1) aggregation or addition; (2) diversion; and (3) disguise of power and its exercise.[31] More bluntly, the great power's motives are: (1) a desire to control the activities of the small state; (2) a desire to deny the small power 's territory to an adversary; (3) a wish to support the "legitimacy" of a particular government; and (4) an attempt to impress third parties by maintaining that particular alliance.[32]

On the other hand, the motives of small power s to ally with a great power can be those of security, stability and status.[33] As an analytical purpose, Omer De Raeymaeker classified small power s motives for joining alliances as follows: (1)

security in relation to the geographical situation; (2) prestige in the international community; (3) domestic stability; (4) economic aid and military assistance; and (5) ideology.[34]

However, the basic dilemma of the small power in an alliance is to obtain sufficient support without undue interference from the great power. Weakness, according to Vital, is the dominant fact of the existence of small power alliances with great powers because of a disparity of military strength. Thus, the dilemma of the small power is that it is difficult for it to establish military modernisation without compromising its political independence.[35] He warns that the price of alignment is the loss of real independence and effective sovereignty of the small power.[36] Thus, Vital's argument is that the small power's conflict with the great power is eventually a conflict over its autonomy.[37]

On the other hand, while aware that a small power may show weakness in military capability, some scholars view that the small power has some area of strength. Annett B. Fox, analysing small power s in World War II, and 1919-1969, finds:

> "The distinctive power of great states flows from their military strength. However, the ability of a state to secure what it wants through the use of violence is only one mark of political power... There are other means. Both small and great states can employ economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods, as well as military measures."[38]

Furthermore, she finds:

> "the small state has one important advantage over the great power: its interests are local and limited. Thus, all attention can be focused upon a single objective, whereas the large state, with varied and extensive interests, must balance these and give only a relatively fleeting glance towards a particular small power . With favourable conditions many governments of various small states have successfully utilised negotiating techniques in order to resist the pressures of the great powers."[39]

She emphasises the techniques of diplomacy as the government's strongest power, and "the small states must be able to protect themselves by adroit diplomatic use

of favourable opportunities for advancing their interest."[40]

Robert Keohane also argues that "possession of superior military or economic force cannot guarantee small-power compliance with big power interest."[41] He continues that "weakness does not entail only liabilities; for the small power, it also creates certain bargaining assets."[42] Generally, small powers' bargaining positions stem from the following conditions:

(1) a state may be economically weak, have low military strength and be politically unstable; but its weakness can be a source of bargaining power if a great power perceives the territory of the small state to be of strategic importance and is prepared to commit conventional military forces to its assistance.

(2) the bargaining power of small states involved in a military conflict will be increased if there is a clear and overt commitment by great powers to opposite sides.

(3) a coalition of small states, which is weakly organised, with disputed leadership and whose members have differing political systems and ideologies will have a high degree of stress within it over the formulation and implementation of common objectives, when involved in a military conflict.

(4) a small state can sometimes act with impunity against a great power. The response of the great power will be determined primarily by the type of threat, the degree of its active involvement elsewhere and concern lest any retaliatory action might adversely affect its relations with other states in the region.

(5) a small state can use international organisations to mobilise support for its policies by widening the arena of debate and criticism.

(6) a small state will be able to resist collective non-military sanctions if it receives support from border states and if the collective sanctions are not universally or equally applied by members of international organisations.[43]

Keohane observes that the small power in an alliance system can influence the great power more actively and forcefully than in a non-alliance system.[44] The bargaining power of the small power stems from the alliance structure of

interdependence. In the alliance system, the smaller ally can use three lines of tactics to influence the larger ally: (1) unreliability by attempting to trigger the larger ally into unwanted conflict or by seeking a separate accommodation with the common enemy, (2) contributions by becoming a loyal and reliable ally, or (3) weakness by stressing its fragile position which may undermine the alliance itself.[45]

The capability of a small power to influence the great power is sometimes referred to as the "power of the weak", or "tyranny of the weak". However, generally, a small state's bargaining power stems from the great power's motivations and gratuity. Thus, small power s usually have disproportionate power in the bargaining process with great powers, and the small power may "accept a certain amount of control by the great power in its domestic and foreign policy as an inevitable and legitimate price for support."[46] In order to minimise great power influence, however, a small power can resist from positions of both weakness and strength.[47]

Based on the above arguments several hypotheses are derived:

(1) Neutrality or nonalignment is a dangerous security policy for small powers which are exposed to a great power threat.

(2) In the alliance system, however, a small power ought to prefer mixed, multilateral alliances.

(3) The distinctive power of great states flows from their military strength. However, possession of superior military force cannot guarantee small power compliance with big power interest.

(4) For the small power , weakness does not entail only liabilities. It also creates certain bargaining assets.

(5) A small power in an alliance system can influence a great power more actively and forcefully than in a non-alliance system.

In spite of the fact that such a broad general approach to the study of small and big power relationships has appeared in the professional literature, the inquiry is still at an elementary stage. There still remains a lack of any workable theory for comparative

analysis, partly because the universe of big power-small power relationship is too broad. Thus, a restricted case-study has been adopted. By use of a relaxed conceptual framework in the analysis of small power -big power behaviours in an alliance system, it is hoped that the case-study of US-Iran relationship can facilitate theorising concerning the behaviour of the big power's relationships with the small power. As Michael Brecher indicates, "social science models are of little value unless they are subjected to the rigorous test of empirical utility. Without case studies little progress can be made on the long road to theory."[48]

Harry Eckstein classifies five different types of case-studies: (1) configurative-idiographic studies, (2) disciplined configurative studies, (3) heuristic case studies, (4) case-studies as plausibility probes, and (5) crucial case-studies.[49] He lists six options on the utility of case studies:

(1) Holds case-studies and comparative studies to be wholly separate and unequal.

(2) Desegregates case-studies and comparative studies.

(3) Holds case-studies to conduct precisely for the purpose of discovering questions and puzzles for theory, and discovering candidate-rules that might solve theoretical puzzles.

(4) Focuses on the stage of theory-building at which one confronts the question whether candidate-rules are worth the costs (time, effort, ingenuity, manpower, funds, etc.) of testing.

(5) Goes still another step further, to the testing (validation) stage itself in attempting to validate theories case-studies and comparative studies in principles.

(6) Holds that case-studies are not merely equal alternatives at testing stage, but, properly carried out, a better bet than comparative studies.[50]

This case-study is a disciplined configurative study[51] which adopts the third option. This case-study approach is useful not only for the interpretative application of general ideas to particular cases and for helping the inquirer to arrive at notions of problems to solve or solutions worth pursuing, but also to arrive at more useful means

of determining whether solutions are valid.[52]

In constructing and in interpreting a single case-study, however, there are many persistent problems:

(1) The boundaries of the case - what is to included or excluded;

(2) The level of case comparability to be sought - the extent to which the case method employed will permit replication and comparison;

(3) The representativeness of the case - the universe of behaviours to which the case findings are hypothesized to apply; and

(4) The adequacy of explanation - questions concerning the relative merits of competing explanatory hypotheses, including choices among internally induced and externally introduced explanations.[53]

With the disciplined configurative case study approach the examination of the nature of national security in the framework of small power and great power relationships in an alliance system is a systematic means of proceeding toward solution of these problems. As noted above, the study of national security has several advantages as an organising concept over foreign policy.

To support this thesis, the following fundamental questions must be kept in mind: (1) What were the sources of bargaining power of the United States - Iran? (2) To what extent did the allies' goals conflict? (3) How US foreign policies were related and influenced between president and interest groups? (4) In what circumstances was the United States able to influence domestic and foreign policies of Iran? (5) What tactics (means) did great power (United States) and small power (Iran) use to influence the other? (6) Did US foreign policies pursue national interests or values?

To answer above questions, this study analyzes the issue areas in historical events in order to trace the development of each nation's strategy, leverages, and tactics towards the other. Each chapter in part two of this case study is related to the US security commitment policy toward Iran and Iran's responses in the framework of big power and small power relationship. The organization of this study is basically

chronological.

1.2. The Definitions of Patron and Client state

1.2.1. The Cliency Relationship

Cliency is a long-term, asymmetric, mutually-beneficial relationship between two independent and autonomous countries which differ greatly in their size, wealth, and military and political power. The cliency relationship is security-oriented, based on a broad spectrum of security concerns which are complementary and often identical for the countries involved. The similarity of these concerns and the great disparity in the capabilities of the patron and client create strong incentives for them to co-operate in order to further their mutual interests. This co-operation consists of a reciprocal exchange of services and material resources which are dissimilar and which help to enhance the security interests of the two countries. While this exchange is the most visible and concrete aspect of the cliency relationship, it is the recognition of mutual interests and the commitments and co-operation which follow that are its defining characteristics. The co-operative nature of the cliency relationship means that it is fundamentally non-coercive, and the patron and client are autonomous in this sense. Its non-coercive character and its security orientation are the major factors distinguishing cliency from other asymmetric international relationships, such as economic dependence, the satellite relationships of Eastern Europe, colonialism, and imperialism.[54] Cliency and these other relationships will be contrasted in some detail in next section of this chapter.

The goals which bring the patron and client together in a cliency relationship may vary considerably, depending on domestic, regional, and global circumstances. However, some basic motives can be outlined here.

In entering into a cliency relationship, the patron primarily seeks a stable and

co-operative ally in an area vital to its security which can deter threats by rival powers and help defend its regional interests. The patron's regional interests may include the defence of its national borders or other strategically important areas, protection for nearby allies, and economic concerns such as the protection of investments by its nationals or sources of vital raw materials. The patron may also have various secondary goals, including co-operation from the client on intelligence matters, support in international forums, military assistance in extra-regional conflicts, and arrangements for military bases and other kinds of facilities.

The client generally seeks a reliable source of security-oriented goods and services to enhance its domestic stability and its military capabilities vis-à-vis other countries. Those may include various kinds of military and economic aid and formal or informal commitments by the patron to assist it in the event of threats to its security.

The motives of the patron and client in establishing a cliency relationship thus converge on two basic goals: a stronger client military apparatus and greater stability in the client country. A strong client is clearly essential for the patron's primary goals of deterring hostile powers and protecting its regional interests. However, the client's domestic stability can be equally important for the patron. A client which experiences frequent unrest may be weakened by dissension may make it difficult for the client to act decisively on behalf of the patron's interests. Uncertainty about the client's future stability can present serious problems for the patron's long-term interests and force it to re-evaluate its regional policies. The patron will generally seek to minimise these problems by acting to ensure that the client is sufficiently stable to present a credible military threat and justify a long-term commitment.

The client government also has an obvious interest in becoming military stronger and more stable. While the broad goals of military strength and stability are held by both the patron and the client, in practice they may have very different reasons for pursuing these goals and different conceptions of what they entail. The client may have regional ambitions which are not shared by the patron or which may, in fact,

conflict with the patron's interests. Building up the client's military forces without some control over their use may then have adverse consequences for the patron. Of perhaps greater importance are differences between the patron and client over how to achieve domestic stability. While the patron may seek a measure of political consensus to minimise unrest and ensure peaceful changes of government, a client government may be more interested in strengthening its domestic position by repressing popular movements and acting against its opposition. Since the client government is the main recipient of the services and resources transferred under the cliency relationship, cliency can help it to achieve these particular goals. Repression of popular movements and suppression of the opposition can lead to conditions which jeopardise the client's long-term stability. Consequently, attempts by the patron to enhance the client's stability may also have adverse long-term implications for the patron's interests.

1.2.2. Means of Cliency

The resources and services provided by the patron to the client under this relationship will be referred to here as means of cliency. Three main categories can be distinguished: i) military and economic transfers, including loans and grants, training for security forces, and indirect transfers via loan guarantees, quotas, favourable credit terms, etc.; ii) overt and covert interventions, including intelligence, direct manipulation of domestic political actors, and military or paramilitary actions against particular domestic or foreign targets, iii) security agreements such as treaties, pacts, and other less formal arrangements. These goods and services are provided by the patron to enhance the strength and stability of the client, to ensure its continued co-operation, and often to achieve more specific security goals.

Foreign aid is an instrument that has been used to achieve a broad variety of foreign policy goals,[55] many of which do not involve a cliency relationship. It can, however, be of considerable importance in this context as well. In sufficient

magnitude, economic aid can bolster the client's economy by increasing domestic demand and augmenting investment in infrastructure and other key areas. It can be used to finance transfers to specific domestic groups by enabling the client government to allocate social services and development projects more selectively and fund more direct transfers such as subsidies and tax concessions. These mechanisms can be quite useful in placating popular unrest, particularly in crisis periods, and can thus enhance the client's stability. Economic aid can also be used to build up the client's military capabilities by providing it with a strategically-important infrastructure and by allowing other funds to be diverted for military spending. Indirect financial transfers can play a similar role, although they do not necessarily accrue to the client government and are usually smaller in volume than direct economic aid.

Transfers of military equipment and training for military personnel can more directly enhance the military capabilities and domestic stability of the client country. Sophisticated military equipment is, of course, available in the international arms market. However, the patron can provide it at no cost or on favourable terms, and can often provide items which are more advanced than those available elsewhere. While most discussions about US arms transfers have focused on major weapons systems for use primarily in international engagements, a sizeable portion of US military aid has actually gone for domestic counterinsurgency operations.[56] Of particular importance in this context has been special training for counterinsurgency units, both at US bases and locally through military missions. Sophisticated equipment and special training can boost morale and make military and paramilitary operations more efficient, enhancing the client's military posture and enabling it to maintain domestic stability in a more effective manner.

Military and economic transfers can increase the client's military capabilities and its ability to contain domestic unrest. However, they may not be sufficient to achieve the patron's particular regional goals or maintain the client's stability. Overt or covert interventions by the patron or security agreements providing for intervention

under certain circumstances may be necessary. Actions of this sort generally imply a stronger commitment by the patron to the client's security, and thus a stronger and more vital cliency relationship.

In its most benign form, intervention can involve relatively innocuous actions by the intervening power such as the provision of subsidies, advice, and technical assistance for domestic organisations which are seen as favourable to its goals. These may include labour unions, political parties, business firms, newspapers, and other private organisations which play a significant political role.[57] More effective covert action may include propaganda, sabotage, assassinations, and other paramilitary activities directed against groups who are seen as a threat to the client government.[58] These actions are generally targeted at nationals of the client country, either at home or in exile. They can have a substantial impact on the organisation and effectiveness of friendly or hostile groups, and can thus significantly affect the client's stability. Covert action may also involve foreign targets, as when a hostile country provides critical support for domestic groups. Actions such as these can strengthen the client vis-à-vis other countries, in addition to enhancing its domestic stability.

Overt interventions include direct involvement of the patron's military forces on behalf of the client country and the temporary or permanent stationing of its troops within the client's borders. Direct military involvement by the patron is generally a means of last resort. The stationing of troops in a client country is used more frequently to deter hostile aggression. Overt interventions may be directed either at domestic groups, which may not receive outside support, or at nearby countries which are hostile to the client. They may consequently be used either to promote the client's domestic stability or to enhance its military capabilities vis-à-vis other countries. In many cases (such as the large-scale US intervention in Vietnam) these two goals may be indistinguishable.

Bilateral treaties, multilateral pacts and security organisations, and other security arrangements often serve as the legal basis for interventions. In addition to

legitimising interventions, these arrangements symbolise the patron's commitment to the client and consequently can play an important role in deterring aggression by hostile foreign or domestic groups.

1.2.3. The Client State

The main thesis of this study is that cliency can seriously affect the domestic politics of the client country. The impact of cliency on the client's domestic politics is embodied here in the concept of the client state. The *client state* is a particular form of state in which state-society relations have been fundamentally altered as a result of the client government's participation in a cliency relationship. State-society relations are affected by the transfer of the goods and services referred to above as cliency instruments to the client government. These instruments can obviate the client government's need for support from domestic social groups and enable it more effectively to undermine the political power of groups that oppose it. Domestic groups consequently have very little political influence in a client state, and the state's policies may become divorced from the interests and needs of society.

This can have important long-term consequences. A state which is not constrained by societal pressures can undertake virtually any policies it sees fit, regardless of their impact on society. Over a long period of time the absence of public input into state policy-making can lead to serious problems in the economy, in foreign relations, and in other policy areas, often resulting in domestic unrest. This may be particularly true in underdeveloped countries, where unrest can be augmented by the absence of institutions to channel and contain public discontent and where economic planning is generally of great importance. By undermining societal influences on state policy cliency can thus paradoxically lead to long-term instability. Furthermore, if the patron power becomes closely identified with the client state in the eyes of discontented social groups, their anger may be directed at it as well as at the client government.

Hence in the long term cliency can have consequences which are quite different from those originally envisioned by the patron and client governments.

In order to adequately discuss how cliency can lead to the establishment of a client state and to succinctly characterise state-society relations in such a state it is necessary to discuss several other concepts which bear on these matters. This will be done in chapter 2. Chapter 2 will also review a number of studies which give important insights into the nature of policy-making in a client state and its possible long-term consequences. The remainder of this chapter further illustrates the concept of cliency by comparing it with other asymmetric international relationships and by presenting some empirical data which help to identify US clients in the post-War period.

1.3. Comparison to Other International Relationships

In this section cliency is compared with dependency, with the satellite relationships which existed in Eastern Europe, and with colonialism and imperialism. These five types of international relationship are contrasted in figure 1 according to two key issues: i) whether the more powerful country must use coercion to maintain the relationship and ii) whether it is primarily an economic relationship, a security-oriented relationship, or a combination of the two. A comparison of these five relationships according to these issues helps to identify the unique aspects of cliency. It is also useful in broadly illustrating how the domestic impact of cliency may differ from that of the other relationships discussed here.

- Figure 1 will be seen next page -

Figure 1 - Cliency Contrasted with Other International Relationships

		Primary Orientation of Relationship		
		Security	**Economic**	**Imperialism**
Coercion Required to Maintain Relationship?	yes	*satellite*	*colonialism*	*imperialism*
	no	*cliency*	*dependency*	

1.3.1. Dependency

As is evident in figure 1, cliency bears a greater similarity to dependency and to satellisation than to colonialism or imperialism. Cliency and dependency are both non-coercive, but differ in their primary orientation. Dependency theory, at least in its original Latin American tradition,[59] is mainly concerned with the effect of such economic interactions as trade, capital flows, and technology transfer on the economic development of the weaker, dependent country. This approach has been extended by writers such as Frank, Cardoso, and O'Donnell, who have examined how these interactions affect social and political structures in the dependent country.[60] As is clear from the above discussion, cliency involves very different kinds of interactions (although economic aid and other financial transfers are capital flows and hence contribute to dependence). Furthermore, cliency is fundamentally a state-to-state relationship motivated by security concerns. By contrast, dependency generally involves private actors in both countries and is motivated essentially by the desire to exploit international disparities in factor endowments.

Despite these differences, cliency and dependency are both non-coercive in the sense that neither country is forced by the other to enter into the relationship. In both cases, public and/or private decision-makers in the two countries engage in the relationship because it affords them (although not necessarily their respective societies) mutual, if asymmetric, benefits. Because they are both non-coercive and very different kinds of interactions, cliency and dependency are complementary and may very easily co-exist. This appears to be the case in the relationships between the United States and several countries in Central and South America, where strong commercial and security-oriented bonds have traditionally gone hand-in-hand. As will become evident in later chapters, economic dependence and even security concerns arising from economic issues have, by contrast, played a relatively minor role in post-war US-Iranian relations.

1.3.2. The Satellite Relationship

The satellite relationships of Eastern Europe were primarily security-oriented, but, unlike the cliency relationship depicted here, were maintained with a high degree of coercion. Economic interactions among the Eastern European countries were quite strong and their economies were in fact highly integrated. However, economic ties among these countries had always been subordinated to political and military concerns,[61] and it is the latter to which the concept of satellization generally refers.

Coercive domination in the satellite relationship is maintained in several ways. The most prominent form of domination has been the threat or actual use of military force to maintain a country in the satellite system, as has occurred in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Closely related to this was the use of the Soviet secrete police to spy on and occasionally arrest satellite leaders and activists, a practice which was used more frequently in the Stalinist era than in later years. The ability to implement these forms of coercion had also given Soviet leaders a large measure of indirect influence over decision-making in the satellite countries, generally manifested through informal channels. More direct control resulted from the occupation by Soviet officers of high positions in the armies of the satellite countries. Similarly, much of the military and economic policy of the satellites was controlled and co-ordinated through the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and COMECON, which were dominated by Soviet decision-makers.

Another major form of domination in the satellite relationship resulted from the ideological similarities between the Soviet and satellite leaders and the strong personal bonds that link them. The leadership in the satellite countries was initially installed at the end of World War II, when contending political forces were extremely weak. It subsequently emerged through the Communist parties of these countries, whose ideological orientations were virtually identical to those of the Soviet Communist party and whose loyalty was reinforced by Soviet coercion and by post-war East-West

tension. The loyalties and similar world-views of the satellite leaders were instrumental in maintaining the cohesion of the Soviet bloc.

Although the satellite relationship also involves transfers of the kinds of goods and services exchanged under the cliency relationship, the coercive measures it entails clearly distinguish it from cliency. These coercive measures also mean that satellization has a stronger and much more blatant impact on the domestic politics of the satellite country. Satellite leaders emerge only through a very circumspect selection process, and their policy options are highly constrained. Political activities outside of the party and the state apparatuses are rigidly repressed. Censorship and highly controlled forms of socialisation and mobilisation help to further restrict activities which might conflict with the goals and methods of the dominant power.

1.3.3. Colonialism and Imperialism

Colonialism and Imperialism differ from cliency both in having a substantial coercive component and in having strong, if not exclusive, economic motivations. Colonies have generally been established by armed conquest and maintained by an occupying army and colonial administration, the upper levels of which are staffed mainly by functionaries from the colonising country. During the early era of European colonisation colonies were sought mainly to secure exclusive control over sources of precious metals and other valuable commodities. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries colonies often took on an added importance as capital outlets, exclusive markets for goods produced in the home country, and sources of cheap labour for light industries such as textiles. The impact of colonisation on the political and social structures of the colonised societies has been severe, and in many ways still persists.[62] However, the absolute control it entails and its strong economic motives clearly distinguish colonisation from cliency.

Imperialism is the most ill-defined of the four relationships discussed in this

section, and for this reason it is not easily compared with cliency. All writers seem to agree that imperialism refers to an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy, and that an imperialistic relationship is consequently exploitative and hegemonic, though it does not entail the formal control of colonialism. Marxists and many non-Marxists see imperialism as a relationship that is motivated exclusively or primarily by private economic concerns, much like those that motivated colonialism.[63] Other writers, however, deny the importance of private economic motives and maintain that imperialism is based on broader considerations of the imperialist power's national interests.[64]

The economic motives attributed to imperialism by many writers distinguish this conception of it from cliency in an obvious way.[65] However, imperialism also entails a high degree of coercion that is perhaps less direct than in colonial and satellite relationships but that nevertheless does not appear in the cliency relationship. This coercion is generally manifested in the threat or actual use of military force. It gives the imperialist power a large measure of informal influence over the subjugated country. By contrast, the cliency relationship is maintained by the perception of mutual interests on the part of the patron and client governments and by the realisation that co-operation can further these interests. Because of the coercive influence it entails, imperialism can have a very direct and blatant impact on the domestic politics of the subjugated country, much like that of satellization.[66]

1.4. Overview of U.S. Cliency Relationships During 1950-1980

Table 1.1 contains data on various forms of US security assistance to 50 major Third World countries in the post-war period, as well as figures on US direct investment and trade with these countries. This table helps illustrate the discussion in this chapter by helping to identify the motives which guided US policy-makers in establishing these relationships. It is also useful in illustrating how the relationships

between the United States and Iran have compared with other cliency relationships which may be more familiar to the reader

The sample used in this table was chosen by selecting those Third World countries which either: i) received a substantial volume of US military transfers or economic aid; ii) were the target of a major US intervention; or iii) were engaged in a major security agreement with the United States in the post-war period. It was made sufficiently large to ensure that all countries which might possibly be considered US clients would be included. The periods shown in column 1 give the years in which each country had a close relationship with the United States and for which the yearly averages in columns 2, 3 ,5 ,6 and 12 are figured. The period 1950-1980 is used for those countries which were closely allied with the United States in the entire post-War period. Shorter periods are used in cases where a country became independent after 1950, or where a treaty or conflict, or coup, revolution, or other change of government substantially altered the country's relationship with the United States. The data given in columns 2-10 show how the foreign policy tools referred to here as cliency instruments have been used by the United States in the post-war period. Figures in columns 2, 3 and 5 are given on a per capita basis to facilitate cross-national comparisons and to indicate the relative magnitude of external versus domestic resources of a particular type.

- Table 1.1 is about here -

Table 1.1 Major World Recipients of US Security Assistance, 1950-1980

. Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11		12
Region and Country	**Duration of Relationship**	**Average Economic Aid Per Capita (rank)**	**Average Military Transfers Per Capita (rank)**	**US Military Imports as % of Total, 1964-1978**	**Average Military Training Per Capita (rank)**	**Average US Troops Stationed in Country (rank)**	**Number Major US Bases, 9/69**	**Number US Military Actions, 1946-76**	**Multilateral, Bilateral Treaties, Executive Agreements**	**Military Mission, Mutual Security Act**	**US Foreign Direct Investment 1950---1966**		**Average Yearly Trade**
Cent America/ Caribbean	**50-80**	**2128**	**151**	**14**	**10.2**	**25864**	**27**	**50**			**1778**	**3192**	**8253**
Cuba	53-59	95(49)	666(28)	0	5.6(33)	8724 (6)	2	17	RP*	1950	642	0	1985
Haiti	50-80	2417(30)	71(45)	0	4.5(35)	154(16)	0	9	RP		13		142
D. Republic	50-80	6910(15)	459(35)	100	32.0(12)	110(19)	0	10	RP		106		478
Mexico	50-80	305(46)	29(48)	31	.6(46)	56(26)	0	1	RP		415	1329	4430
Guatemala	50-80	4516(19)	587(30)	70	24.2(15)	52(28)	0	4	RP	1965	106	149	354
Honduras	50-80	4504(20)	437(36)	28	43.1 (7)	22(42)	0	2	RP	1950	62	93	238
El Salvador	50-80	2634(28)	223(41)	40	18.8(19)	25(40)	0	0	RP	1954	19	41	257
Nicaragua	50-80	7242(14)	769(26)	69	96.3 (5)	22(43)	0	3	RP	1952	9	58	183
Costa Rica	50-80	7363(13)	126(43)	100	13.2(26)	43(35)	0	1	RP		60	79	264
Panama	50-80	13459(6)	1045(20)	78	109.6 (4)	10175 (5)	13	2	RP	1942	348	847	324
South America	**50-80**	**2149**	**543**	**29**	**9.8**	**707**	**0**	**11**			**2957**	**5651**	**10714**
Colombia	50-80	3370(25)	386(37)	45	12.6(28)	53(27)	0	0	RP	1974	193	459	1213
Venezuela	50-80	1058(38)	1160(17)	36	16.7(22)	92(21)	0	5	RP	1950	993	2136	3488
Ecuador	50-80	2868(27)	829(24)	16	34.2(9)	44(33)	0	1	RP		14	-	416
Peru	50-80	2219(32)	936(22)	13	19.5(18)	65(22)	0	0	RP		145	651	795
Brazil	50-80	1447(35)	324(38)	36	2.9(37)	174(17)	0	3	RP		644	882	2824
Bolivia	50-80	10052(11)	628(29)	52	38.5(8)	43(34)	0	0	RP	1956	11	-	159
Paraguay	50-80	3607(24)	492(34)	77	26.0(14)	25(41)	0	0	RP		30	-	51
Chile	50-80	6563(17)	1410(15)	41	23.6(16)	63(23)	0	1	RP	1964	540	765	724
Argentina	50-80	590(43)	535(31)	35	5.4(34)	50(30)	0	1	RP	1956	356	758	840
Uruguay	50-80	3140(26)	1506(14)	65	32.3(11)	100(20)	0	0	RP	1951	30	-	135

Table 1.1 (continued)

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11		12
Region and Country	**Duration of Relationship**	**Average Economic Aid Per Capita (rank)**	**Average Military Transfers Per Capita (rank)**	**US Military Imports as % of Total, 1964-1978**	**Average Military Training Per Capita (rank)**	**Average US Troops Stationed in Country (rank)**	**Number Major US Bases, 9/69**	**Number US Military Actions, 1946-76**	**Multilateral, Bilateral Treaties, Executive Agreements**	**Military Mission, Mutual Security Act**	**US Foreign Direct Investment 1950---1966**		**Average Yearly Trade**
Sub-Saharan Africa	**50-80**	**816**	**94**	**8**	**8**	**1117**	**1**	**10**			**299**	**1361**	**3998**
Liberia	50-80	10640 (9)	512(33)	100	17.2(21)	28(37)	0	0	EA	1951	82	124	168
Nigeria	60-80	620(42)	55(46)	12	0.4(47)	10(49)	0	0		1952	10*	219	1835
Zaire	60-80	2077(33)	261(40)	20	2.1(40)	38(36)	0	6		1963	8*	-	203
Kenya	63-80	1277(36)	291(39)	40	0.8(44)	6(50)	0	1			-	-	83
Ethiopia	50-74	852(41)	520(32)	12	5.6(32)	1225(11)	1	1			-	-	101
S Africa	50-80	0(50)	33(47)	5	0(50)	26(38)	0	0			140	490	1252
Middle East/ Africa	**50-80**	**4790**	**7337**	**37**	**7.6**	**16918**	**5**	**94**			**84**	**2093**	**7533**
Morocco	57-80	4135(23)	1208(16)	22	7.3(23)	3328(10)	1	0			-	-	158
Tunisia	56-80	11167(7)	1014(21)	38	9.7(29)	22(44)	0	0			-	-	80
Libya	51-70	10286(10)	1583(12)	1	14.2(24)	3758(9)	1	0			-	305	138
Iran	50-79	1649(34)	13351(7)	75	12.7(27)	630(13)	0	1	CE,EA	1947	-	314	1272
Turkey	50-80	4626(18)	6704(10)	72	17.4(20)	6806(7)	3	10	CE,NA,EA	1952	16	158	568
Iraq	50-67	481(45)	687(27)	0	2.4(39)	25(39)	0	4	CE*		-	-	111
Egypt	74-80	18417(5)	1551(13)	2	0.7(45)	224(16)	0	17			39	-	949
Lebanon	50-80	4325(21)	1057(19)	23	23.6(17)	646(12)	0	11			-	-	130
Jordan	50-80	26022(3)	17236(6)	78	31.7(13)	13(48)	0	10			-	-	129
Israel	68-80	100666(1)	184008(1)	93	0(50)	57(25)	0	13		1951	15	64	1460
Saudi Arabia	50-80	293(48)	52579(3)	52	7.4(30)	603(14)	0	7		1977	-	-	1737

(4) Calculated from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, US Department of State, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1973* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), Table III, and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978*, Table IV.

(5) Calculated from Defence Security Assistance Agency, US Department of Defence, *Fiscal Year Series, 1980.*

(6) US troops include all military personnel stationed in the country. Averages exclude 1951 and 1952, for which data were unavailable. These figures were calculated from work sheets provided by the directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR), US Department of Defence, Washington, D.C.

(7) Congressional Quarterly Service, *Global Defence: US Military Commitments Abroad* (September, 1969), p. 38.

(8) Military actions here include violent and non-violent responses to both domestic and international actions pertaining to the particular country. The data was obtained from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, *Political Use of the United States Armed Forces, 1946-1976* (ICPSR 7595). This data was the basis for Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: US Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington: Brookings, 1978).

(9) Includes the Rio Pact (RP), Executive Agreements (EA), Central Treaty Organisation (CE), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NA), and Mutual Defence Treaties (MDT), from Congressional Quarterly Service, *Global Defence,* p. IV. Treaties are no longer in force for countries marked with an asterisk.

(10) US Department of States, *Treaties in Force* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, January 1980). Year shown is the earliest year military mission was provided or in which the mutual Security Act was signed.

(11) 1950 figures are from US Office of Business Economics, *Direct Private Foreign Investments of the United States* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 44. 1966 figures are from US Department of Commerce, *US Direct Investment Abroad, 1966* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 31. Missing data are due to regional aggregations given in these tables, and generally reflect low levels of investment.

(12) Trade is imports plus exports, calculated from a 1978 tape based on International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade.* Where necessary this data was supplemented with data from the original source

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1.4.1. Post-war US Clients

Although the United States has maintained allies in all regions of the Third World, it is clear from this table that the strongest US cliency relationships have been with countries in the Middle East and in East Asia. These two regions accounted for 21 and 57 percent of US economic aid to all Third World countries in 1950-1980 respectively, and 41 and 55 percent of US military transfers (both sales and aid).[67] The United States has also stationed a large number of troops, maintained numerous military bases, engaged in frequent military actions (including two major wars), and made strong formal commitments to the security of countries in these regions, especially in East Asia.

In the Middle East, Israel has been the major US client, followed closely by Saudi Arabia and recently by Egypt. Since the 1967 war Israel has received US economic aid and military transfers at a higher per capita rate than any other country in the world, and has been almost exclusively dependent on the United States for sophisticated military equipment. Saudi Arabia was the third largest per capita recipient of US military transfers in 1950-1980. Egypt has rapidly emerged as a major recipient of US military and economic aid in recent years. These three countries have also figured prominently in US security arrangements for the region. Although none have concluded major formal security agreements with the United States, a variety of important informal agreements has been reached with each.

Large amounts of US military and/or economic aid have also been given to Libya (under King Idris), Iran, Turkey, and Jordan. Libya and Turkey provided the major US military bases in the region during the post-war period, each hosting a large contingent of US troops. Iran provided several important intelligence-gathering sites on the Soviet border and was the target of a major covert US intervention in 1953. Iran and Turkey were the key members of CENTO in the region, and Turkey is also a member of NATO and provided troops for the war in Vietnam. Morocco and Lebanon

can probably be considered minor US clients. Each received moderately high levels of US economic aid and military transfers. Morocco has provided a major military base for the United States, while Lebanon was sufficiently important to US policymakers to warrant major intervention in 1958 and 1983. Of the Asian countries located between Iran and Thailand shown in table 1, only Pakistan can be considered a US client or even a US ally. Although the figures shown for Pakistan in 1950-1980 do not suggest a strong cliency relationship, they are considerably higher for a period in the late 1950s and early 1960s when Pakistan played an important role in the US strategy of containing the Soviet Union and China. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and especially South Vietnam have been quintessential US clients. Each received very large volumes of US military and economic aid and participated on a large scale in US military activities in Southeast Asia. Much the same can be said for the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. Each provided major military bases for the United States and signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with it. Taiwan and South Korea were major recipients of US military and economic aid. The Philippines, with no immediate threat from its neighbours, received moderately high levels of US aid. As shown in column 8, US military forces have been used extensively in this region. The United States intervened in South Korea on a large scale in the early 1950s and on a smaller scale in the Philippines in the early 1950s and in the Formosa Straits in the late 1950s.

The US relationships with countries in Central and South America and Sub-Saharan Africa have been considerably weaker than those with countries in the Middle East and East Asia, at least in terms of the security-oriented indicators used in this table. None of the countries in these regions received high levels of per capita military transfers from the United States, although several were primarily armed by it. While a number of these countries received fairly high per capita levels of US economic aid, security concerns can clearly be identified as the primary motive for this aid only for the countries of Central America and possibly Chile. Military bases were only provided by Cuba, Panama, and Ethiopia in these regions, and these countries were the only ones in

which large numbers of US troops were stationed. US military forces were quite active in the Caribbean and in Central America, with virtually every country in these regions being the target of US intervention at some time in this century. US interventions in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa have been limited to covert actions in Chile and Zaire and counter-insurgency assistance in countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia. While all of the countries in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa shown in the table been have fairly close US allies, it would be difficult to argue that any other than Panama and possibly the Dominican Republic have had relationships with the United States approaching the levels of some countries in the Middle East and East Asia.

On the basis of this discussion, three broad categories of US clients can tentatively be identified:

Strong Cliency Relationships: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea.

Moderate Cliency Relationships: Libya, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Panama, Dominican Republic

Weak Cliency Relationships: Morocco, Lebanon, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Bolivia, Chile, Liberia, Zaire, Ethiopia.

These categories are provided to give some idea of which countries the concepts developed in this study are meant to apply to. The inclusion of many of these countries in a particular category can certainly be debated. The weak clients are best viewed as marginal cases which may have been legitimate clients for brief periods but are clearly not comparable with countries in the strong and moderate categories. The concepts developed in this study should be thought of as applying mainly to the strong and moderate clients.

1.4.2. US Motives in Establishing Cliency Relationships

Columns 11 and 12 give figures on US direct investment in 1950 and 1966 and total US trade in the periods shown in column 1 with these 50 countries. A comparison of the different regions shows that no clear relationship exists between the volume of direct investment or trade and use of the foreign policy tools shown in this table. South and Central America had highest volumes of US investment and trade of the five regions, and, with the exception of US bases and military actions in Central America, among the lowest levels of the foreign policy tools. Sub-Saharan Africa had generally the lowest volume of US investment and trade and levels of the foreign policy tools not much lower than in South America. Asia and the Middle East received the highest levels of the foreign policy tools shown but only modest volumes of investment and trade, particularly in the early post-war period. Furthermore, no significant correlation was found among the 50 countries between investment or trade and the figures shown in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6.[68]

The establishment of cliency relationships by the United States has also not been clearly associated with sources of essential raw materials. The desire to protect oil deposits and shipping routes in the Persian Gulf has certainly been an important motive in US policy toward the Middle East. However, it has not dissuaded US policymakers from giving extensive support to Israel. Other sources of strategic raw materials in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South America have evidently not warranted such attention by the United States. The countries of the Mediterranean Middle East and East Asia which have received high volumes of US security assistance do not contain, or even border on, major sources of strategic raw materials.

While the protection of foreign investment, markets, and sources of raw materials or other goods certainly cannot be ruled out, on the basis of this brief discussion, as an important US goal in establishing cliency relationships, it is clearly not by itself a sufficient explanation. Marxists such as Magdoff have suggested that US foreign policy in general is based on motives such as the desire to protect private US and Western economic interests, combat socialism, and maintain an open door for

multinational corporations.[69] Although these factors have undoubtedly influenced US foreign policy in many instances, they cannot explain why the United States has become more heavily involved in the Middle East and East Asia than in South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.[70] Furthermore, this argument does not consider the importance of economic factors such as these to US national security. This amounts to a failure to distinguish between the goals of the state and the private sector in the formulation of US foreign policy.[71] It should be added that many other explanations of US foreign policy, such as the desire to promote democracy, strengthen US allies, or extend spheres of influence, also cannot explain these regional variations.

It is clear from table 1.1 that the United States has engaged in cliency relationships mainly in areas along the borders of the Soviet Union and China where a serious threat of expansion and penetration by these countries has been perceived. The two exceptions to this pattern have been the US relationships with countries in the Mediterranean Middle East and in Central America and the Caribbean. In the latter regions the desire to combat Soviet influence in Guatemala in 1954 and throughout the area after the Cuban revolution were certainly major determinants of US policy. In the Mediterranean Middle East, Soviet involvement in Egypt under Nasser and in Iraq after 1958 were clearly of some concern to US policymakers. However, the massive US support for Israel cannot be explained solely on this basis, particularly since it increased rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s when Soviet influence in the region was declining. While US support for Israel remains something of an enigma, cultural similarities, sympathy for survivors of the Holocaust, and pro-Israeli influences in the American political process are certainly important explanatory factors.[72]

Except in the case of Israel, it thus appears that US cliency relationships in the post-war period have been motivated primarily by a desire to limit or contain advances by the Soviet Union and China. This is consistent with the strong US relationships with countries in East and Southeast Asia, in the Northern Tier and Persian Gulf regions of the Middle East, and in the Caribbean and Central America. It is also consistent with

the weaker US relationships with countries in South America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South Asia, where Soviet and Chinese advances in the 1950s and 1960s were considerably weaker. The desire to protect various economic interests has clearly been an important goal in the Persian Gulf area, in Central America, and in the Caribbean. However, other interests considered vital by US policymakers, such as protection for key allies and certain ideological goals, have undoubtedly played an important role in the establishment of cliency relationships as well.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 This definition draws on Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, *Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age,* (New York: Preager, 1984), Ch. 2, and Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 24-26 For a good collection of studies on a similar topics see Jan F. Triska, ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1986)

2 Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *The United Nations, and US Foreign Policy: A New Look at the National Interest,* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 40.

3 Burton M. Sapin, *The Making of United States Foreign Policy,* (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 1986), p. 2.

4 Ibid.

5 Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, 'National Security', David L, Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 11, (New York: The Macmillan Company & The Free Press, 1968), p. 2.

6 Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggles for Power and Peace, Brief Edition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1993), pp. 27-80.

7 Ibid., p. 10.

8 K. J. Holsty, 'The Concept of Power in the Study of International relations', *Background,* VII, e (February, 1964), p. 193.

9 P. G. Bock and Morton Berkowitz, 'The Emerging Field of National Security', *World Politics,* vol. 19, No. 1, (October, 1966), p. 122.

10 For example, the major books and articles in this field are: Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II,* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959), Robert Rothstein, *Alliance and Small power s,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), Robert L. Rothstein, *The Weak in the World of the Strong: The Developing Countries in the International System,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), David Vital, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small power in International Relations,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), David Vital, *The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small power /Great Power Conflict,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence,* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), George Liska, *Alliances and the Third World,*

(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), August Schou and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.) *Small States in International Relations,* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1971), Ronald P. Barston, *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Polices of Small States,* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1973), Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy,* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).

11 For example, 'Belgium may be small in relation to France, but Luxembourg is a small state in relation to Belgium, and France is a small state in relation to the USA. To be of any analytical use 'small state' should therefore be considered shorthand for 'a state in its relationships with greater states'.' Erling Bjoi, "The Small State in International Politics." in Schou and Brundtland, (ed.), op. cit., p. 29.

12 For example, Robert O. Keohane defines: 'A Great Power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive, on that system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systemic impact in a small group or through an international institution; a Small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never alone or in a small group make a significant impact on the system'. Keohane, 'Lilliputians' Dilemmas', op. cit., p. 296. David Vital defines the Small power based on the size of population. He limits the class of small power s to those having a population of less than 10 to 15 million in the case of economically advanced countries, and (b) less than 20 to 30 million in the case of underdeveloped countries. David Vital, *The Inequality of State: A Study of the Small power in International Relations,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 8. Ronald P. Barston suggests four possible approaches in defining the term: (1) arbitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper limit on, for example, population size, (2) measuring the 'objective' elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale, (3) analysing relative influence, and (4) identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from other classes of state. Ronald P. Barston, 'Introduction', in *The Other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States,* ed. by Ronald P. Barston (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 15.

13 Maurice A. East, 'Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models,' *World Politics,* XXV (July, 1973), p. 557.

14 Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliance and Small power s.* (New York: Columbia press, 1968), p. 29.

15 Ibid., p. 34.

16 Ibid., p. 177.

17 Ibid., p. 34.

18 Ibid., p. 177.

19 See Ole R. Holsty, P. Terrence Hopmann, and Hojn D. Sullivan, *Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies,* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 249-284.

20 Ibid., p. 3.

21 Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy,* p. 17.

22 Liska, *Nations in Alliance,* pp. 12-13.

23 Liska, *Alliance and the Third World.,* pp. 23-26, and Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy,* pp. 21-22.

24 Ibid., and John H. Herz, *Internal Politics in the Atomic Age,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 130-133.

25 US Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes.* Joint Committee print. Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, and Committee on Foreign Relations, Snate, 94th Congress, 2d Session. April 1976, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 1209.

26 Roland A. Paul, *American Military Commitments Abroad,* (New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. 6.

27 Franklin B. Weingstein categorised commitment into main concepts of commitment: 'situational" and 'non-situational.' According to Weistein, a 'situational' concept of commitment holds that 'commitments are inherent in the situation, their verbalisation is basically unimportant' In contrast, a 'non-situational' view assumes that 'the primary impetus for a commitment's fulfilment comes not from a continuing reassessment of national interests in the situation but from a conviction that a government must keep all its commitments even though, if it could reverse the clock'. Frank B. Weinstein, 'The Concept of Commitment in International Relations'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* March 1969, pp. 40-41.

28 Paul, *American Military Commitments Abroad,* pp. 8-11.

29 Liska, *Alliance and the Third World,* p. 23.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., pp. 24-26.

32 Suhrke, 'Gratuity or Tyranny', p. 509.

33 Liska, *Alliance and the Third World,* pp. 27-29.

34 Omer De Raeymaeker, *et. al.*, op. cit., pp. 27-29.

35 Vital, *The Inequality of State,* pp. 33-66.

36 Ibid., 184-186. Vital's view of inability of small power s to undertake autonomous foreign policy is shared somewhat by Wayne Ayres Wilcox. He indicates that in Asia, any form of relations with United States is considered a threat to a small power 's independence. As example, Wilcox lists Korea, Taiwan, India and Pakistan. Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *Asia and United States Policy,* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 91. For the similar view, see David A. Baldwin, "Foreign Aid, Intervention, and Influence," *World Politics,* XXI (April, 1969), p. 427.

37 Vital, *The Survival of Small States,* op. cit., p. 12.

38 Annette Baker Fox, *The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War II,* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1959), pp. 183-185, and Annette Baker Fox, "The Small States in the International System, 1919-1969," *International Journal* (Canadian Institute of International Affairs), vol. 24, No. 4 (Autumn, 1969), p. 754.

39 Fox, *The Power of Small States,* p. 2.

40 Ibid.

41 Robert O. Koehane, 'The Big Influence of Small Alliance', p. 162. This argument is inherent in Secretary of State William Rogers' comment:
'Great power does not mean great freedom of action and decision. On the contrary, it often means very narrow choices of action, and what we can do to influence events in a given case well may be marginal'. William Rogers, 'The Complexity of World Affairs', *Department of State Bulletin,* XL (May 5, 1969), p. 388.

42 Koehane, 'The Big Influence of Small,' p. 162.

43 Ronald P. Barston, (ed.), *The Other Power,* pp. 22-23.

44 Keohane, 'The Big Influence of Small Alliance', op. cit., p. 509.

45 Suhrke, 'Gratuity or Tyranny', op. cit., p. 509.

46 Ibid., pp. 508-511.

47 Ibid., p. 512.

48 Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* XII (March, 1969), p. 152.

49 Harry Eckstein, *Case-Studies and Theory in Macropolitics,* (Princeton University, July, 1971), pp. 22-54.

50 Ibid., pp. 16-22.

51 Disciplined configurative study is a comparatively tested theory to case interpretation, and thence, perhaps via *ad hoc* additions newly discovered puzzles, and systematized prudence, to new candidate-theories.

52 Ibid., p. 20.

53 Glenn D. Paig, *The Korean Decision,* p. 11.

54 This definition is similar to that given by Klaus Knorr, *The Power of Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 24-26.

55 For useful discussions about the political uses of foreign aid, see Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid'. in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.), *Why Foreign Aid?* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 70-89; Jacob J. Kaplan, *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* (New York: MacMillan, 1968). For an excellent empirical study that finds foreign policy goals to have outweighed humanitarian considerations in US aid-giving, see R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, 'A Foreign Policy Model of Bilateral Aid Allocation.' *World Politics,* vol. 30, No. 1, October 1977, pp. 58-86.

56 In the terminology of the linkage politics school, they are the main linkage groups associated with the cliency relationship. See Karl W. Deutsch, 'External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States', in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University press, 1966), p. 8. For a much broader concept of cliency which allows

for non-state actors such as multinational corporations, see Henry L. Bretton, *Patron-Client Relations: Middle Africa and the Powers* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).

57 David Collier (ed.) *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 402-403.

58 See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1991), pp. 104-106, 503-516. The critical role of the state is emphasised by Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 50-53.

59 See especially Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

60 Some useful comparative studies focusing on the breadth of participation are Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University press, 1971), pp. 232-234; and Richard Fark, 'A World Order Perspective on Authoritarianism', *Alternatives,* Vol. V, No. 2, August 1979, pp. 127-194.

61 See the classic study by C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

62 Nocos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 147-153.

63 For a broader definition of authoritarianism based on these distinctions see Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science,* Vol. III (Reading, Mass.: Addison, 1975), pp. 264-274.

64 See, for example, Lowi, *The End of Liberalism,* pp. 46-47.

65 See Michael Twaddle, *Imperialism, the State and the Third World* (London: British Academic Press, 1992), ch. 1,2.

66 Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), ch. 1, and 'State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade', *World Politics,* Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 317-347.

67 These percentages were calculated from the sources used for columns 2 and 3 of table 1.

68 The 12 correlation ranged from - .21 to .16, and none were significant at better than .10.

69 Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), ch. 1, 2.

70 For a critique of theories of imperialism along these lines, see James R. Kurth, 'Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism', in Steven J. Rosen and Kurth (eds.), *Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism* (Lexington, Nass.: D. C. Heath, 1974), pp. 12-14.

71 For an excellent theoretical discussion relating international economic issues and national security see Clark A. Nurdock, 'Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics, Scarcity, and Vulnerability', in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds.), *Economic Issues and National Security* (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977), pp. 67-98, and other contributions to this volume. On the distinction between state and private goals in US foreign policy, see Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), ch. 1, 3.

72 For a provocative study of pro-Israeli influences on US policy, see Alfred M. Lilienthal, *The Zionist Connection* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1978).

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF THE CLIENT STATE

This chapter further elucidates the concept of the client state, which was first introduced in chapter 1. Some theoretical literature on the nature of the state and on related concepts is first reviewed. This is followed by an examination of the role played by the state in the process of industrialisation. The concept of the client state is then elaborated in greater detail on the basis of this discussion, and is related to the material presented in chapter 1 by examining how a client state can emerge under a cliency relationship. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the possible consequences of the establishment of a client state for the client society and for the long-term interests of the patron power.

2.1. The State and Society

2.1.1. Definitions of State, Government, and Regime

The state is an administrative body which claims legitimacy in society by virtue of the paramount role it assumes in organising and maintaining the social structure. Its most prominent functions in fulfilling this role are: i) the maintenance of social domination, through its monopoly over the legitimate means of coercion, its ideological apparatuses, and its various redistributive and allocative organs; ii) maintenance of the economy, through actions such as fiscal and monetary policy, social welfare policies, and organisation of the economic infrastructure; and iii) the conduct of foreign policy, including co-operative and hostile relations with other states and foreign interventions on behalf of society as a whole and particular private interests.[1] The state may also undertake a variety of other tasks which may be accorded varying degrees of legitimacy.

These include foreign expansionism, self-aggrandisement, and the destruction of opposition groups and organisations.

The state is distinguished from *the government,* defined as the group of individuals who are formally authorised to exercise state power.[2] In practice this term is often used to refer to the group of top state officials whose tenure is associated with that of the head of state, such as the "Nosed government." The terms *patron government* and *client government* were used in chapter 1 to refer to the individuals who exercise state power in countries engaged in a cliency relationship. As is clear from the discussion there, the patron and client governments are the main groups directly involved in the cliency relationship.[3] The term client government will apply in any client country, regardless of whether a client state (which refers to a particular pattern of state-society relations) is said to exist. In a monarchy such as the one which existed in Iran before the 1978-1979 revolution the *royal court* refers to the titular head of state (who may or may not exercise effective state power) and his entourage.

The state is also distinguished from *the regime,* which refers to the system of governmental roles and processes, including the methods of representation, repression, and leadership selection.[4] This term is also used to refer to the period of tenure of a particular monarch or head of state having a distinctive style of leadership, such as the "Reza Shah regime". In this context "the regime" and "the government" are often used interchangeably.

2.1.2. Contending Views of State-Society Relations

Despite the legitimacy it may be granted and its control over the coercive forces and other powerful state apparatuses, the state is not independent of society and societal pressures. Rather, by its very nature the state is normally engaged in a complex web of reciprocal relations with the various groups in society. The paramount role of the state in organising and maintaining the social structure ensures that its actions are of great

interest to all domestic groups. Many of its policies inherently serve the interests of some groups at the expense of others, making it the object of competition and pressures from the groups affected by particular policies. Furthermore, the state is dependent on certain kinds of support and material resources from different groups in society. This dependence confers substantial power on these groups, enabling them to influence the state's actions. State policy consequently reflects in a general way the changing configuration of power in society, mediated through the conflicts and political processes which characterise intra-social relations.

Even though this study focuses on the patron country (US) policy making process, it is useful to review a number of conceptual frameworks which embody different views on the relationship between the state and society to understand the domestic politics of the client country. These approaches can be delineated along two principal dimensions, as shown in figure 2. The first dimension reflects the degree of equality in the influence exercised by different groups over the state. The second dimension embodies the degree to which the state's policies are actually affected by those groups which have influence over it. Five major views of state-society relations are grouped along these dimensions in figure 2. Two of these views (those of the statists and elite theorists, delineated with a question mark) do not explicitly address one or the other of these issues, and so are placed in more than one category.

- Figure 2 about here -

The pluralist conception of state-society relations holds that all groups have some influence over state policy. In this view influence is dispersed throughout society mainly because of multiple, overlapping group membership and because the state actively works to equalise group influence.[5] Prominent writers in this tradition such as

Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby argue further that these factors ensure that all groups have virtually equal influence over the state.[6] However, more recent studies, including a later work by Dahl, have found that even in countries with representative institutions certain groups are often effectively excluded from participation.[7]

A very different view is held by elite theorists and by Marxists, who argue that only one or a few particular groups can exert real influence over the state. For elite theorists, influence is limited to top politicians and bureaucrats, corporate executives, military leaders, celebrities, and the very rich. This influence is due to certain qualities which characterise the members of these groups, such as their great wealth, powerful positions, superior education, and extensive social connections.[8] Marxists argue that the class which owns the means of production has preponderant influence over the state. The preponderant influence of this class is due to the power inherent in its control over the production process. Many Marxists concede, however, that the state

Figure 2 - Different Conceptions of State-Society Relations

		Responsiveness of State Policy to Societal Pressures	
		state policy entirely determined by societal pressures (weak state)	state policy largely independent of societal pressures (strong state)
Dispersion of influence Among Groups	all groups have nearly equal influence (democratic regime)	*pluralist*	*statists(?)*
	some groups have much more influence than others (authoritarian regime)	*instrumental Marxists elite theorists (?)*	*statists(?) elite theorists (?) structural Marxists (relatively autonomous state)*

must occasionally make concessions to the lower classes in order to fully serve the interests of the dominant class.

The issue of which groups have influence over the state and are consequently served by its policies is of such importance that the state cannot be fully understood without explicitly identifying these groups. It is useful to specify the *form of state* by referring to the groups which have preponderant influence over the state and whose interests are consequently served by it. This term is adopted from the work of Nicos Poulantzas, who uses it to identify the hegemonic fraction of the class which owns the means of production.[9] The client state was defined in chapter 1 as a particular form of station in order to emphasise the idea that *domestic groups exert little or no influence over a state of this kind.*

The form of state has an important bearing on the type of regime. A *democratic regime* is one in which the state extends at least limited representation to all groups in society. An *authoritarian regime* is one in which certain groups, generally popular groups, are excluded from effective participation. The pluralist vision of universal representation clearly holds only under a democratic regime. While the views of elite theorists and Marxists imply an authoritarian regime. The type of regime can be further identified by specifying the form of representative bodies (if any exists), the degree of social mobilisation, the guiding ideology, and the mechanisms of social domination.[10]

The second dimension along which views of state-society relations are distinguished in figure 2 concerns the degree to which the state's policies are actually affected by those groups which exert effective influence over it. For pluralists, state policy is the resultant of the conflicting pressures exerted by all groups in society, and it is entirely determined by these pressures. This view reflects the liberal notion that the welfare of society is maximised when all groups are represented and when the state cannot act independently of society.[11] A very different view is taken by statists such as Krasner's, who argue that state policy is often entirely independent of societal pressures. The state frequently pursues goals which transcend class and other

distinctions. These state goals may include economic growth, full employment, national security, and domestic order. The state pursues these goals not because it is compelled to by certain groups but because they fall within the purview of its obligation to maintain the social structure.[12] To these legitimate goals may be added other state goals such as foreign aggression and self-aggrandisement which may serve only the interests of the government and which are generally pursued independently of societal pressures. The statist perspective does not explicitly address whether influence over the state is dispersed equally throughout society, and hence is placed in two categories in figure 2.

While all Marxists agree that the state ultimately serves only the interests of the class which owns the means of production, an important debate has emerged in recent Marxist literature over exactly how this occurs. In a view which resembles the pluralist argument, instrumental Marxists such as Ralph Miliband see state policy as determined entirely by pressures exerted by the dominant class. The state serves the interests of this class because its control over the means of production makes it sufficiently powerful to impose its will on the state.[13] A different view is taken by structuralists such as Poulantzas, who argue that the state is *relatively autonomous* from direct pressures by the dominant class. While the state serves the long-term interests of this class by maintaining the existing mode of production, its relative autonomy enables it to occasionally act against the immediate interests of the dominant class by making concessions to other classes. These concessions may include social welfare policies, recognition of labour unions, and limited representation in the form of free elections and other democratic processes. The state makes these concessions in order to reduce class conflict and thus preserve the hegemony of the dominant class.[14]

The pluralist/statist and instrumental/structural Marxist distinctions both concern the degree to which the state is enmeshed by the pressures and influences of various groups in society. Each can be seen as defining a continuum along which the independence of the state from society varies. For pluralists and instrumental Marxists

the state is *weak,* being dominated by pressures from those domestic groups which are represented. For statists and structural Marxists the state is *strong,* and can act to some extent independently of domestic groups.[15]

The main difference between these two approaches is that for Marxists the state ultimately serves only the interests of the class which owns the means of production, while for pluralists and statists the state's policies serve any group that wields sufficient political power. Furthermore, Marxists argue that it is the mode of production which fundamentally determines which class is dominant in society, since it identifies the dominant means of production. Consequently, even if the state is entirely independent of pressures from society it serves the interests of the dominant class simply by acting to maintain the social structure. The views of statists and structural Marxists are thus closely related, since, in the context of a capitalist mode of production, "one man's (maintenance of the social structure) is another's long-term preservation of capitalism."[16]

2.1.3. Mechanisms of Group Influence

The two dimensions along which views of state-society relations have been distinguished here each relate to the ability of different groups to pressure the state so as to obtain more favourable policies from it. As such, a society will be located along these dimensions according to the degree of influence which the different groups in it have over the state. Societies where the weakest groups are nevertheless sufficiently powerful to exert some influence will tend toward the democratic model. Those in which these groups are nearly powerless can be considered authoritarian. Societies in which the most powerful groups still have limited influence over the state are characterised by an autonomous or strong state. Those where the most powerful groups dominate the state are said to have a weak state.

In order to determine where a society lies along these two dimensions it is necessary to examine the conditions which affect the ability of different groups to influence the state. The writers discussed above identify a number of important factors which affect the amount of influence different groups can exert. These factors form a basis for characterising state-society relations along these two dimensions, and for understanding the dynamic conditions which bear on the form of state and the type of regime.

The simplest explanations of how groups influence the state are given by elite theorists such as C. Wright-Mills and by instrumental Marxists such as Gabriel Kolko and Ralph Miliband. These writers argue that state policy serves the interests of the elite or of the capitalist class because the state is primarily staffed by employees either drawn from or owing allegiance to these groups. State policymakers make decisions on the basis of their values, habits, and beliefs. These reflect their upper class backgrounds or personal connections, and hence their decisions invariably serve the interests of the upper classes. Lower class state employees undergo a process of "bourgeoisification" in which upper class values and beliefs are instilled in them.[17] Since legitimate representatives of the lower classes are not employed by the state, state policy does not serve the interests of these classes.

A second, more sophisticated explanation of group influence sees state policy as the resultant of direct pressures exerted on the state by conflicting groups, targeted at either single issues or at a broad range of policies. This general approach is taken by a variety of different writers, ranging from pluralists to instrumental Marxists. In this view the state's actions are entirely determined by direct pressures exerted on it by society. These pressures are applied to the state in the form of co-operation or opposition on particular policy issues, manipulation of public opinion, financial persuasion, coalitions with other groups, etc. The ability of groups to exert pressure in these forms depends broadly on their degree of political power relative to other groups.

The sources of this political power, and hence also the ability of different groups to influence the state, are the main issues on which writers taking this approach differ.

Pluralists hold that a broad range of factors can affect the political power of different groups. Truman summarises these in three main categories: i) a group's strategic position in society, including its social status, membership among government officials, and usefulness to the government; ii) its internal characteristics, such as its organisation, cohesion, leadership, size, and wealth; and iii) certain characteristics of state institutions, including their operating structure and group life.[18] Of these, Truman places the greatest emphasis on group organisation, cohesion, and leadership, devoting a chapter of his book to each. For pluralists such as Truman, the broad range of factors affecting group power and variations in the degree to which groups actually exert their power result in a rough parity among the groups seeking to influence the state. Thus while elite groups may have higher social status, close ties with government officials, and extensive financial resources, popular groups are generally much larger, may be better organised, and may have more effective leadership.

For Marxists such as Miliband, a group's political power depends on its relation to the means of production. Rather than denying the importance of the factors emphasised by pluralists, Miliband sees them as being structured by underlying socio-economic conditions. Ownership of the means of production confers enormous power on the capitalist class. This power is most visible in the form of financial resources, but also includes the ability to aid or frustrate state policies and act independently against other groups (such as organised labour) by using the resources owned and controlled by this class. The state has great difficulty imposing its will on the capitalist class, and must retain its confidence in order to effectively implement policies. By contrast, the only source of working class power is the strike, based on its organisation and size. Working class cohesion is often weak and its leadership corrupt. It is subject to critical attacks by the state and the media, and is weakened by political socialisation which reinforces the ideology and beliefs of the capitalist class.[19]

This explanation of group influence based on the ability of groups to directly pressure the state is much more convincing than the previous explanation based on the group membership and affiliations of state employees. Biases in state policy favouring one group or class fraction over others that are represented are due to the unequal distribution of power among these groups. Changes in the orientation of state policy to favour another group or class fraction result from changes in the underlying distribution of power. By attributing some political power to the dominated classes, this explanation can even explain why the state makes concessions to these classes, an issue which has been the subject of much debate in recent Marxist literature. However, by explaining all state actions on the basis of direct pressures by social groups, this view does not allow for the sort of state autonomy discussed by statists and structural Marxists. It cannot explain why the state may take actions which do not reflect the interests of any specific group or which are contrary to the short-term interests of the dominant classes.

An approach which sheds some light on this problem is taken by Harold Laski. Laski argues that the state is dominated by, but not subordinated to, a dominant class. Rather than acting on the basis of direct pressures, the state formulates policy on the basis of ideological beliefs and principles which reflect the interests of this class. In Laski's words: "history is meaningless when read as a struggle between competing selfish interests... it is rather the competition of ideals for survival."[20] Laski's key point, however, is that the ideology which guides the state is the ideology of the group which have seized and control state power. The state does not ultimately serve the interests of the dominant classes because of direct pressures exerted by them, but rather because they have installed it and presumably can overthrow it.[21]

This view suggests a third, indirect way in which groups can influence state policy. A group, or a coalition of groups, which is sufficiently powerful to seize the state apparatus, either by peaceful or by violent means, can install a government which is to its liking. State policy will then generally reflect the interests of this group or

coalition, since the government has been selected for its beliefs, loyalty, etc. Should the state begin to act in a manner which seriously threatens these interests it will presumably be overthrown. The state is relatively autonomous in the sense that its actions are not entirely determined by direct pressures from the dominant groups. It will nevertheless serve the long-term interests of these groups since they have installed the government and since its tenure depends on their continued support. The degree of state autonomy depends largely on the ability and willingness of the dominant groups to change the government. Should the state go too far in making concessions to other classes or in otherwise ignoring the short-term interests of the dominant classes they will take decisive action.

This explanation of indirect group influence refines and complements the other explanations discussed above. State officials *do* act in part on the basis of their values and beliefs, as emphasised by elite theorists and by instrumental Marxists. However, the important point is that these officials do not just happen to enter the government, but are selected in some manner by the dominant groups in society (or by their representatives). It is influence over this selection process, rather than the values and beliefs of particular state officials *per se,* which shapes the guiding ideology of the state and gives powerful groups inordinate, if indirect, influence.

As with direct group pressure, the ability to indirectly influence the state in this manner depends broadly on a group's political power. However, indirect group influence is based on a somewhat different set of factors than direct group influence. Seizure of the state may occur either violently through a revolution or coup d'etat or peacefully as powerful groups gain influence over the selection of state officials. In the latter case, a group's indirect influence is due to factors similar to those which affect direct influence. A violent seizure of power, however, requires that a group have sufficient size, organisation, leadership, and coercive force, or that it join in a coalition with such a group (often a military faction). Because of their size, popular groups have an inherently greater ability to seize the state violently than do elite groups.

Consequently, the state frequently seeks to neutralise threats from these groups by repressing them or by offering them concessions. Extracting concessions through the threat of violent take-over (whether latent or overt) amounts to a form of direct influence. This is, in fact, often the most potent source of influence over the state for popular groups.

2.1.4. Summary

It should be clear from this discussion that the state is, in general, bound up in a complex system of relationships with the various groups in a society. Different groups with different sources and degrees of power attempt to influence the state in order to make its policies more favourable to them. This influence may take the form of direct pressures, typified by actions such as lobbying, bribery, and agreements to exchange co-operation on one issue for another, or indirect influence in the form of political struggles to maintain or alter the form of state. The state is susceptible to direct and indirect influence because the government needs co-operation in carrying out state policies, because of the particular values and beliefs it holds, because it is corrupt, or, most importantly, because it needs support in its struggle to retain state power. The government satisfies these needs by tailoring state policy to serve the interest of the groups it is dependent on. The state is strong or autonomous to the extent that the government can resist direct pressures from the most powerful groups in society while maintaining itself in power. It maintains an authoritarian regime if it feels some sort of imperative that certain groups must be excluded and if it can effectively resist direct and indirect pressures from these groups.

2.2. The Political Economy of State-Society Relations

Before discussing how a cliency relationship can affect this complex system of state-society relations, it is useful to view some of these concepts in a more concrete and dynamic context. In this section several related studies dealing with the political economy of development are discussed. These studies examine the roles of authoritarianism and state autonomy in the process of industrialisation. Because of the paramount role of the state in structuring society and because the state is constantly subject to societal pressures, the relationship between the state and society is a key factor in the historical evolution of society. These studies illustrate how state-society relations are affected by, and how they shape, economic development. Since cliency can have a substantial impact on state-society relations, these studies also provide a useful basis for understanding the long-term consequences of cliency for economic development and for other major changes affecting the client society.

Perhaps the most famous writer taking this approach has been Barrington Moore, who argues that authoritarian exclusion of the lower classes was necessary for late industrialising countries such as Japan and Germany to achieve industrialisation. Authoritarianism emerged because of the historically weak position of the peasantry and because of economic crises associated with late development. In order to be competitive with the industrialised countries of the day, these countries had to keep low by adopting "labour repressive" polices. Authoritarianism enabled the state to enforce such policies and thus promote rapid industrialisation.[22]

A similar argument is made by Guillermo O'Donnell in the context of contemporary underdeveloped (or late-late industrialising) countries such as Brazil and Argentina. O'Donnell argues that the state was seized in these countries by a "coup coalition" seeking to resolve economic crises associated with the exhaustion of the "easy" stage of import substituting industrialisation. This group used the state apparatus to roll back industrial wages and promote capital concentration in order to "deepen" the economy by establishing a capital goods industry.[23] Other writers have

argued that the goal of this group was to implement effective stabilisation policies to curb the high inflation caused by import substitution.[24]

In a related approach, several other writers have argued that a state which is autonomous from direct pressures by the dominant classes is able to undertake the decisive policies necessary to industrialise or otherwise transform the economy. Poulantzas views autonomy as a fundamental characteristic of the "exceptional state," a form of state which corresponds to the period of transition between stages of a mode of production. This transition is brought on by the inherent contradictions of capitalism, which weaken the class which had been hegemonic in the earlier stage. The state is autonomous because of the decline of this old class and because the dominant class of the new stage is not yet sufficiently powerful to achieve hegemony. Autonomy enables the state to carry out the policies necessary to bring about transition to the new stage.[25]

Ellen Trimberger takes a similar approach, viewing autonomy as an essential precondition for the "revolutions from above" which transformed Turkey and Japan from feudal to industrialising societies. Autonomy arose in these countries because of the decline of the landowning classes and the establishment of a centralised bureaucracy. As with Poulantzas, autonomy gave the state the latitude necessary to transform the economy.[26] By contrast, Theda Skocpol argues that the state was not sufficiently autonomous in France, Russia, and China to effect such a transformation, and consequently was overthrown.[27]

The general thrust of these writers is that economic crises in late and late-late industrialising countries altered the political structure of state-society relations in such a way that the state was able to take a decisive role in transforming the economy. These crises were largely a consequence of participation in the world economy. The need to compete in foreign markets or avoid penetration of home markets by more advanced countries created strong pressures to industrialise or to establish particular industries. This made the capitalist class, or fractions of it, more powerful by giving it a more prominent role in the economy, increasing its financial resources, etc. The

strengthening of the capitalist class or particular fractions of this class changed the configuration of power among the groups competing to influence the state. For Poulantzas and Trimberger it led to the decline of the landowners or the previously hegemonic fraction, and consequently greater autonomy for the state from these old classes. For Moore and O'Donnell, together with the imperative that wages be lowered to make industry more competitive or stimulate investment, it led to the accession of a government which excluded the lower classes.

In each case, the state's freedom from direct pressures by particular groups (in the form of autonomy or authoritarianism) gave it the latitude necessary to undertake policies which led to the transformation of the economy. However, it should be emphasised that autonomy or authoritarianism as such do not necessarily guarantee that the state will attempt to transform the economy, or that it will transform it in the proper manner, or successfully. Rather, the freedom of the state from societal pressures is simply a necessary precondition for taking the decisive actions required to effect such a transformation.

Nevertheless, in the cases studied by these authors the state *did* attempt to transform the economy. It did so for two main reasons. First, in these cases the state became autonomous or authoritarian in a period of severe economic crisis. By virtue of its role as the main body charged to take some actions to relieve this crisis. Second, and more importantly, in each of these cases there were direct or indirect pressures on the state to transform the economy, and to transform it in a certain manner. In the cases of authoritarianism discussed by Moore and O'Donnell, the state came under the control of a dominant class whose interests were tied to industrialisation or to the establishment of a capital goods industry. In the exceptional state discussed by Poulantzas, indirect pressures by the capitalist class as a whole compel the state to effect transition to the next stage of capitalism. For Trimberger the autonomous bureaucratic-military coalitions which carried out revolutions from above were forced to industrialise in order to retain their control over the state.

For each of these writers, while the state was free from direct pressures by certain key groups and hence was able to undertake decisive policies, indirect pressures nevertheless compelled it to act to resolve the economic crisis by transforming the economy in a certain way. This suggests that a kind of self-regulating mechanism operates through state-society relations which bears some resemblance to the liberal vision underlying the pluralist approach. For pluralists, social welfare is maximised when all groups have equal access to the state and when state policy is entirely determined by direct pressure from these groups. In the view of the writers discussed here, direct group pressures merely hinder the state. Furthermore, a clear stratification exists in the influence different groups exert on the state, and the changes brought about by the state do not reflect the general interests of society. Nevertheless, the welfare of the dominant groups in society is maximised (in the form of state actions to resolve economic crises) because these groups retain indirect influence over the state.

2.3. The Politics of the Client State

The *main thesis* of this study is that cliency can make the state more autonomous and authoritarian by enabling the client government to undermine the sources of power of different domestic groups and thus weaken their ability to exert influence over it. This happens because the services and material resources transferred under a cliency relationship can be used by the client government to weaken both popular and elite groups. A state in which cliency has significantly contributed to authoritarianism or autonomy in this manner is referred to here as a client state.

This section brings together the material presented in chapter 1 and section 1 of this chapter to elucidate these ideas more concretely. The long-term implications of this scenario for the domestic politics of the client country and for the interests of the patron power are also briefly discussed.

2.3.1. The Relationship Between Cliency and Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism was characterised above as a type of regime in which the ability of popular groups to influence state policy is severely limited. Since popular groups generally have meagre financial resources, do not occupy positions of authority in the economy, and have weak ties with government officials, their ability to influence the state depends mainly on their ability to engage in mass action. Cliency contributes to authoritarianism to the extent that it enables the client government to undermine this basic source of popular political power.

Mass action can be used to influence state policy in a number of ways. Since the state must obtain at least some co-operation from popular groups to achieve such basic goals as domestic order and a functioning economy, strikes and boycotts can be used by these groups to gain certain concessions from the state. In the terminology developed above this is a form of direct political power. Popular demonstrations and organised acts of violence can similarly be used to win concession from the state or force it to modify particular policies.

In a competitive electoral regime mass-based political parties and popular participation in elections can dramatically change the composition of the government and hence the form of state. Short of such a dramatic change, mass action can still exert extensive influence over state policy through the electoral process. In non-democratic regimes, large-scale popular violence culminating in a revolutionary seizure of power is, of course, the ultimate recourse of disenfranchised popular groups, though one that is rarely used successfully. The possibility that they might seize state power whether through elections or through popular violence, confers enormous political power on the ascendant groups. This form of power was described above as indirect political power.

In whatever form it takes, the ability of action to influence state policy depends on the degree to which particular groups are mobilised and on the strength and

effectiveness of their leadership and political organisations. Groups in which only a small percentage of individuals are politically active are inherently weaker than highly-mobilised groups. Organisations representing under-mobilised or inarticulate groups may find it difficult to claim legitimacy and hence gain acceptance in political circles. Groups which are poorly-organised or have weak leadership cannot compete effectively with other groups and tend to respond slowly to novel or fortuitous circumstances. A cliency relationship can enable the client government to undermine popular political movements by providing it with resources which can be used to co-opt and demobilise popular groups and weaken their leadership and political organisations. These resources include military and economic aid, overt and covert interventions, and various kinds of security agreements.

Economic aid, when given in sufficient quantities, can be an important political resource in the hands of the recipient government. By augmenting domestic demand or contributing to the economic infrastructure, foreign aid can stimulate the recipient country's economy and can thus help to placate popular unrest. Greater popular satisfaction due to improved economic conditions, even if improvements are due to flows of foreign aid rather than to changes in the state's policies, can result in popular demobilisation and can thus undermine support for political movements. Aid can be particularly useful in this manner in times of economic crises, when popular unrest is generally most acute. Moreover, economic aid can be selectively allocated to particular regions or social strata, giving the recipient government a measure of flexibility in its use as a political resource.

Military and security-oriented transfers, and economic aid which allows other funds to be diverted to the security apparatus, can help the recipient government undermine political organisations and successfully combat armed movements. Special training can increase the effectiveness and morale of security forces. Transfers of sophisticated equipment can improve the capabilities of the security forces in areas that are important for maintaining domestic security, such as intelligence-gathering and

paramilitary operations. Intelligence agencies which have received assistance of this sort are generally better able to penetrate and disrupt opposition organisations. Military forces which have received sophisticated training and equipment can more effectively combat armed opposition groups. Since the threat or actual use of organised violence is often the only means of political power for popular groups, transfer which strengthen the recipient's security apparatus can severely weaken these groups.

Overt and covert interventions and security agreements calling for intervention or other assistance under certain circumstances effectively increase the size and quality of the security forces available to the recipient government. Interventions and security agreements can thus have consequences similar to, and even more drastic than, those of material transfers and training. Direct intelligence assistance and support for loyal groups by the patron can enable the client government to infiltrate opposition organisations and anticipate or undermine their programs. Covert actions by the patron such as sabotage or assassination can disrupt a group's organisational structure and undermine its leadership. Concerted actions such as these can force an organisation to restructure itself to achieve greater secrecy, reducing its efficiency. Overt interventions can, of course, have an even greater impact. They may lead to the outright defeat of armed opposition groups or force them into protracted conflicts with high attrition rates.

In addition to the direct impact of these cliency instruments, a close and enduring relationship between a patron and a client can generate a climate of fear and pessimism which may further inhibit popular mobilisation. Individuals may come to view political activity as hopeless in the face of a strong client state backed by a powerful patron. Intervention by the patron in the domestic affairs of the client country, or even evidence of the patron's willingness to intervene in the form of security agreements or interventions in nearby countries, can have a particularly depressing effect on political activity. Groups whose members have little confidence in their ability to influence the state can have little hope of doing so collectively, no matter how strong their political organisations and leadership may be.

It should be emphasised that the relationship between cliency and authoritarianism elaborated here is not merely coincidental. Since cliency is conceived primarily for the purpose of enhancing the client government's stability, the instruments which transpire under a cliency relationship are selected specifically to achieve this goal. For the most part these instruments consist of resources which can be used to repress popular political movements. However, for the relationship between cliency and authoritarianism to develope two features require to be present. Firstly, regular commitment from the patron state and secondly, weak domestic political institutions in the client state. The major exception is economic aid, which can also have important political consequences and is often used with this goal in mind. Moreover, if the client's stability is sufficiently important to the patron it will provide *whatever resources are necessary* to achieve this goal, virtually guaranteeing certain domestic political outcomes. Thus while many writers and policymakers use the term "stability" in a politically-neutral sense, its pursuit can only be regarded as an inherently political act.

2.3.2. Cliency and Relative Autonomy from Elites

A relatively autonomous state was defined above as one in which even powerful social groups have little influence over state policy. The most powerful groups in a society, even in a democratic society, are invariably elite groups of one kind or another whose power lies in their wealth, social positions, and political connections. These groups rarely engage in armed confrontation with the state, and hence security-oriented transfers have little bearing on the state's autonomy from them. Furthermore, their degree of mobilisation and the strength of their political organisations and leadership are less important as determinants of power for elite groups than for popular groups. Services and resources which enable the state to undermine a group's cohesion and political organisations also have little bearing on the state's autonomy.

Nevertheless, cliency can have important implications for the relative autonomy of the state from powerful social groups. Economic aid and other capital transfers can enable the state to play a large role in organising and financing development projects, reducing its dependence on local banks and other sectors and increasing its control over the economy. Capital transfers and special arrangements with the patron, often acting in collaboration with multinational corporations, can be used to establish state-controlled industries. This can serve to deny important sectors of the economy to private capital and further increase the state's control over it.[28] Foreign aid can also be used to displace taxes and other transfers to the state from wealthy groups, placating these groups and reducing the state's dependence on them as sources of revenue. In general, financial transfers and other policies of the patron can increase the client government's control over the economy and enable it to act with greater autonomy from powerful economic actors.

In addition to increasing the economic power of the state vis-à-vis powerful domestic groups, foreign aid can be manipulated in other ways by the patron and the client government for domestic political ends. Contracts financed under foreign aid can be awarded prejudically to gain the loyalty and support of the recipients. Foreign aid which is not tied to specific projects can be secretly channelled to key individuals or political organisations. Corruption can be used in this way to establish elaborate systems of patronage in which members of the elite become indebted to the state. Political control of this sort can fragment and weaken elite groups, allowing the state to act with greater autonomy from them.

2.3.3. The Client State

As the quantitative data presented in section 4 of chapter 1 indicated, the United States has employed the foreign policy tools referred to here as cliency instruments in varying degrees throughout the world. While the concept of cliency can be used to

refer to only those relationships where these tools have been used in substantial volume, a broad variety of cliency relationships nevertheless remain. These were characterised above as ranging from strong to weak. Given this large variation, the impact of cliency on the client's domestic politics should also vary as well, *ceteris paribus.* In order to focus on the most extreme cases, the term *client state* is used here to refer to situations in which cliency instruments have been used in sufficient volume to enable the state to act independently of domestic groups, whether strong or weak. Such a state is characterised as both autonomous and authoritarian.

It is evident that the countries referred to in chapter 1 as strong and moderate clients do not all have states which are autonomous and authoritarian, and that consequently the relationship between cliency and these domestic political outcomes is not a simple, cause-and-effect process. At least two important factors can be mentioned which mediate between cliency and these outcomes. First, the patron's commitment to the strength and stability of the client government must be sufficiently strong and durable for these consequences to occur. In countries such as Pakistan and Cambodia in the late 1950s and 1960s the commitment of the United States was, at times, very strong, but fluctuated dramatically. The client governments in these countries were consequently not able to consolidate power sufficiently to establish client states. Second, domestic political institutions must be relatively weak for the client government to be able to undertake the measures necessary to establish a client state. In Israel and to a lesser extent in Turkey, strong political parties and a highly mobilised and sophisticated populace have prevented client governments from taking these measures, despite high levels of U.S. security assistance.

Unfortunately, the international and domestic conditions bearing on the establishment of a client state can only be investigated thoroughly with detailed, comparative case studies. Such comparative studies are beyond the scope of this analysis. This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion of this study in the

context of a discussion of possible strategies for avoiding the undesirable consequences of cliency.

Since a variety of domestic and international factors other than cliency can also contribute to autonomy and authoritarianism, it may be difficult to positively identify a client state in practice. One way of doing so is to ascertain the degree of dependence of the client state on transfers from the patron by examining the consequences of a major cutback in these transfers. If the client state, as a particular form of state, is dependent on support from the patron, then withdrawal of this support should result in a change in the form of state. However, this approach is only useful in retrospective studies where the cliency relationship has ended and the client state has collapsed. Another way to identify a client state is to establish a direct causal relationship between cliency and the outcomes of autonomy and authoritarianism. If the establishment of a cliency relationship coincides closely with a substantial shift toward autonomy or authoritarianism a causal relationship may exist. A causal relationship can be more clearly verified if cliency instruments can be specifically implicated in the process of transition to autonomy or authoritarianism. Each of these approaches will be used in this study.

2.3.4. Consequences for the Client Society

The main argument of this study, then, is that a country's domestic politics can be strongly affected by international security structures in much the same way that it may be affected by international economic structures, as was discussed in section 2. This may not seem particularly surprising, nor at first glance does it seem more problematic than the impact of international economic factors on a country's politics. However, potentially serious problems may arise when a state is no longer subject to societal pressures.

Several studies were discussed in section 2 which argued that a state which is autonomous or authoritarian may be sufficiently independent of pressures from particular groups in society to fundamentally transform the economy. In the cases examined in these studies a severe economic crisis weakened certain groups, permitting the state to act without regard for their interests. With the decline of these groups the state was able to undertake policies which led to economic recovery at their expense. It pursued these policies because it felt an imperative to transform the economy, reinforced by direct or indirect pressures from other powerful groups seeking a particular type of recovery.

Should some other factor (such as cliency) weaken domestic groups and make the state more autonomous or authoritarian, the state will have the same latitude to transform the economy at the expense of these groups. However, in the absence of an economic crisis there is no clear imperative to transform the economy in a certain way. Furthermore, if the state is independent of pressures from *all* domestic groups, powerful groups will not be able to pressure the state to move the economy in a particular direction. Consequently the state may be able to pursue economic policies which are contrary to the interests of all domestic groups, and of society in general. The self-regulating mechanisms embodied in both the pluralist view and the political economy approach used in the studies discussed above may be seriously disrupted in this way. The state and society may become thoroughly *disarticulated* in the sense that the state is no longer constrained by societal pressures to pursue policies which are in the interests of either particular groups or of society as a whole.

This line of reasoning can be extended to other areas in which the state may take a leading role in transforming society. Areas of particular interest in the case of Iran are Westernisation and secularisation. A state which is free from societal pressures can undertake policies to transform society in any manner it sees fit. Having undermined the political power of both the nationalist movement and the clergy in the 1950s and 1960s, the client state in Iran was able to undertake Western-oriented development

projects, establish close ties with governments and businesses in the West, and introduce a series of reforms which conflicted with traditional Islamic values. These policies were strongly opposed by many sectors of society and contributed to popular dissatisfaction with the state.

Another area in which cliency can greatly strengthen the client state and result in a similar disarticulation between the state and groups seeking to pressure it is in regional relations between a client country and its neighbours. A client whose military forces are enhanced to the point where it achieves regional hegemony obviously cannot be pressured by military threats from other countries in the area. Such a country may become so powerful that it is in a position to impose its will on all other countries in the region. The self-regulating mechanism which operates in this case is the regional *balance of power*, a concept with liberal origins similar to those of pluralism.[29] Israel has been the prototypic example of this pattern in recent years. While this is an area of obvious theoretical importance and of direct relevance for U.S. interests in the Middle East, it lies beyond the scope of the present study.

The disarticulation of state-society relations or of regional relations can have serious long-term consequences for both the patron and the client. In the absence of pressures from domestic groups, the client state is free to pursue policies of its own choosing. These may be quite unpopular, or may be contrary to the interests of particular groups. The client state's economic policies may be unsuitable for prevailing domestic and international conditions and may lead to severe economic problems in the future. Its policies in other areas such as land reform, income redistribution, political participation, and cultural or religious issues may cause great popular dissatisfaction. Over a period of time the cumulative effects of bad economic policy or popular discontent may lead to increasing instability. Aggressive actions against neighbouring countries may provoke military build-ups, the entrance of other superpowers into the region, and other reprisals, and may dangerously drain the client's economy.

These various consequences present a serious *paradox* for the patron. While its initial motive in establishing a cliency relationship may have been a desire to obtain a strong and stable regional ally, the long-term consequences of its involvement may in fact produce quite the opposite result. This issue will be discussed further in the conclusion of this study with particular reference to the case of Iran.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 This view of the state draws heavily on Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, 3 Vols., ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), especially pp. 54-56, 333-337, and chs. 9-11; and on Harold Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice* (New York: Viking Press, 1935), chs. 1-2. A useful discussion which also draws on Weber is Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 24-33.

2 This definition is from David E. Apter, 'Government', in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* Vol. 6, (Mcmillan, 1968), pp. 214-230. On the distinction between state and government see Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice,* pp. 10-14.

3 In the terminology of the linkage politics school, they are the main linkage groups associated with the cliency relationship. See Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behaviour of States," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University press, 1966), p. 8. For a much broader concept of cliency which allows for non-state actors such as multinational corporations, see Henry L. Brotton, *Patron-Client Relations: Middle Africa and the Powers* (New York: General Learning Press, 1971).

4 This definition is adopted from David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 402-403.

5 See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), pp. 104-106, 503-516. The critical role of the state is emphasised by Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969), especially pp. 50-53.

6 See especially Nelson W. Polsby, *Community Power and Political Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); and Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

7 Some useful comparative studies focusing on the breadth of participation are Robert A. Dahl, *Polvarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 232-234; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 290-291; and Richard Falk, 'A World Order perspective on Authoritarianism, *Alternatives,* Vol. V, No. 2, August 1979, pp. 127-194.

8 See the classic study by C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

9 Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes* (London: New Left Books, 1973), pp. 147-153.

10 For a broader definition of authoritarianism based on these distinctions see Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,' in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science, Vol. III* (Reading, Mass: Addison, 1975), pp. 264-274.

11 See, for example, Lowi, *The End of Liberalism,* pp. 46-47.

12 Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), ch. 1, and 'State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade', *World Politics,* Vol. 28, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 317-347.

13 Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

14 Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, See also the articles by Poulantzas and Miliband in Robin Blackburn (ed.), *Ideology in Social Science* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). For a useful discussion of instrumental and structural Marxist views on the state see David A. Gold, Clarence Y. H. Lo, and Erik Olin Wright, 'Recent Developments in Marxist Theories of the Capitalist State', *Monthly Review,* Vol. 27, No. 5, October 1975, pp. 29-43, and Vol. 27, No. 6, November 1975, pp. 36-51. A similar concept of state autonomy is discussed from a different perspective by J. P. Nettl, 'The State as a Conceptual Variable', *World Politics,* Vol. 20, No. 4, July 1968, pp. 564-565.

15 The concepts of the strong and weak state are from Krasner, *Defending the National Interest,* pp. 55-61.

16 Krasner, Ibid., p. 32.

17 Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society,* ch. 3. Miliband also argues that groups influence the state by exerting direct pressure on it. See footnote 19, below. Another instrumental Marxist taking this approach is Gabriel Kolko, *The Roots of American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Bracon Press, 1969).

18 Truman, *The Governmental Process,* pp. 506-507.

19 Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society,* chs. 6-8.

20 Laski, *The State in Theory and Practice,* p. 101.

21 Ibid., pp. 93-102.

22 Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), ch. 8. Moore argues that authoritarianism characterised both the fascist and pre-fascist periods in these countries.

23 Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institutes of International Studies, 1973). O'Donnel has since minified his argument somewhat; see his 'Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State', *Latin American Research Review,* Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1978, pp. 3-38. For a number of excellent critiques and extensions of O'Donnell's work, see Collier, *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America.*

24 see, for example, Robert R. Kaufman, 'Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule in Latin America: A Concrete Review of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model,' in *Ibid.,* pp. 165-253; and Thomas E. Skidmore, 'The Politics of Economic Stabilisation in Post-war Latin America,' in James M. Malloy (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), pp. 149-190.

25 Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship* (London: New Left Books, 1974).

26 Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution From Above* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1977). Trimberger employs a somewhat different, essentially non-Marxist, concept of autonomy. See pp. 47-51.

27 Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions,* pp. 47-51.

28 For a provocative study of the role of the state and state enterprises in the development of Brazil, see Peter Evans, *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State, and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

29 Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations,* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), PP. 142-185.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF US FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY MAKING

3.1. Introduction

This chapter shall attempt to trace the philosophy of US foreign and security policy making. Every state has a foreign and security policy. To create and manage such a policy is essential to its existence as an independent actor in an international system dominated by the power, prestige, and influence of other nation-states with different cultural experiences, historical traditions, institutional structures, national goals, and political aspirations. As long as there is no universal agreement as to the moral, ethical, and legal codes which might govern the behaviour of nation-states towards one another, tensions will persist, conflicts of interest will arise which will have to be tolerated, accommodated, and resolved. Hence, a given state's reactions to other nations will continue to dominate the abstract analysis of academics and the operational policies of decision makers. It means that nation-states and their foreign policy will continue to be explained in the continuing and interlocking tensions of domestic and foreign realities.

Before examining the case study of US security policy towards Iran in part two, it is essential to broadly understand the philosophy of US foreign policy-making. Because reviewing the historical precedents and philosophical roots at the base of the US political system, can facilitate the objective and symmetric criticism of US security policy towards a Third World state. After briefly discussing the American culture, we shall trace the five typical characteristics of US philosophy in policy-making, beginning with Isolationism. However, to obtain the characteristics of the philosophy of US

policy making in general, this chapter will not only focus on the specific aspects of US-Iran relations but also on significant global and historical situations.

Foreign policy decisions are made in the context of the political culture, or set of attitudes towards politics, of the society in which the decisions are made. In some countries, the political culture may be diverse, with several sets of values competing for authority. The United States is unique among the great powers (with the possible exception of Britain) in having a political culture which is the opposite. It is not only extremely homogeneous, but it has also been highly stable ever since the US entered the international arena. The continuity, stability, and uniformity of its government, politics and attitudes towards America's place in the world means that an examination of its conservative culture and traditions is perhaps more important than when considering other countries, in which other factors such as geography, size or economic circumstances may go a long way towards creating a general understanding.

American foreign and security policy itself appears, at a first glance far from being consistent. It would appear to have undergone monumental changes during its history. Following the entangling alliance with France during the revolutionary war, there was a century and more of neutralism, succeeded quite suddenly by a switch to hegemony and involvement on a scale which has caused some observers to accuse the United States of attempting to create a world empire since 1945. The neutralist phase itself was interrupted by the War of 1812, by a burst of imperialism in the 1890s, by enforced intervention in each of the two world wars of this century, and by brief periods of diplomatic leadership, Great-Power style, in the 1900s and in the aftermath of World War I. Yet beneath these apparent alternations between active and passive foreign policy, it is possible to discern an entirely consistent pattern, as Hans J. Morgenthau has argued in his book *In Defence of the National Interest*[1] and elsewhere. In its simplest form, this pattern has consisted, first, of an assertion of United States dominance in the Western hemisphere, comprising the north and south American continents, the Caribbean, and the Pacific Ocean at least as far as Hawaii. This hemispheric hegemony

might be described as the "vital interest" of the United States in relatively narrow sense, and it was established in the early stages of emergence of the United States of America. Further, it has been a traditional and consistent US foreign policy to support a general balance of power in Europe in order to prevent the growth of any one super-power there which might pose a major threat across the Atlantic Ocean. In the same way, the United States has been concerned to establish and maintain a rough balance of power in the Far East, although the complexities of the Asian environment have given little opportunity for a coherent US foreign policy to emerge during the period since its first diplomatic intervention in Asia in 1899. This elementary formula, control of the Western hemisphere plus intervention on the side of the weaker powers whenever the balance seemed to be in danger in Europe or Asia, does give some understanding of US foreign policy, partiality before 1945. But it is by no means a comprehensive explanation, and it gives no impression of the distinctively American philosophy of foreign affairs which was first expressed in President Washington's celebrated 'Farewell Address' and which is necessary to an understanding of the attitudes of successive generations of American national leaders which in turn gives the foreign policy of the country its diplomatic 'style', and has its roots in the national character and historical experience of the American people.

3.2. Isolationism

3.2.1. Early Isolationism

No adequate understanding of post-1945 (post-war) American foreign policy is possible without insight into the isolationist mentality which governed the diplomatic behaviour of the United States from the founding of the republic down to World War II. An understanding of the isolationist viewpoint is essential for two reasons. The first is that every state's foreign policy is to a significant degree an outgrowth of its diplomatic

history and experience. To cite merely two examples: It is impossible to comprehend modern United States - Latin American relations without at least a rudimentary awareness of the issuance and evolution of the Monroe Doctrine; or, from the end of World War II until the termination of the Vietnam War. American foreign policy was massively influenced by "the lessons of the 1930", when the United States (along with the Allied powers of Europe) failed to act decisively against German, Italian, Japanese, and other sources of aggression. Presidents Truman and Johnson, for example, repeatedly cited these lessons as justification for their staunch opposition to Communist expansionism after 1945.[2]

The second reason why attention must be devoted to the isolationist period and viewpoint is that many vestiges of a traditional isolationist mentality continue to influence public and official attitudes toward foreign affairs in the United States. When the United States took the lead in establishing, and later joined, the United Nations in 1945, isolationism was officially repudiated as the guiding principle of American foreign policy. Two years later - when the Truman Administration enunciated the "Truman Doctrine" (or containment strategy) for resisting Communist expansionism, the United States committed itself to an "interventionist" foreign policy. Implementing this strategy required the state to assume defence and diplomatic obligations throughout the world and led to active American involvement in every major region. Despite these developments, new forms of isolationist thought evolved after World War II. These neo-isolationism and tendencies drew heavily from the more traditional isolationist approach; and many of the underlying assumptions made by devotees of the old and the new isolationism were identical or remarkably similar.[3]

Isolationism has pervaded the American approach to foreign relations since the earliest days of the republic. America's pattern of isolationist thought is well illustrated by its foreign policies during the 1920s and 1930s. What is not so widely recognised is that isolationism goes much deeper than merely the desire to avoid foreign entanglements. It is above all a habit of mind, a cluster of national attitudes, a feeling

of spiritual separation from other countries, especially Europe, with roots penetrating deeply into the nation's heritage and experience.[4]

Isolationism is more than a doctrine advanced to explain the objective facts of America's geographical relationship with the rest of world. Instead, it is supposed to explain what American people believe to be the proper relationship between themselves and other countries. Isolationist thinking permeates the American cultural experience, its philosophy, and what may be called more generally (the American way of life.) It is basically a conviction that Americans are different from other people; that they do not look to foreigners for guidance but that foreigners should look to them; that their national destiny is to serve as a beacon to pilot all mankind into new paths of greatness - but that all this should be done primarily by precept and example.[5]

The influences that have contributed to isolationist thinking are many and complex. Here we can do no more than allude to some of the more important ones. The desire for separation from the vicissitudes of Europe brought settlers to the New world. The wish to begin life anew, to leave behind the turmoil, the hopelessness, the bigotry of the Old world - these ambitions brought the religious dissenter, the skilled artisan, the speculator, and the felon to American shores. From all walks of life they came, and with one objective: to find a new birth, as it were, in a far-off continent.

The American revolution cut the political ties with England, and as the years passed, Americans came to believe more firmly than ever in their uniqueness. Presidents Washington and Jefferson both cautioned their countryman and countrywoman that America and Europe had different interests and advised that America's best course was to concentrate on keeping these interests distinct.[6] Very early in the nation's history, isolationism became the underlying principle of foreign policy. So, one pretext after another was found to justify America's refusal to honour the French alliance during the Napoleon wars. President Monroe in 1823 asserted that the United States had but one objective in its relations with the Old world: a free translation of Monroe's admonitions would be that America wanted the European

countries to mind their own business and, if they must persist in power struggles, to keep them out of the Western hemisphere. The United States, shielded by the British navy, experienced remarkably few challenges to the Monroe Doctrine during the course of almost a century.[7]

From the Monroe Doctrine until World War II the American people were profoundly isolationist. We must regard participation in World War I as an interlude. Its politico-strategic significance generally passed unnoticed within the United States. After World War I, Americans looked forward to a return to "normalcy", or preoccupation with domestic affairs; they quickly became disillusioned with foreign affairs, preferring to "let Europe stew in its own juice" and to refrain from participation in the League of Nations. For example, the United States was prepared to do little more than reprimand Japan verbally for its aggression against Manchuria in the early 1930s; and it was unwilling to join with other countries in dealing decisively with numerous instances of Axis expansionism in the years which followed. Shaken by the impact of the Great Depression, the American society was overwhelmingly preoccupied with internal problems. Many leading isolationists remained convinced until Pearl Harbour in 1941 that America would escape involvement in another global conflict. Americans believed that creation of their 'new society' demanded almost exclusive attention to domestic problems and pursuits. This fact prompted one of the nation's leading historians, and in time a prominent spokesman for the isolationist viewpoint, Charles A. Beard, to prefer the term continentalism to isolationism in describing the nation's foreign policy stance. A more recent observer, Max Lerner, has emphasised basically the same idea, but with the additional thought that isolationism and post-World War II interventionism (or internationalism) shared a common goal: both were ultimately designed to enable American society to devote itself chiefly to internal pursuits.[8]

The isolationist principle found concrete expression in several diplomatic behaviour patterns and propensities. The best-known perhaps was America's traditional refusal to enter into military alliances with other countries; the concept of 'no

entangling alliances' was consistently adhered to until after World War II. Isolationism also dictated the nation's non-intervention in European political conflicts except (as President Monroe's message provided) when America's own security interests were directly affected. A position of 'neutrality' toward Europe's war - a stance which the United States tried to maintain in the early stage of both the First and Second World Wars - was also a component of isolationism. Another element in the isolationist approach was what was sometimes called the Doctrine of "a free hand": the United States would preserve maximum freedom of action diplomatically. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine (and, some 75 years later, the 'Open Door Policy" toward Asia) was issued unilaterally by the United States; and Washington remained the sole interpreter of these policies.[9] The Carter Doctrine issued early in 1980 was a recent example of another important unilateral foreign policy declaration by the United States, committing America to the defence of the Persian Gulf area.[10]

The isolationist approach to external questions was marked by two conspicuous omissions. One of these was a clear American understanding of the role of power, particularly armed force, in global political relationships. Few Americans were aware (and many may still be unaware) that during most of the nineteenth century the British fleet largely provided whatever 'enforcement' was needed to gain international compliance with the Monroe Doctrine. Not until after World War II did Americans accept the idea that an adequate and modern military establishment is essential for the achievement of many major foreign policy goals.

The second fundamental weakness in the isolationist viewpoint was the failure to comprehend, and to modify national policies in the light of, significant changes in the nature of the international system. Innumerable examples of this weakness might be cited. One was America's failure to comprehend the implications of the emergence of an increasingly powerful and assertive Japan after 1900. Another was the lack of awareness in the United States of the steady decline in British power in the twentieth century. After World War II, Great Britain no longer ranked among the more powerful

members of the international system. Among its other consequences, this British decline meant that in instance after instance (and the issuance of the 'Truman Doctrine' to protect the security of Greece was an example), the United States was compelled to assume international obligations once borne by Great Britain and its empire. Rapid and ongoing technological changes, the emergence of airpower, and the growing firepower of modern weapons - rendered all nations more vulnerable and largely cancelled out many of the security advantages which geographical barriers (like the Atlantic Ocean or the Arctic icecap) had given the United States. Still another reality largely ignored by isolationists was America's own growing dependence upon a long list of 'strategic' imports from abroad. Insofar as economic self-sufficiency had sustained the isolationist position throughout much of the nation's history, by 1940 this precondition of successful isolationism was rapidly being superseded by new realisation in which the prosperity and security of the United States depended as never before upon access to raw materials import and upon continuing sales of American goods overseas.

3.2.2. Isolationism after World War II

World War II ended the era of classical American isolationism. Habits of mind, prejudices, and in some cases misconceptions which had nourished the traditional isolationist approach continued to survive and to influence the US behaviour in foreign affairs. Yet neither the historic isolationist nor the newer neo-isolationist viewpoint comprised a unified, logically consistent 'system' of thought. In the isolationist approach, as other points of view about the country proper diplomatic course, the American penchant for eclecticism could be discerned. Today, as in the past, isolationists often advocate incompatible ideas and favour mutually exclusive courses of action.

In the post-war period, however, two broad schools of isolationist thought could be identified. One of these could be labelled 'liberal neo-isolationism' and was often

espoused by liberal spokesmen in the Democratic and Republican parties, as well as by prominent citizens' organisations.[11] Contemporary liberal neo-isolationism draws freely from the old isolationist tradition. Prominent themes in liberal neo-isolationist thought are the ideas that the United States should avoid relying upon military force to achieve its diplomatic objectives; that Washington should lean heavily upon the United Nations and upon international law to accomplish its external objectives; that it should respond generously to the economic needs of the Third World; that the United States should become identified with, and should support, revolutionary political movements abroad, which are directed at abolishing the status quo and creating more equitable social, economic and political systems in other societies; that American officials should directly encourage and support the emergence of democracy in other countries. Many contemporary liberal neo-isolationists believe that the most effective influence which America can exert upon the international system is the power of its own example in successfully eliminating racial conflicts, eradicating poverty, and providing equal opportunities for all citizens within its own borders.

The basic premise of the liberal neo-isolationist was that extensive American involvement in the affairs of other countries was objectionable for two reasons: more often than not (as in the case of Vietnam), it compounded the foreign society's problems and resulted ultimately in lessened American power and influence in the region; and it was highly inimical to American domestic programmes and goals, causing the state to neglect pressing internal problems, producing a high level of internal dissension over foreign policy issues, and leading to the emergency of the 'imperial presidency' over which Congress and the American people had little control.[12]

The conservative version of neo-isolationism shared the same basic goal - retrenchment in the country's overseas commitments - but it supported this conclusion for different reasons.[13] Advocates of conservative neo-isolationism today share the view of traditional isolationist that the international environment is in the main inimical

to the achievement of American foreign policy goals. Even more than in the late nineteenth century, or in the early post-war period, the external milieu is unfavourable for the beneficial application of American power. Soviet Russia's continuing military build-up (vis-à-vis a relative decline in American defence spending); Western Europe's apparent continued indifference to the problem of its own defence; continuing political upheaval and instability throughout the Third World; America's failure to use its military power to achieve 'victory' in the Vietnam War; the country's steadily worsening balance-of-payments deficit, created in large part by the policies of the Middle East oil-producing states - such developments convinced conservative neo-isolationists that the 'internationalism' practised by the United States for some 25 years after World War II achieved few beneficial results.

As was also true of liberal neo-isolationism, the conservative variety was far from monolithic.[14] Its proponents differed widely, for example, on the precise criteria which ought to govern American interventionism abroad and concerning the countries and regions whose security constituted a 'vital interest' for the United States. An early version of conservative neo-isolationism - advocated by ex-US President, Herbert Hoover during the 1950s - was the 'Fortress America' strategy.[15] The United States should confine its diplomatic and military activities abroad largely to the Western Hemisphere. A more recent proposal in this vein urges the United States to concentrate its diplomatic and security efforts on the "Northern Hemisphere" - more specifically, Europe and Japan - where its vital interests supposedly lie. Implicit in this approach is the idea that most developments in the Third World are of marginal importance to the United States.[16] A more recent alternative proposal, advocated by a former US State and Defence Department official, calls for the United States to reformulate its diplomatic strategy around the concept of the seas and a long list of countries (from Western Europe to East Asia) where American commercial interests lie.[17] As is evident, securing agreement upon the criteria which ought to be employed for defining

America's 'vital interest' poses as much difficulty for conservative neo-isolationism as for other approaches to American foreign policy.

3.3. The Ideology: Liberalism and its Critics

3.3.1. Liberalism

An optimistic interpretation of the relationship between capitalism and democracy is central to the driving ideology of US foreign policy: the ideology of liberalism. It is, of course, conventional for practitioners and defenders of American foreign policy to deny that it has an ideology. It certainly has goals, but ideology, no. Writing in 1945, Thomas Bailey outlined the traditional goals or 'fundamental policies' as: isolation, non-intervention or nonentanglement; the Monroe Doctrine (the protection of a sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere); freedom of the seas; the Open Door (especially in China) - the 'right of American citizens to engage in industry abroad on an equal basis with other foreigners'; pacific settlement of disputes; Pan-Americanism; and opportunism (minor adjustments without reference to fundamentals).[18] The principal post-1945 goal was the containment of communism, an objective to be achieved within an internationalist policy context. But, as for ideology, it is, according to Arthur Schlesinger, "out of character" for pragmatic Americans.[19] Of course, 'ideology' bears many meanings and, no doubt, the term can be defined so as to separate it from American liberal pragmatism. Such a separation, however, seems to serve little purpose other than the polemical one of being able to characterise opposing positions as 'ideological': over-zealous, dogmatic, undemocratic, totalitarian. Within Marxism, 'ideology' embraces both 'false consciousness' and forms of thought which function to preserve or represent class interests. For the Marxist, obviously, there is no question as to the 'ideological' status of ideas underpinning and seeking to justify US foreign policy. Outside Marxism, 'ideology' may be defined as 'more or less coherent

collections of political beliefs and values which take a doctrine and identifiable shape' or 'value system'. In these senses, US liberalism is clearly an ideology among other ideologies, and it is worth remembering that Louis Hartz, the most celebrated modern interpreter of American liberalism, had no doubts about this.[20]

American democratic liberalism, whose main progenitor was John Locke, may be characterised as embodying commitments to the interdependence of democracy and capitalism; to individual liberty and the protection of private property; to limited government, the rule of law, natural rights, the perfectibility of human institutions, and to the possibility of human progress. It is allied with a strong sense of national mission and American exceptionalism; the belief that American democratic history provides a model for the world. At its heart, Lockeian liberalism embraces a commitment both to national self-determination and to the view that the world belongs to the industrious and the rational.[21] Enemies of liberalism are, on the right, conservative ideologies which exude pessimism about the possibility of progress through human agency; and, on the left, ideologies which assert that human freedom may only be realised through a transcendence of private property and capitalism. As an ideology underpinning US foreign policy, liberalism oscillates between the poles of non-entanglement and interventionist internationalism. Historical in Presidential age Washington's farewell address, non-entanglement has been held up as a consequence of American exceptionalism. Non-entanglement would allow the United States to shape its frontier destiny, remain aloof from distant quarrels, and provide a model for the world in the process.

With the closing of the frontier and, especially, with US assumption of global leadership after 1945, non-entanglement gave way to the liberal internationalist ideal: the protection and promotion of liberal, capitalist values on a global scale. President Woodrow Wilson appropriated the term 'liberal' to justify American entry into World War I. Liberal internationalists like President Franklin Roosevelt used the denigratory label 'isolationist' to stigmatise the older, non-entanglement tradition.[22] After 1945, the

cause of liberal internationalism became inextricably bound up with the idea of 'containing' expansionist, Soviet-directed communism. Containment, articulated within a culture of self-righteous anti-communism, was always a rather unsatisfactory concept. Its progenitor, George Kennan, came to disagree with the global interpretation of containment advanced by the Truman administration. When tied to a defensive vocabulary, and particularly when used to underpin 'limited' wars, containment also conflicted with the crusading, quasimassianic tone of US liberal internationalism.[23]

3.3.2. Alternatives to Liberalism

Within the history of US policy making what alternatives have been presented to liberal ideology? There are at least five candidates: self-interested realism; conservatism; isolationism; Wilsonian idealism; and left liberalism. These will now, very briefly, be considered in sequence, with the underlying implication that they are most appropriately viewed as variants on and tendencies within the overarching liberal ideology. This is not to suggest however that there are not real and important differences between these points of view - between, for example, self-interested realism and left liberalism. But it is not being argued here that voters in liberal, capitalist democracies are offered no 'real' choice in these matters. It is also the case that both realism and conservatism have the potential to constitute ideologies antagonistic to Lockeian liberalism. Rather, the point is that, at least in the American context, these viewpoints have exhibited a large measure of convergence, and an unwillingness to challenge the dominant liberal ideology. Even accounts of American foreign policy which stress its moral idealism and evangelising mission generally acknowledge the role of national interests. The dialectical tension between 'ideals' and 'self-interest' lies at the heart of conventional treatments of US foreign relations.[24] Robert Garson puts the point well: 'foreign policy is the result of the intermingling of preconceived assumptions (ideology if you like) and calculations about the national interests.'[25] A

full-blown realist interpretation would have that US foreign policy achieves rationality and purpose only to the extent that it embodies accurate, power-oriented, calculations of national interest. Arguing against the legacy of Wilsonian idealism, Nicholas Spykman wrote in *America's Strategy in World Politics* that the 'preservation and improvement of their power position' constitutes the goal of state's foreign policies.[26] The point to be made here, however, is that power-based, national interest-oriented realism has been an influence upon, rather than a substitute for, the liberal ideology of US foreign policy. Realist, geopolitical ideology in recent American foreign policy has operated as a facet of liberal internationalism, which itself embodies a firm (if usually unstated) commitment to the national interest. Realism has had an important effect on the history of the Cold War. Realist critics of the American involvement in Vietnam contributed decisively to the changing public debate over the war. However, when self-proclaimed upholders of real politic have guided US foreign policy, they have altered the direction of American diplomacy rather than its underlying foundations and assumptions.[27]

Conservative foreign policy positions in the United States tend to be identified with a strong commitment to high levels of defence spending and an intense level of anti-communism. They also are inclined to romantic notions about the assertion of American power. A version of conservatism has been articulated in recent years by writers like Norman Podhoretz and Irving Kristol. Hostile to the perceived foreign policy practices and legacy of the Carter Administration, these 'neo-conservatives' exhibit a self consciously tough-minded world outlook; they also have a firm commitment to free market liberalism and reject welfare capitalism. Again, such views may be regarded as constituting a variant of, or tendency within, liberal internationalism rather than as an alternative to it. Nonetheless, conservatism, especially in its scepticism toward perfectibility of human institutions, can be said to represent a genuine alternative to liberalism. From a 'neo-conservative' position, Jeane Kirkpatrick has berated liberals for failing to acknowledge the existence of 'human wickedness', taking refuge in 'pale euphemisms and blind theories of inevitable human

progress'.[28] An authentic conservative tradition does exist within the history of American foreign policy: anti-imperialists, anxious about American security, sceptical about 'Manifest Destiny' and national missions, concerned above all with the preservation of liberty at home. Defined in these terms, conservative sentiments were expressed by Daniel Webster at the time of the acquisition of California and New Mexico (1846-48) by the United States from Mexico. Webster feared the growth of an American imperialism: 'this country should exhibit to the world the example of a powerful republic, without greediness and hunger of empire'.[29] Henry Clay argued in 1852 that the best way for the United States to show 'to other nations the way to greatness and happiness' was by maintaining liberty at home as a model for imitation. Samuel Flagg Bemis, diplomatic historian and celebrator of American liberty as expressed in the foreign policy wrote in 1936 that, after 1898, the American people decided to acquire an empire and take their place in the world: 'Actually, the United States had already taken its proper place in the world before 1898. That was in North America'.

Robert Taft also developed a coherent conservative position during the Korean conflict (1950-53). One aspect of this perspective concentrated on the domestic effects of war: partly inflation, but also the inevitable domestic militarisation and centralisation of power. Another related to the constitutional issues of excessive executive unaccountability and secrecy. This Republican Senator from Ohio also stressed the dangers of America 'becoming an imperialistic nation', which failed to recognise the moral and practical 'limitations on what the United States can do'.[30] This anti-imperialist strain within American conservatism was to generate a debate in the 1970s on the putative continuity between older conservative and Vietnam generation - New Left positions. During the Korean war, Taft pointed to the possibility that interventionist liberalism might destroy the rights and lives of people the US intended to defend against communism. In *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, Taft argued that foreign remote peoples to be free ran counter to American democratic ideals.[31] Taft

himself saw these democratic ideals as liberal: individual liberties defined within the context of market liberalism and governmental non-interference. If we define liberalism in these terms, and also note that American liberalism embodies a strong commitment to the idea of America's special mission to protect liberty, we see here a major problem with the articulation of American conservative passions which inevitably tend to spin towards liberalist traditions. As Richard Crockatt has put it, the US lacks a tradition which unites the European organic conservatism of Edmund Burke and the dirigisme of Alexander Hamilton.[32] Taftian conservatism, although taken up in later years by conservative intellectuals like Karl Hess, in any case found it hard to survive the Cold War. Anti- imperialist criticisms of the Vietnam war came from the Left rather than the Right of the political spectrum. In this connection, a comparison of Barry Goldwater's hawkish Why Not Victory?(1962) with Taft's fears about the creation of a 'garrison state' in *A Foreign Policy for Americans is instructive.*[33]

The main tenets of the foreign policy idealism associated with President Woodrow Wilson were outlined in Wilson's 1918 'Fourteen Points' speech: open diplomacy, anti-colonialism and self-determination, free trade. This idealistic internationalism was to find echoes in the 'world order' internationalism of the Carter Administration.[34] Clearly, however, neither Wilson's nor Carter's internationalism were outside the ambit of liberal ideology. On the contrary, both were driven by a notion of human perfectibility guided by the example of American democracy and responsiveness to the needs of American capitalism. Wilson declared in 1912 that US producers had 'expanded to such a point that they will burst their jackets if they cannot find a free outlet to the markets of the world'. T.J. McCormick, summarising the work of 'corporatist' historians, equates 'Wilsonianism' with 'globalised corporatism'; ('Americanised corporatism' is defined as 'a sort of corporate, pro-capitalist reformism'). Carter's policies were affected, at least temporarily, by the programme for post-Vietnam inter-capitalist co-operation advanced by the Trilateral Commission. Both Wilson and Carter, in fact, oscillated between 'idealist' and 'realist' versions of

liberalism. Wilson intervened in six Latin American conflicts to secure regimes acceptable to the United States government. American troops fought against the Red Army in the Russian civil war. The Carter Presidency, overtaken by events, had by 1980 adopted a confrontational posture towards the Soviet Union.[35]

Left liberalism may be regarded as an attempt to take Wilsonian idealism seriously: to amputate its interventionist and militarist tendencies. Former vice-president Henry Wallace advocated open diplomacy with the USSR in the late 1940s. He attacked the Baruch Plan of 1946 (to set up an international atomic development authority) as insufficiently generous in its promise to share knowledge of atomic energy. In 1947, he admonished: 'Once America stands for opposition to change, we are lost'. Unthinking counter-revolutionism would lead to America becoming 'the most hated nation in the world'.[36] Wallace was attacked as an appeaser and dismissed as Secretary of Commerce in 1946. He was an optimistic liberal, believing firmly in American democratic values, 'peace and prosperity': the alleviation of distress through post-war reconstruction and the expansion of democracy and free trade. Post-Vietnam left liberals continued to protest the influence of giant corporations and the 'military-industrial complex', in the name of democratic values. Globalistic ambition had caused political leaders to lose sight of domestic problems they argued. In his 1968 campaign, Robert Kennedy attacked President Johnson's claim that the war presaged 'a Great Society for all of Asia'. Kennedy urged that 'we cannot build one in our country'.[37] In 1984, the Reverend Jesse Jackson delivered a speech to the United Nations entitled 'Foreign Policy - But Not Foreign Values'. He took up, indirectly, Robert Kennedy's point about the neglect of domestic reform and linked it to the need to recover America's true liberal democratic mission: 'If we are to remain the hope of the free world, our challenge is not military escalation but a world-wide war on poverty, disease and illiteracy. Domestic policy is foreign policy'.[38]

In *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, Michael Hunt makes an eloquent plea for a 'Republican' foreign policy rooted in the notion that 'American greatness should be

measured against domestic conditions'. He traces the cultural roots and acceptions of American foreign policy ideology, identifying a commitment to American exceptionalism and sense of mission, an acceptance of racial hierarchy, and hostility to revolutionary change abroad. Education is presented as a way out of this cultural bondage: 'Education...offers one powerful antidote to the long-prevalent core ideas of US policy. American values, especially the American conception of liberty, do not export as well as we would like to think. It is time Americans... accepted the limits of our power to shape other societies, time we pondered the contradiction we have long perpetrated by seeking to impose our conception of self-determination and development on peoples with aspirations quite different from our own'.[39]

3.4. The American Mission

The sense of mission was also the outcome of the search by Americans for a precise definition of their national purpose and the development of an American worldview. After all, this was a young country full of nationalistic enthusiasm and it was felt that the development of a conviction of national purpose was an historical necessity. In the first place, it provided a basis for continuity for a new nation which had no developed historic past.[40] Second, it established a concept in which the American citizen could define the meaning of his or her life and his/her institutions, and set goals for his purpose and destination.

This conviction of mission also provided grounds to incorporate religion into the new American ideology. This combination supported the basic American concept of liberty and freedom in all spheres of life. Religious tolerance was being assimilated in a new political environment and it was the beginning of a new pluralistic democratic society.

Strong religious convictions and a sense of mission developed a deep belief that the American people were divinely designed for certain great achievements. Herman

Melville wrote: 'And we Americans are peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our times; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world'.[41] Edward Johnson in 1630 saw the new country as 'the place where the Lord will create a new Heaven, and a new Earth, new churches, and a new commonwealth together'.[42] Jedidiah Morse, the scientist and historian, wrote in 1789:

> Here [America] the sciences and the arts of civilised life are to receive their highest improvement. Her civil and religious liberty are to flourish, unchecked by the cruel hand of civil or ecclesiastical tyranny. Here genius, aided by all the improvements of former ages, is to be exerted in humanising mankind... in expanding and enriching their minds with religious and philosophical knowledge, and in planning and executing a form of government, with as few of their defects as is consistent with the imperfection of human affairs, and which shall be calculated to protect and unite, in a manner consistent with the natural rights of mankind, the largest empire that ever existed.[43]

The mission of America, according to Albert Gallatin was:

> 'to be a model for all other governments and for all other less favoured nations, to adhere to the most elevated principles of political morality..., and by [your] example to exert a moral influence most beneficial to mankind'.[44]

George Baneroff believed that the United States would eventually 'allure the world to freedom by the beauty of its iustration'. The Reverend Timothy Dwight believed the United States to be "by Heaven designed, the' example bright, to renovate mankind". Alexander Hamilton believed that the American revolution set a precedent that would force Europe to 'inquiries which may shake it to its deepest foundations'. And Jefferson called the American experiment 'the last best hope of mankind', and 'a barrier against the returns of ignorance and barbarism'.[45]

Obviously, the idea of an unique American mission flourishing under such tremendously favourable psychological and political orientations has had an important impact on United States foreign policy. Already blessed by the natural support of the environment of the New World and the security derived from its geography and location, more credentials were added to the doctrine of an unique American mission by

the political and social contributions of the American revolution. The success of the revolution made the new nation conscious of its unique position as a republic in a world of monarchies. Psychologically, the Americans were well prepared and even anxious to proclaim their political and social concepts to the rest of the world. They were developing liberal political and social institutions and 'naturally' were constructing their government with respect for the natural rights of man. In spite of their isolationist inclinations, most Americans felt a concern and sympathy for foreign people who still suffered under tyrannical governments. In 1782 Benjamin Franklin predicted:

> Establishing the liberties of America will not only make the people happy, but will have some effect in diminishing the misery of those, who in other parts of the world groan under despotism, by rendering it more circumspect, and inducing it to govern with a lighter hand.[46]

John Adams predicted in 1785 that the United States was 'destined beyond a doubt to be the greatest power on the earth, and that within the life of man'.[47]

Thus, the Americans started the formulation of their ideas in foreign relations under the impact of the political notion of a mission. Reformation of less fortunate people was to be at the forefront of this mission of America.

The climax of the 'Age of Enlightenment' coincided with the American revolution, and liberals across the Atlantic, such as Condorcet, paid glowing tributes to the new republic. This French liberal philosopher said America was living proof of the universal truth of the principles of the Enlightenment, on which human progress depended. He wrote: "it is not enough that the rights of man be written in the books of philosophers and inscribed in the hearts of virtuous men; the weak and ignorant must be able to read them in the example of a great nation. America has given us this example."

Therefore, the outbreak of the French revolution was seen by Americans in the image of their own glorious revolution. It was the American revolutionary mission that was taking France in its grip and freeing the French people from the yoke or monarchy and setting them on to the path to democracy.

Tom Paine was a militant opponent of tyranny and joined the revolutionary struggle in France. He advocated that the revolution was the logical continuation of the struggle for the rights of man which had been inaugurated in thirteen colonies. Paine wrote:

> 'I see in America the generality of people living in a style of plenty unknown in monarchical countries; and I see that the principle of its government, which is that of the equal rights of man, is making rapid progress in the world...'.[48]

Paine linked the continuity of revolution to the American spirit of liberty and freedom and maintained that America would be the scene of coming reformation of the world. He concluded: From the rapid progress which America makes in every species of movement, it is rational to conclude that, if the governments of Asia, Africa, and Europe had begun on a principle similar to that of America, or had not been very early corrupted, therefrom, those countries must by this time have been in a far superior condition to what they are.[49]

Replacement of monarchy by a constitutional regime was regarded as the embodiment of the American spirit and the fulfilment of its liberal teachings. With the passage of time and the rising tide of liberal trends in Europe, the Americans' faith in their sense of mission was further strengthened. American public opinion swept in favour of the revolt of the Greeks against their Turkish rulers in 1821. American statesmen, including President Monroe, became warm advocates of the Greek cause. Elsewhere in Europe the mass uprisings for national self-determination and political and economic reforms aroused popular feelings and sympathy in the United States. But in the wake of the momentary failure of these revolutionary movements, the American liberals were forced to believe that their mission to advance the cause of world liberty would have to be confined to perfecting the democratic model at home.

However, the doctrine of an American mission continued to have an indirect connection with United States foreign policy. Scientific and technological breakthroughs provided new inputs to the American sense of pride and confidence and

enhanced its prestige abroad. The dynamic progress made in the fields of science and industry was having important international significance and adding tremendously to the prestige of American. America was breaking all political, social, economic, and technological barriers to human progress and for more and more people it became the land of promise and opportunity. The American inventions and techniques of mass production and the increasing reputation of its literature abroad may have done much to spread American institutions and ideas than any explicit interventionist policy.

Moralism has been the guiding principle and ethics have been the underlying concern - liberty, peace, and democracy have been the ultimate ends of American foreign policy. Thus American foreign policy hinged both in rhetoric and in practice upon ethnocentric moralistic grounds. To Americans foreign policy was thought to be the cosmic struggle between right and wrong; the perpetual repulsion of tyranny; the true belief in individual liberty, freedom, and equality; total dedication to the rule of law; and peaceful settlement of disputes with an ethical, democratic missionary zeal undergirded with intense moral idealism. This attitude produced a false antithesis in the American mind between morality and power politics; in effect, arrogating to the United States all the moral values and placing the stigma of immorality on the corrupting theory and practice of power polities pursued by other nations.[50]

As Orestes Brownson noted in an essay entitled 'The American Republic':

> small. Of these entrusted with great duties, the Jews were to 'Each people had a mission selected by God, ...some great, some establish worship of a single God, and belief in the Messiah. The Greeks were chosen to develop beauty in art and truth in philosophy. The Romans to develop law, order, political systems. The United States has divine orders to continue these, and to contribute its own, that is, its mission is to bring out in life the dialectic union of authority and liberty, of the natural rights of man and society'.[51]

There is an unbroken chain of continuity of thought deeply rooted in the American spirit of missionary zeal. The hope for the world has always been closely linked with American ideals. Thus, a Massachusetts orator told his Fourth of July

audience in 1827: "The spark kindled in America, shall spread and spread, until all the earth shall be illuminated with its light."[52] Theodore Roosevelt reaffirmed the faith in American mission and wrote in 1901: "We people of the United States, as to whether or not we shall play a great part in the world, that has been determined for us by fate,..."[53] Adlai Stevenson, speaking in 1952 during the Korean war, phrased his message in a biblical spirit:

> 'God has set for us an awesome mission: Nothing less than the leadership of the free world. Because He asks nothing of His servants beyond their strength, He has given to us vast power and vast opportunity. And like that servant of Biblical times who received the talents, we shall be held to strict account for what we do with them'.[54]

This moralism allowed Americans to justify their increasingly interventionist conduct of international affairs. Psychologically, it was impossible for them to perceive a role without [good] aims and ideals. Politically, the stage had already been reached in which America was involved in international affairs simply because of the reality of its political power base and expanding economic system. Subsequently, the net effect of Theodore Roosevelt's interventionist and aggressive diplomacy around the world was the maintenance of a strong United States position in Latin America and monitoring of the continuance of the precarious balance of power among the nations in the Far East and Europe. But Americans maintained that all such foreign policies were conducted in the cause of peace and democracy.[55] The rapid changes in the international environment, however, presented a paradox. Along with the pursuit of ideals of peace and democracy, for example, went peripheral involvement in war and power politics and the paradox of a growing peace movement in the midst of mounting appropriations for armaments and battleships. For virtually the first time in its history, except in war, the United States began to take very seriously the establishment of a strong military force.[56] But the moral rhetoric of American foreign policy continued to be the underlying basis of its aims. Exercising its new-found powers, America moved toward leadership, intervening in the cause of peace and democracy and urging the view that

peace must be enforced, if necessary through what was certainly the ultimate paradox by war. In this fashion, in a period of only some twenty years, a foreign policy that had been formulated to free Cuba was transfigured, via the Philippines and the Far East and then World War I, into a holy crusade which overwhelmingly began to be seen as a mission to make the world safe for peace and democracy. For such a task the American people felt themselves equipped not only by history but also by the aggressively jingoistic foreign policies asserted in the era from William Mokinly to Woodrow Wilson.[57]

Thus, in the period from the turn of the century to America's entrance into World War I, there began to be seen the beginnings of a major shift in the thinking about American foreign policy. "Without yielding their faith in the goals of peace and democracy as mainsprings of that policy, the American people became more willing to accept new means to accomplish these ends. The methods of peace through power, and of democracy by intervention and force rather than by example, though not without precedent in American history, came to achieve nevertheless a new degree of official sanction and popular support."[58] Imperialistic ambitions and the passing of a century of relative security meant that military considerations would have to play an increasingly important part in foreign affairs. And, involvement in world politics now also entailed sending American soldiers and sailors as well as missionaries and traders to the far corners of the world.

This moral imperative of US foreign policy found its strongest expression in Wilsonian internationalism. Wilson's ideals were in fact a projection of American identity in universal terms. To Wilson, American ideals were in perfect harmony with the principles of liberated mankind and were applicable to any society at any time. Americanisation of the world appeared to be the ultimate ideal of Wilson's vision. Therefore, even entry into World War I was voiced in strident moral, ethical, and holy terms. In Wilson's concern with the internal stability of nations along with their international harmony, he adhered to his belief that the foreign and domestic policies of

a country could not be separated. Therefore, in his mind, peace and democracy were linked as related goals in American foreign policy and the hint of America's need to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations became a latent tenet of US foreign policy.

The American way of life has laid special stress on the concept of assurance in every endeavour. Expectancy is the mark of the American temper, which has found its classic expression in the quest, the mission, the journey toward destiny.

The combination of moralism, expectancy, confidence, assurance, and the idea of destiny has generated a kind of "faith" in the American style of handling international politics and foreign relations. This concept of faith derives its sanctions from spiritual as well as material culture. Faith united the goals of American material prosperity with its aims of ultimate good in mankind. Within this definition of faith Americans combined the emotional element of ecstatic openness toward the spiritual presence in the reality and usefulness of their material culture. Therefore, there is no essential contradiction and confusion in the American mind between seeking goals of national self-interest and international betterment. Every war becomes a holy war - until Vietnam - and idealism and moralism tends to give American foreign policy an extremely ethnocentric and potentially aggressive character. As George F. Kennan has pointed out, this spirit of moralism identified with the 'Manifest Destiny' of American democracy led to the fervent involvement of the United States in such crusades as the Spanish-American war and World War I - which were supposed to be the wars to end all wars.[59] And surely this faith in American national purpose was the motivating force behind the frontier spirit - that physical and psychological belief that the American could and should extend his abilities and infiltrate every nook and cranny of the continent. In fact, many cherished the notion that once the continent was explored, American psychological and entrepreneurial energies would be obliged to discover new frontiers in which to find expression, new opportunities to expand and grow. Of course, this frontier spirit, based on the acceptance of the idea of faith in national

purpose, foreshadowed many of the latter-day manifestations of American capitalism, dollar diplomacy, manifest destiny, and cultural imperialism in twentieth century

3.5. The Public and Foreign Policy

A further point, an American foreign policy historically (and even today) has always been formulated by an elite group.[60] Nevertheless, the American public from time to time has been passionately involved in foreign policy issues. But their involvement has usually been emotional-based. Thomas Bailey, discussing American attitudes toward foreign affairs, had much to say about the sectionalism, Anglophobia, suspicion of foreigners, and other emotional attitudes behind early American behaviour. Slogans such as 'atrocities', holy war, 'Huns' and 'Hang the Kaiser' moved the American public; and the nations of manifest destiny, isolationism, American mission, and the Monroe Doctrine fed mostly on the people's emotions.

The American people have always been able to find a glow of ethics in their foreign policy. Their actual influence on foreign policy questions, however, has never been too deep. On the whole they have been rather consistently indifferent to the questions of foreign policy. Gabriel Almond has called this attitude a 'mood' which is the outcome of America's material culture. To Americans internal prosperity and personal success are the immediate questions and challenges to which one looks and which shape one's world. Americans are in a constant race with time and self-recognition of their respective achievements by the society. Thus, the American's outlook and outward orientation is limited; he is more [inward] and is apt to be unconcerned with the larger questions of policy-making. He gets involved only when his personal interests are threatened. At other times, his deeply nationalistic attitudes command and motivate his inclinations on foreign policy questions.[61]

Americans have created an artificial paradise of their own, a world full of material prosperity and the race to continually accumulate more. Therefore, outlook on

foreign policy is based on some sort of 'balance sheet' concept, an estimate of profit and loss calculations. Nevertheless, it is not an 'amoral' attitude. It has its own philosophy, historical justification, and creative forces. On the positive side, it has produced interesting and valuable changes in consciousness and released the forces of pragmatism to 'march forward' ahead of everyone. This consciousness has given birth to a society which is 'self-centred' and progressive within its own definition of a self-created paradise: nothing succeeds more than success. It is a never ending force wrapped around people, moving them at a very fast pace within their own cycles and generating more and more wealth, more and more prosperity, and more and more conformity to their already well-established norms, values, attitudes and ideas. Obviously, the American public happily shares the views of the media and its opinion leaders on international questions and they seek guidance from the political elite and especially the president on foreign policy issues.

This process of dependence on the political elite in the arena of world politics has minimised the effects of public opinion on foreign policy making. No doubt rising public resentment against the Vietnam war had some impact on President Johnson's decision not to seek re-election in 1968. On the other hand, the American public had supported Wilson's moralism leading to the interventions in Latin America; gave moral consent to support Western governments to consolidate power in China at the beginning of this century and felt justified in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion; accepted in principle the [immoralism] of communism; felt morally obliged to support the Truman Doctrine; wholeheartedly stood behind the rhetorical preaching of John Foster Dulles; felt spiritually elevated in fighting the war of [free people] and [freedom] in Korea; hated Castro in Cuba; rejoiced in Kennedy's hour of glory in the Cuban Missile crisis; feared the Soviet plans to spread the [communist sin] in Europe and Southeast Asia; generously contributed taxes to build up heavy defence against the communist threat; mourned the [loss] of China; welcomed Madam Chiang Kai-shek to America. And yet, strangely, in the final analysis the American public has accepted the restraints

and limitations of the Nixon Doctrine. Painlessly, they have listened to changing tunes on old issues, thereby almost effortlessly changing their moods at the whims of presidential changes in perception. Amicably they accepted the new realists of China in the 1970s and supported friendly gestures to the Soviet Union. Old enemies became new friends; old fears vanished into romantic feelings; the American public historically and even today accepts the guidance of the political elite in the foreign policy process on the questions of world polities without much sophisticated questioning.

For example due to the public opinion from the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, Carter was able to be elected president as 'Mr. Clean', a man who would transmit his religous convictions to the world and whose policies would carry on aura of morality. However a mere four years later the embassy hostages crisis in Iran which began on 11th April 1979 and was subject to considerable negotiation and an abortive military raid, caused his downfall. The failure of last-minute efforts to reach a settlement in November 1980 was regarded as the reason for the landslide Republican victory over president Carter in the American elections later that month. The crisis ironically was resolved on the last day of the Cater administration.[62]

3.6. Democratic Experiment and Political System

Not least important is the reality of the political structure and the American system of government which necessitates the creation of a nucleus, around which runs the machinery of foreign policy formation. America with its expanding political and economic influence requires expertise knowledge to deal with foreign relations. This has naturally made the president more powerful and concentrated in him essentially all the powers necessary to deal with foreign issues and crisis situations. Throughout American history these have tended to accentuate his predominance even more. Naturally, under these circumstances, the political leaders project their views on foreign issues and help develop (or manipulate) images in the public mind. This process by no

means developed any sophisticated philosophy of international politics among the people, and even ideological matters remain blurred in their minds. Norman L. Hill has noted:

> The people are handicapped in their thinking on world problems not so much by a lack of information on current issues - although they are handicapped in this respect - but rather by their lack of a well-considered philosophy of international politics. They read the papers without the ideological tenets, background knowledge, and assumptions necessary to transform facts, rumours, events, and allegations into tenable opinions on policy problems. Without a guiding philosophy, the thinking of the people tends to be shallow.[63]

Yet, set into a cultural pattern that is intoxicated with speed, and necessitated by a political system which thinks of itself as the historical [number one nation] the ideal choice for the American public has always been the acceptance of elite guidance on international politics. The question of the guiding philosophy does not pose any problem. After all, the ideals of moralism, manifest destiny, democracy, the Monroe Doctrine, and the isolationist tradition to provide a rich heritage to depend on and give real and fairly substantial meaning to a concept which is more forceful and has deep links with the past. No nation grows without links to its past; and the future is very much a reflection of the past history. Past history binds the glory of a nation with the future accomplishments of its people; it is a relationship of soul with life; the ending of one well end the other. And America has grown within its bonds to the past; the American people have never found any reasons to regret their historical accomplishments - and there are enough reasons to justify their philosophy of life. The American public's contentment with material progress in their society has made and added to the blend of spiritual happiness in the form of a vague but reassuring belief system toward the world.

3.7. Conclusion

So far this chapter has traced the typical characteristics of US philosophy in policy-making in the context of global and historical situations. These concepts will provide one of the objective standards to analyse the US foreign and security policy towards Iran in part two of US and Iran case study.

Even though, US policy-making process has the typical characteristics, it has been changed based on its national capability and interests. As we already discussed in the Introduction and in this chapter, Isolationism as non-involvement in European affairs had prevailed until President Wilson involved in "world(European)"affairs as a war partners. During the World War I, as the United States became a global power, its foreign and security policy began to change and the US public had accepted wars as just. During the cold war era, the United States, as the strongest economic and military power, key security policy makers and business elites constructed a national security state to deal with global affairs. However, as we discussed before, interventions in the third world sates are psychologically impossible without good moralism and ideals. They justify their intervention in the name of peace, democracy and liberalism.

In this context, we can understand president Truman's determination to resist Soviet aggression in the Iran-Azerbaijan crisis of 1945-1946. Based on this event the foundation of a long-range US policy toward Iran was laid. It was a policy based on his understanding of the nature of the Soviet system and its expansionist proclivities that Soviet threats and aggression should be contained, with force if necessary. In this broad conceptual framework Iran played a strategically significant role: as Russia's direct neighbour and a target of Soviet imperialism; as a vital link in the chain on non-Communist states bordering on the Soviet Union; as a rich source of oil, and as an access route to the Indian Ocean.[64] US intervention increased substantially in the aftermath of World War II as the US foreign and security policy making elite brought numerous instruments to bear on the cold war struggle with the Soviet Union. Foreign economic and military aid, for example, has totalled nearly $825 billion during the last four decade. US intervention policy toward Iran since end of World War II should also

be viewed in the same context. Washington's preoccupation with keeping Iran free from Soviet influence can be seen by their role in the 1953 overthrow of the nationalist government of Mohammad Mosaddeq and the reinstatement of the shah to protect the West's control of Iran's oil.[65] The US role in the 1953 overthrow of Mosaddeq government is one good example of conflict between national security interest and their moralism which will be discussed later in part two of case study.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

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CHAPTER IV

THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY POLICY MAKING PROCESS

This chapter shall examine the institutions that are significant in formulating US security policy towards Third World countries. As already discussed in the introductory chapter, chapter two and this are essential to analyse the US policy towards Iran more realistically. The US constitution has been characterised as an open invitation for struggle between the executive and the legislative branches for implementing policy. Therefore this study will describe in detail each institution's role along with the influence of important individuals on significant global events not focusing on specific US-Iran affairs. Because good foreign and security policy analysis should combine the objective and the methods of both the scientific and the humanistic approaches to political analysis.

The US democratic system is governed by a network of legal, governmental and organisational rules. At the very beginning of American independence a constitutional formula was established for the construction of a governmental system which would, through such means as the separation of powers, checks and balances, and federalism, avert tyranny and guarantee the dignity and rights of the individual. In essence, the action channels for American foreign policy were constrained by a conscious effort on the part of the Founding Fathers to fragment governmental power territorially, institutionally, and legally. The elements of bargaining within a governmental and democratic framework of consensus and conflict were built into the foreign policy process right from the beginning. Hence, special attention must be given to a description of the formal patterns of authority and the distribution of power as it is structured in the foreign policy-making process. Formal authority and actual power realities do not, of course, always coincide as we will find in the later chapter on US-

Iran relations. However, in a democratic environment, the legal, constitutional framework sets the rules by which decision makers interpret the setting in which they must act. The rhetoric that must be used to justify (legitimate) their decisions to the domestic constituents and the action channels that can be used to implement policies must be consistent with the principle of democratic control of foreign policy.[1]

4.1. Policy Making Process

The key components of the US policy making process, following closely the terminology and concepts of Gabriel Almond can be broadly described as follows: an elite structure characterised by a large number of autonomous and competing groups, a mass structure characterised by a small, informed stratum, attentive to elite discussion and conflict, and a much larger base, normally, ignorant of and indifferent to policy and policy-making.[2] However, as will became apparent from the rest of this chapter, the US foreign and security policy is more hierarchical compare to the other great powers.

The condition responsible for the competitive character of the elite structure is obvious; members of the policy elite normally differ and differ significantly about both the ends and the means of foreign policy. The autonomy of the elite structure is the result of the fact that power is both widely dispersed among the participants in the policy process and drawn from a variety of sources independently of each other. The group character of elite politics reflects both of these circumstances. The diffusion of power means that various members of the policy elite must group together on the basis of some amalgam of interest if they are to have any prospect of seeing their individual preferences compete successfully against the goals and programmes advanced by others. The absence of a single locus of power or a base from which it can be monopolised also means that policy, once formulated, must continue to depend upon the voluntary co-ordination of elite groups if it is to be effective.

It is the dependence of the elite, one upon the other, for both the formulation and the conduct of policy, and the absence of any single chain of command whereby their co-operation can be assured, that Roger Hilsman has highlighted with his description of the policy process as one 'conflict and consensus-building'. For the would-be policy advocate must do more than contend with the opponents of his programme; he must develop support for it throughout the relevant parts of the elite structure and, on occasion, the mass structure as well. If, by means of persuasion and judicious accommodation to the interests of others, he is able to bring the weight of opinion to his cause, the resulting agreement will probably insure the adoption of his policy and its effective implementation. Failing such support, or lacking the political skills and prestige prerequisite for an opportunity to secure it, or confronted from the beginning by a wide and politically unassailable consensus to the contrary, the realistic policy advocate will turn his political energies to more promising issues. For however wise his idea and cogent his argument or extensive his personal influence, his will remain a voice in the policy wilderness.[3]

The characteristics of elite structure and elite relations just outlined are general to all policy-making situations, although the number, size, and kind of elite groups necessary for the formulation and conduct of policy - and therefore, the kind of consensus required - will, of course vary greatly with the issues and circumstances with which this study will later be concerned involve mainly government elite and government structure. It will be useful to continue the development of the above concepts primarily in this context.

It is, to begin with, important to note that there are two basic causes for policy conflict among the government elite and these lead to two different kinds of groupings among them. Many of these conflicts simply reflect the diversity of opinion Americans are likely to hold, in the absence of sanctions to the contrary, regarding the state of the world and what America should do in it. The groups that coalesce in support of one or

another of these views appear, for the most part, to cut across formal institutional and organisational lines (Congress, Executive, State, Defence).

In contrast, some policy conflicts are 'institutionally grounded'. These are differences that result from the peculiar responsibilities (with respect either to values or to skills) of various government institutions and organisations. Not sharing the same responsibilities (or, put another way, not charged with the representation of the same values or skills), government organisations will necessarily bring divergent interests and approaches to common problems. When conflicts of this order occur, the lines of battle are more likely to conform to the boundaries of the organisations involved. These are also the more enduring of the two kinds of group conflict.

Specific ideas about what to do in the world will change, and with them the *ad hoc* groupings that once espoused them, but divergent responsibilities are built into the structure of government. The allocation of responsibility may be changed, but the effect is usually to shift the location of battle rather than to bring it to an end.

The presidential system has perhaps been more capable of adaptation to changing international exigencies than a parliamentary system. But could it be that the very size of the government - the incredibly complex organisational structures into which the millions of federal employees fit, and the maze of channels through which innovative ideas must pass before they become new policies - is itself a force working against 'the understanding of change and the formulation of new purposes'? Apart from the cabinet departments, the federal roster includes over sixty different agencies and over 1,250 advisory boards and commissions. Of those, at least forty different agencies have some kind of foreign affairs responsibility. Add Congress - which often appears more like 535 separate interests than one unified body - and we can begin to understand why the very size of government fosters a process in which today's policies often turn out to be tomorrow's as well. How the United States organises itself for the making of foreign policy, in other words, is assumed to shape the nature of American action abroad.

To guide the study's inquiry, this chapter will draw on a conceptualisation of the foreign policy - making process as a series of concentric circles (see figure 3) suggested by Roger Hilsman. His view, in effect, bends the boxes and branches of the standard government organisation chart so as to draw attention to the core, or source, of the action. Thus the innermost circle in the policy-making process consists of the president, his immediate personal advisers, and such important political appointees as the secretaries of state and defence, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and various under and assistant secretaries who bear responsibility for carrying out policy decisions. The most important decisions involving the fate of the nation are made, in principle, at this level.

The second circle contains the various departments and agencies of the executive branch. If we exclude from that circle the politically appointed agency heads and their immediate subordinates, whom we have already placed in the innermost circle, we can think of the individuals within the second circle as the career bureaucrats who provide continuity in the implementation of policy from one administration to the next, regardless of who occupies the White House. Their primary task - in theory - is to provide top-level policy makers with the information necessary for making decisions and then carry out those decisions.

- Figure 3 will be seen next page -

Figure 3. The Institutional Setting - The Concentric Circles of Policy Making.



SOURCE: Adapted from Roger Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, (New York: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 541-544.

The outermost circle is what Hilsman referred to as the 'public one,' consisting of Congress, domestic interest groups, public opinion, and the mass media. Collectively, the institutions, groups, and individuals at this level are least involved in the day-to-day foreign policy process.

Emphasising the conceptualisation, this study will take three different approaches to describing the foreign affairs of the government in the subsequent sectors. First, attention will focus on the way presidential factors, but especially the relationship between the president and his immediate group of advisors (with special reference to the National Security Council and the president's national security assistant), affect American foreign policy. In a sense, the question addressed is how particular presidential preferences combine with the generalised presidential form of government to promote what may be a distinctively American institutional approach to foreign

policy making. Second, the information-gathering and policy-implementation tasks of some of the many government organisations involved in the foreign policy-making process will be considered. If foreign policy making is primarily an executive function, then he must be examined how the structural characteristics of the foreign affairs government define authority and divide the labour among those responsible for the making and execution of foreign policy. Finally, this chapter will examine the government sources included in the third concentric circle by examining the role of Congress in foreign policy making. Here this study will explore how the separation of powers - or the sharing of power by separate institutions, some would argue - is related to security and foreign policy outcomes

4.2. The President and his Advisers

Examination of the president's role in the policy process will be guided by several analytic models. Three of them that are especially relevant - the pluralist, the ruling elite, and the human behaviour models - lead to focus analysis on the following questions: What are the formal and informal sources of presidential power? How much power do presidents and the advisers have? What are the constraints on presidential power? How does a president's background and personality affect policy-making.

The president is not only an individual participant in the policy process; he is also part of the institution of the presidency. The presidency is an institution in three respects. First, it is an institution in the sense that any president has certain formal authority conveyed by the constitution. Second, it is an institution in the tangible form of a specific organisation, the Executive Office of the President. Third, it is an institution in the informal behavioural sense that there are widespread expectations about the role the president will play in policy-making.

The Constitution specifies several functions for the president in the conduct of foreign policy, but his authority in each area is also limited by constitutionally

prescribed congressional authority. The president can negotiate treaties, but the Senate must ratify them. The president is Commander-in-Chief of the military, but its operations require congressional appropriations of funds. The president can appoint ambassadors, high level officials, and military general grade officers, but the Senate confirms the appointments.

Although these constitutional provisions are important determinants of presidential power, they are not the only ones - and indeed not even the most important ones. The president's power depends to a great extent on other factors, which affect his position in the executive branch, his relations with Congress, and his public standing.

4.2.1. Executive Office of the President

Within the executive branch, the president's position is substantially strengthened by the staff support he receives from the Executive Office of the President - a large group of people who are individually and collectively among the most powerful participants in the policy process.

The Executive Office of the President was created in the Roosevelt administration to provide more staff assistance so that the president would be better able to control and co-ordinate the executive branch of the government. Since that time, the size, composition, and responsibilities of the office have changed considerably; these changes have been partly the result of differences in the individual presidents' backgrounds and policy-making styles. Since the Executive Office of the President is intended to serve as the president's own advisory staff, it is altered somewhat by each new president to suit his own preferences. Furthermore, the growth of the rest of the executive branch has also led to a general increase in the size and responsibilities of the Executive Office of the President.

All its major organisational components, as listed in Table 4.1, are involved in foreign policy-making. A few of the components, however, are especially important in

foreign policy-making. One is the White House Office, which includes many of the president's closest advisers. Although their titles and backgrounds usually do not suggest foreign policy interests, they are nevertheless frequently among the most important participants in foreign policy decision-making. This is especially the case when a foreign policy issue has significant political consequences inside the United States. Since most of these senior White House advisers are long time associates who have advised the president during his campaign for the presidency and even before, they are especially sensitive to the impact of foreign policy issues on the president's domestic political support. When President Carter, for example, was trying to build public and congressional support for the Panama Canal Treaties, he assigned the task of co-ordinating the administration's efforts to Hamilton Jordan, one of his top political advisers. Such other White House staff members as the press secretary, speech writers, and congressional liaison specialists also often become involved in foreign policy discussions.

- Table 4.1 will be seen next page -

Table 4.1: Components of the Executive Office of the President.

Component	Staff Size
White House Office	351
Office of Management and Budget	539
National Security Council	64
Council of Economic Advisers	35
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations	41
Office of Science and Technology Policy	24
Council on Environmental Quality	32
Council on Wage and Price Stability	43
Domestic Policy Staff	50

SOURCE: US *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1980, Appendix* (Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 1020-21.

The Office of Management and Budget is the largest component of the Executive Office of the President. Its director is often a close associate of the president and general purpose adviser on a broad range of issues. Most of its staff, however, are career government employees who specialise in preparing the presidential budget submission to Congress, reviewing other legislative proposals, and providing general managerial oversight of executive branch agencies.. They are especially important in defence spending issues. Other components of the Executive Office of the President are also regularly involved in particular kinds of foreign policy issues - the Office of Science and Technology Policy, for example, in advanced weapons issues.

The one component that is exclusively and centrally involved in foreign policy-making is the National Security Council.

4.2.2. National Security Council

The importance of the national security affairs advisor for the president's involvement in the formulation of foreign policy is highlighted by the fact that this advisor plays a very significant role in the operations of the National Security Council (NSC). This is not a statutory role but one that has developed since President

Kennedy's administration when McGeorge Bundy was the national security affairs advisor.

In statutory terms, the National Security Council consists of the president as chairman, the vice-president, and the secretaries of state and defence. Other high-ranking officials frequently invited to sit in on the NSC sessions include the secretary of the Treasury, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Other invited participants may be the heads of Department of Energy and the Office of Management and Budget, the attorney general, the director of the FBI, and sometimes during earlier periods the US ambassador to the United Nations. The statute creating the NSC was passed in 1947. Its specified task is:

> 'to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the government to cooperage more effectively in matters involving national security'. [4]

Although it seems obvious that the co-ordination of foreign, military and domestic policies for the assurance of national security should have the highest priority, the utilisation of the NSC has not been uniform. Under President Eisenhower, the NSC followed a clearly defined schedule and met every week. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relaxed the NSC schedule, and meetings took place less frequently. President Nixon in his first term, returned to the weekly schedule; however, beginning in 1971, NSC meetings sometimes occurred only once a month or even less often. President Ford more or less followed the pattern Nixon had established toward the end of his tenure, whereas President Carter restored the NSC to greater prominence. Three senior interdepartmental groups (SIGs) have been established; they are chaired by high officials of the departments of state and defence and the CIA, and their function is to deal with aspects of national security flowing from the formulation and implementation of foreign policies, defence policies, and intelligence policies.[5]

Over the years, not only the personal preferences of presidents but also the professional experience, style and bureaucratic skill of the national security affairs advisors as well as of the secretaries of state and defence have shaped the organisational framework of the NSC.

Henry Kissinger, as special assistant for national security affairs under President Nixon, modified and strengthened the NSC structure further, as can be seen from Figure 4. But strengthening the structure must not be equated with increasing its actual power in the foreign policy-making process. Indeed, as already noted, the NSC meetings, after a good start, met less and less frequently in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and what meetings were held assumed a *pro forma* nature, whereas major decisions were taken by Nixon and Kissinger in personal consultations. This pattern of consultation in foreign policy formulation was further intensified and 'legitimised' when Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973.

Regardless of the actual power exerted by the NSC on foreign policy formulation and implementation. Figure 4 shows the very complex nature of the NSC framework at that time and *the strong personal influence of Henry Kissinger.* He chaired the Senior Review Group (SRG), the Defence Program Review Committee (DPRC), the Forty Committee, and the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG); he was a member of the under-secretaries group (USG); he also had representatives on each interdepartmental group (IG), the Verification Panel, and the Vietnam Special Studies Group. The IGs numbered six, five covered the major regions of the world, and one represented politicomilitary affairs. The USG had as its major task the co-ordination of implementing the presidential decisions. The DPRC was to co-ordinate defence spending with foreign policy objectives, while the Verification Panel had as its primary function the monitoring of negotiations on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The Forty Committee supervised covert intelligence activities conducted by agencies of the US government, and WSAG was in charge of the White House operation centre in the event of sudden international emergencies.

Under the Carter administration and Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski the organisation pendulum of the NSC swung again in the opposite direction, and the structure became less complex. The WSAG was discontinued, and, although the SRG, IGs and USG were retained, most authority was given to a cabinet-level Policy Review Committee, which sought to define foreign policy problems and co-ordinate research on long-range foreign policy issues. A Special Co-ordinating Committee handled immediate crisis problems. Brzezinski reduced the policy-making power of the NSC and strengthened its role of providing information and advice from the executive departments and agencies concerned with national security to President Carter. For this reason, Brzezinski spent at least an hour each day with the president, briefing him on the latest intelligence developments and discussing with him foreign and national security policy problems and possible solutions.[6]

- Figure 4 is about here -

Figure 4: The National Security Council, 1969-1974.



SOURCE: Adapted from Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, *The National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability* (April 17, 1980), p. 97.

4.2.3. Relations with the Congress

On many issues, the president encounters considerable congressional resistance to his wishes. The constituents, responsibilities, and personal political stakes are different for members of Congress and the president. The president is likely to view tariff issues,

for instance, from the standpoint of their effects on the national economy, American trade relations with other countries, and of course his own political fortunes. Since tariff increases are inflationary, domestically, and harmful to American relations with its trading partners, internationally, the president is likely to take these consequences into account more than most members of Congress do. Although members of Congress may be concerned about those consequences, they are likely to be more concerned about the local economic impact and the effects on their own political standing. If a tariff increase is beneficial to local employment and profits in a congressional district or state, a representative or senator is likely to support it.[7]

4.2.4. The President as a Person

We all bring an accumulation of personal experiences and emotions to our decision making, and the president is no exception. As political scientist James David Barber has observed, 'Every story of Presidential decision-making is really two stories: an outer one in which a rational man calculates and an inner one in which an emotional man feels. The two are forever connected'.[8]

Much of what a president feels as he makes decisions depends on how he feels about himself - in particular his self-esteem. Some presidents have had a decent regard for themselves and the self-assurance and security that accompany a strong, healthy ego. Others have been ego-defensive and insecure. The sources of such variations are diverse, complex, and subtle, but the variations are evident, and they affect presidential performance.

The effects on presidential style are the most obvious. Personally insecure presidents - Johnson and Nixon - have been relatively tense, distrustful, secretive, and hostile towards their critics. More personally secure presidents - Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Ford and Carter -have been more relaxed, trusting, and open, even friendly with their critics.

The Nixon administration, for instance, put its political opponents on an 'enemies list' to be harassed by the Internal Revenue Service and to be excluded from the White House invitation lists for dinners and other occasions; other administrations have invited their critics to White House functions in spite of their disagreements. Nixon and Johnson saw only a relatively small number of close advisers because their insecurities made it difficult for them to meet with advisers whose loyalties and opinions were less supportive; other presidents have had a larger circle of advisers. Nixon and Johnson demanded extraordinary secrecy and relished surprising their critics; other presidents have expressed their thoughts and plans more publicly.

Variations in presidential style are also a reflection of differences in personality, that is, basic behavioural and attitudinal tendencies. Barber has identified two dimensions of personality that are particularly important determinants of presidential performance. One in activity or energy. This dimension of behaviour, however, reflects more than mere variations in physical energy. It also reflects several other active-passive personality contrasts, such as the tendency to be dominant or submissive, extrovertive or introvertive, aggressive or timid.

The second dimension identified by Barber refers to the president's feelings about his work, whether positive or negative. Some have clearly enjoyed being president; others have not. All have felt the heavy burdens of presidential responsibilities, but a few have often been gloomy and depressed in presidency.

These two dimensions - active-passive and positive-negative - can be combined to produce four personality types and four types of presidents active-passive, active-negative, passive-positive, and passive-negative. Active-positive presidents are the most likely to be effective because they are assertive, persistent, and goal-orientated. Passive-positive and passive-negative presidents tend to be ineffective. Their tendency to withdraw from conflict makes it difficult for them to engage in the political battles a president needs to fight to get what he wants; their reluctance to be assertive makes it difficult for them to lead.

Active-negative presidents may be fighters and thus often able to get what they want, but they also tend to be destructive. The energy they put into their presidential roles is a reflection of a compulsive striving for power and status. They need these emotional rewards as compensation for their weak egos and as assurance against their insecurities. They also tend to become inflexible and dogmatic about the policies they adopt. They cannot admit to mistakes or defeats; such admissions would be too threatening to their already low self-esteem.

The effects of personality on presidential behaviour were even more evident in Kennedy and Nixon's case. Externally, president Kennedy's beliefs that the principle threat to many Third World countries arose internally due to governmental dishonesty and incompetency. The administrations assessment of the shah of Iran fell into this category, therefore efforts were made to convence the shah that unless he adjusted his policies to solve the economic problems and widespread corruptions at the highest echelons of the government, it could result in a Soviet takeover. Therefore Kennedy's active beliefs altered US policy towards Iran by reducing military grants and increasing economic assistance programmes.[9] Before becoming president, Nixon wrote in his book, *Six Crises*, that 'reaction and response to crisis is uniquely personal in the sense that it depends on what the individual brings to bear on the situation - his own traits of personality and character, his training, his moral and religious background, his strengths and weaknesses'.[10]

Several of Nixon's Vietnam decisions reflected his own strengths and weaknesses[11]. In November 1969, he prepared a major speech on Vietnam policy without consulting his secretary of defence. He wrote the speech himself, mostly while alone at Camp David (the presidential retreat in the mountains near Washington) with little advice from his speechwriters for his national security adviser. Contrary to expectations, he announced there would not be any new troop withdrawals, and he implied that only the domestic critics of his policy could defeat or humiliate the United States in Vietnam. Five months later, however, he announced that 150,000 American

troops would be withdrawn - a decision that was made without consulting the secretary of defence or the secretary of state.

A week after that, he decided to invade Cambodia with thousands of American troops. He decided in favour of the invasion even though the secretary of defence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state, the attorney general, and NSC staff members warned that the military benefits of doing so were uncertain and that a strong negative domestic reaction was likely. Indeed, he made the decision the night after his secretary of state had testified in Congress that the administration would continue to de-escalate in Vietnam and surely avoid any commitment of ground troops in Cambodia. Over the next two days and nights, the president prepared a television address to the nation, mostly working alone at night. His draft of the speech said the operation would enable the United States to capture the communist headquarters for all of South Vietnam. When the secretary of defence learned of this statement, he suggested taking it out, since no such headquarters even existed. When the president's national security adviser briefed reporters on the speech just before the president appeared on television, he recommended they not expect the military action to lead to the capture of an enemy headquarters. The president's address nevertheless announced that the troops entering Cambodia would 'attack the headquarters for the entire communist military operation in South Vietnam' (he also noted that it 'was not an invasion of Cambodia'.) The actual consequences of the decision were to increase domestic turmoil over the war, including the killing of student demonstrators by National Guard troops at Kent State University, but not to reduce significantly communist military operations in Cambodia or South Vietnam.[12]

In short, presidential performance is partly a function of the president's personality. However, the personal sources of a president's style, power, and policies are always operative within the institutional constraints of the presidency. Public, congressional, and even bureaucratic expectations about presidential behaviour all restrict an individual president's leeway. An incident toward the end of the Nixon presidency is

suggestive. As the prospect of impeachment loomed and as Nixon's political fate and psychological state were increasingly in doubt, the secretary of defence sent an unusual message to American military forces: They were to obey only orders coming through the normal chain of command, which includes the secretary of defence and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The significance of the message was that the secretary was in effect telling the troops they should not obey an order coming directly from the president, who might have forcibly tried to resist any efforts to remove him from office.

Yet in spite of the institutional constraints, in spite of common congressional resistance, and in spite of the vicissitudes of his public standing, a president is able to adopt his preferred policies and to do so according to his own decision-making style to a great extent. This is particularly true when the security of the country is perceived to be at stake or when policy can be formulated relatively secretly.

Many of the most significant decisions concerning relations with Russia and China have reflected individual presidents' personalities and power. Those presidential decisions include in particular: Truman's decisions that established containment of communism as the guiding principle in American foreign policy; Kennedy's decisions during the confrontation with the Soviet Union over missiles in Cuba; and Nixon's decisions to seek a reduction of tensions (detente) in relations with Russia and China. These presidential decisions therefore determined American policy at important points in the early, peak and late phases of the Cold War era. They are among the most consequential American foreign policy decisions since World War II.

4.3. The Foreign and Security Affairs Bureaucracy

According to Henry Kissinger, 'The purpose of bureaucracy is to devise a standard operating procedure which can cope effectively with most problems'. In doing so it frees high-level policy makers to concentrate on the unexpected and exceptional and to purse policy innovations. When it fails to identify options or when those options prove

to be irrelevant, bureaucracy becomes a hindrance, forcing policy makers to redirect their efforts away from problem solving to forging a bureaucratic consensus. The critical problem identified by Kissinger is integrating the roles of the professional expert and the political generalist. From one perspective this is a management problem solvable by identifying organisational tasks, establishing lines of communication and accountability, and carefully selecting personnel.[13]

Viewed from another perspective, this tension reflects the fundamentally dual nature of all organisations, and it defies a managerial solution. Organisations can be divided into formal and informal subsystems. The formal system is built around the legal lines of authority structuring the organisation and consists of the official rules and regulations which govern the behaviour or organisational members. It is a goal-orientated system whose logic and coherence are derived from the tasks assigned to it by forces outside the organisation. In the case of public bureaucracies, Congress, the president, and interest groups all participate in defining official organisational goals. The informal system springs up spontaneously around the formal system and consists of the unwritten rules of conduct and fundamental assumptions which guide the day to day behaviour of those employed in the organisation. The two systems frequently collide: Where the formal system is concerned with goal achievement, the informal system is concerned with the survival of organisational members. But no formal system can survive for long without an effectively operating system of unwritten rules and codes of conduct. They are needed to give an organisation the flexibility that allow it to cope with contingencies and problems that were not anticipated when the organisation was set up. At the same time it also confronts policy makers with a challenge. As a spontaneous structure the informal system defies total control and attempts to manipulate it will fail.

The major concern in this section is with the security and foreign affairs bureaucracy. The management dilemmas and the basic organisational realities that sketched above are present here. Three organisations dominate the foreign and security

affairs bureaucracy: the State Department, the Defence Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). This section examines their formal structure and informal value systems in order to understand better how they influence US foreign and security policy towards Third Warld countries.

4.3.1. The Department of State

The president's time cannot be occupied with every aspect of foreign policy formulation; indeed, many decisions are made at lower levels. For the majority of these decisions, the staff work and preliminary decision making takes place in the Department of State, which has the prime interest in and functional responsibility for the relations of the United States with foreign countries and intergovernmental organisations (IGOs).

The chief officer of the Department of State is the secretary of state, who by law and delegation of presidential powers is, at least in formal terms, the president's principal advisor in formulating foreign policy and principal agent in policy implementation. This person is also the first ranking member of the cabinet and fourth in line (following the vice-president, Speaker of the House, and president *pro temper* of the Senate) in the event of presidential incapacity. However, the secretary's effective influence in foreign policy-making varies depending on experience and personality as well as the president's predilection for personal advisors, including the special assistant for national security affairs, which has sometimes led to informal consultation and decision making.[14]

To manage all these tasks, the Department of State is organised along both geographical and functional lines, as can be seen from Figure 5. The geographical breakdown is reflected by the Bureau of European Affairs, African Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Inter-American Affairs, and Near East and South Asian Affairs. The Bureau of International Organisation Affairs can be regarded only partially as a

geographical subdivision and resembles more a functional unit. Other functional bureaus deal with economic and business affairs, human rights and humanitarian issues, policicomilitary affairs, international narcotics matters, terrorism, refugee programmes, and intelligence and research. Some bureaus have primarily administrative functions - the comptroller, inspector general, the legal advisor, congressional relations, protocol, and consular affairs.[15]

The various bureaus in the State Department are headed by assistant secretaries of state and major subdivisions by deputy assistant secretaries. In the geographical bureau, the relations with individual foreign countries are handled by country directors managing a collective 'country desk', which, depending on the importance of the country involved, is serviced by an appropriate number of officials. The country director is not only in daily communication with the American embassy in the foreign country but also has frequent contacts with the embassy of that country in Washington and with his or her counterparts in other executive departments that have a particular interest in the country whose affairs that director handles. The country director plays an important role in the execution of foreign policy actions toward individual countries, because he or she is usually authorised to send telegrams to American embassies over the signature of the secretary of state. Most of these telegrams deal with routine problems; when controversial issues are involved, however, the desk officer may have to seek occurrences from other officials who are responsible for the relations with countries that might be affected.

Between the secretary and the assistant secretaries is the deputy secretary, not only the alter ego but also the chief deputy and advisor of the secretary, who runs the day-to-day operations of the department. The main assistants to the deputy secretary are the under-secretaries for political affairs, economic affairs, security assistance, and management. Depending on the complexity of the situation for which policies must be formulated, the levels of policy formulation range from the country director to the

secretary of state and, on major issues, to the presidential level. Input is also likely to come from the US diplomatic missions abroad.[16]

- Figure 5 will be seen next page -

Figure 5: U.S. Department of State Organisational Chart.



SOURCE: *United States Government Manual 1981-82.*

Minor decisions can be made by the country directors, but their influence is also felt in policy decisions made on higher levels because of the information and recommendations they provide for the higher echelons. More significant decisions on foreign policy formulation may come from the assistant secretaries, but they too are likely to furnish only salient inputs in terms of information and policy positions to the top echelons of the State Department where the truly significant decisions are made. For the most crucial and basic decisions, the secretary has to go the White House level, where ideally his policy recommendations will find a favourable response.

Position papers by proponents of particular policies, clearances, and concurrence by involved officials, and opposition by other officials characterise as well as complicate the policy-making processes on most levels. As the files become heavier and proceed laterally on their way up, they reflect the interests and attitudes of the policy-making participants

4.3.2. The Department of Defence

The Department of Defense (DOD) is the key organisation in security policy formulation stems from several sources. The military establishment provides important resources and capabilities for the potential implementation of policies and therefore needs to be intimately involved in the formulation of all policies whose execution might depend on these capabilities. Military officers provide training to the armed forces of foreign states and supervise the maintenance of arms and equipment supplied to different countries under various US programmes. Finally, the military establishment develops strategies and tactics for the armed services that need to be related to foreign policy needs. The development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in the early 1980s is a case in point. The RDF is composed of elements of all major military services; the Carter administration initiated its creation toward the end of the 1970s.

Its main purpose was rapid military intervention in the Persian Gulf region and other parts of the Middle East in the event of Soviet aggression anywhere in that area.[17]

The foreign policy concerns of the Defence Department are revealed in its *Annual Report, FY 1982* regarding the United States' basic national interests for the coming years:

> "- To maintain the security of our nation, as well as that of our allies and friends around the world. We seek to deter any aggression that could threaten that security, and, should deterrence fail, to repel or defeat any military attack.
>
> - To manage East-West relations, in conjunction with our allies, so as to preserve our interests and the peace. It is incumbent on the United States, as the leader of the Atlantic Alliance and the centre of other collective security frameworks, to cultivate the co-operative aspects of East-West relations, while simultaneously leading renewed efforts on the competitive aspects, channelling them into less dangerous routes wherever possible.
>
> - To respond to the twin challenges of global economics and energy supply. Interdependence has long been a truism, but the extent of our resource dependence, the vulnerability of our supply lines, and the need to do more than merely"[18]

In terms of variables to explain the content of particular foreign and sucurity policies, it is necessary to make careful judgements as to which variables might have the greatest explanatory power. This section discussion suggests that in most policies dealing with security matters, the Defence Department has the major influence, including those dealing with US-Soviet and US-Third World states relations. However, as the policies bear on economic matters, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture will also have important interests and concerns whose pursuit will, in all likelihood, be backed by powerful lobbies. Finally, for most foreign economic policies, the most relevant variables may be found outside the State Department; the organisational and substantive interests of the Department of the Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture will play a major role.

4.3.3. The CIA and the Intelligence Community

4.3.3.1. Structure and Growth

Created in 1947, the CIA is not the first efforto centralise intelligence within the government. In 1939 Roosevelt established an Interdepartmental Intelligence Committee to co-ordinate the activities of the FBI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.[19] This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, and after experimenting with another organisational arrangement, Roosevelt assigned the task to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS was to 'collect and analyse strategic information' as directed by the JGS and to 'plan and operate such special services' as instructed by it. The OSS, in turn, became a victim of post-war demobilisation.

The break-up of the OSS did not end the ongoing dispute over whether a central or federal intelligence system was best suited for the post-war era. In the end the federal principle prevailed when in 1946 Truman established a National Intelligence Authority (NIA) and a Central Intelligence Group (CIG). The NIA was to plan, develop, and co-ordinate intelligence. The CIG operated under the direction of the NIA and was headed by a director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Its job was to co-ordinate, plan and disseminate intelligence and to carry out covert action. One of the considerable handicaps that the DCI laboured under was that all of the people working under him in the CIG were still formally part of other intelligence organisations and, in a sense, were only on loan to him. Both the NIA and CIG were dissolved by the 1947 National Security Act when they were replaced by he NSC and CIA respectively.[20]

Three points need to be stressed before outlining the make-up of the intelligence community. First, the concept of a community implies similarity and likeness, and it suggests the existence of a group of actors who share common goals and possess a common outlook on events. In these terms the US intelligence community is a community only in the loosest sense. More accurately, it is a federation of units existing with varying degrees of institutional autonomy in their contribution to the

intelligence function. Second, the concept on an intelligence community is not inherent in the definition of intelligence or in the common practice among states. The National Security Act of 1947 which created the CIA and assigned it the task of co-ordinating the activities of other departments whose activities were to be co-ordinated. Third, the intelligence community is not a static entity. Its composition, as well as the relative importance of its members, has changed over time as new technologies have been developed, the international setting has changed, and bureaucratic wars have been won and lost.[21]

The status of charter member is best conferred upon the CIA; the State Department's intelligence unit, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR); and the intelligence units of the armed forces. All of these were given institutional representation on the NSC at the time of its creation. Three institutions which have a long-standing but lesser presence in the intelligence community are the FBI, the Treasury Department and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). While the FBI's counterintelligence role has remained constant, significant changes have occurred with regard to the other two. Early accounts of the Treasury Department's role in the intelligence community stressed its drug enforcement mission. By the Ford administration the Treasury Department was responsible for the overt collection of foreign financial, monetary, and general economic information, and its drug enforcement role had been dropped. The fate of the AEC is somewhat different. The task of collecting, evaluating, and providing technical information on the nuclear power programmes of other states is still very much alive. It is the organisation which no longer exists. The AEC gave way to the Energy Research and Development Administration in the Ford administration, and this, in turn, has given way to the Energy Department.

The first major addition to the intelligence community occurred in 1952 when Truman issued a presidential directive transforming the only recently created Armed Forces Security Agency into the National Security Agency (NSA).[22] This operates as a

semi-autonomous agency of the Defence Department and is charged with (1) maintaining the security of US message traffic, and (2) interpreting, traffic analysing, and cryptanalyzing the messages of all other states. In 1961 the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) joined the intelligence community as its newest major member. The DIA emerged as part of the centralisation process then occurring within the Defence Department. The major objectives behind its creation were to unify the overall intelligence efforts of the Defence Department and to more effectively collect, produce and disseminate military intelligence. Over the years DIA has emerged as the principal challenger to the CIA in the preparation of intelligence estimates. The Defence Intelligence Agency's challenge to the CIA's status as first among equals has reached a new height in the Regan administration. Both the Regan transition team and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence called for upgrading DIA's estimating capabilities so that it might more effectively challenge the estimates produced by the CIA.

Organisationally, the CIA is divided into four operational components. Each is headed by a deputy director who reports to the DCI.[23] The Directorate of Administration is responsible for recruitment, training, support activities, communications, and the physical security of CIA buildings. The Directorate of Science and Technology (DDS&T) is the newest directorate. It was established in the early sixties out of the conviction that technology had begun to change the nature of the intelligence function and that the CIA had to stay on top of this trend. The results of these efforts have been considerable. The U-2 and SR-71 planes and satellite reconnaissance systems all owe much to the efforts of this directorate.

The third operating unit of the CIA is the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI). It was created in 1952 through a reorganisation of the CIA's intelligence-producing units and is the largest of the CIA's directorates. Three major offices exist within DDI. They are the Office of Strategic Research which deals with the war-making plans of other states, especially those with nuclear capabilities: the Office of Economic Research which provides reports and analyses on such subjects as Soviet grain production, OPEC oil

production, the economic impact of weather patterns, and the strength of major foreign currencies; and the Office of Political Research which addresses topics such as terrorism, governmental stability, the link between foreign and domestic policies, and the impact of culture and religion on politics.

The DDI is the primary producer of government intelligence documents which range in frequency from daily briefs (at varying levels of secrecy) to weekly, quarterly, and yearly summaries, to occasional special reports. The best known of these reports are the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Until 1973 they were produced by the Office of National Estimates which was part of the DDI. At that time the office was replaced by a National Intelligence Officer system which currently operates out of the DCI's office. The change was made in order to increase the responsiveness of the intelligence community to policymaker needs and to improve the overall quality of the product. The purpose of NIE remains the same: to present the intelligence community's best judgement on a given topic.

The last directorate is the Directorate for Operations (DDO). This is the most controversial component within the CIAs system and one frequently recommended for splitting off or outright abolition. Like the DDI it was created in 1952. The Directorate for Operations has three basic missions; the clandestine collection of information, counterintelligence, and covert action. Within the DDO there exists a staff for each mission. The Foreign Intelligence Service monitors, assesses, and directs the clandestine collection of information, the counterintelligence staff is concerned with protecting the CIA from foreign penetrations; and the covert action staff plans and carries out covert action. The actual operations of DDO are grouped on regional lines and subdivided into stations. Each station is headed by a station chief and is generally housed in the US embassy. Their size varies from that of a few individuals to several hundred.

4.3.3.2. Foreign Policy Impact

It is difficult to determine the impact of covert intelligence operations toward third world states, but the CIA involvement in Central America and other places suggest that indirectly ultimate policy-making may well be influenced. As we will discuss in US-Iran case study, the August 1953 coup was entirely supported by CIA. This coup, planned by Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and John Foster Dulles, the secretary of state, and executed by Kermit Roosevelt at a cost of $1 million, resulted in the overthrow of Mossadeq's government.[24]

The purpose of intelligence is to provide policy makers with enough warning to allow them to act in the face of a challenge to national security. This is not easily done. Surprise is a fundamental reality of international politics, and no foreign policy or defence establishment can expect to escape completely from its negative consequences. Yet intelligence is not easily integrated into the policy process.[25] The conventional wisdom holds that policy and analysis must be kept separate, or policy will corrupt analysis. The alternative view holds that analysis cannot be kept value free or separate from policy-making. This position holds that analysts must articulate and evaluate policy options as well as force policy makers to confront alternatives.

The relationship between the CIA and the president is the key determinant of its impact on the policy process. This relationship is marked by a series of tensions which often serve to make the impact of intelligence on policy less than what it could be under optimum circumstances. The first tension is between the logic of intelligence and the logic of policy-making.[26] The logic of intelligence is to reduce policy options by clarifying issues, assumptions, and consequences. The logic of intelligence is to keep options open for as long as possible. One way to do this is to keep secrets from intelligence agencies. The second tension is between the type of information the president wants to receive and the type of information that the intelligence community is predisposed to collect and disseminate. Commenting upon his experience at INR, Thomas Hughes states that policy makers were most eager to get information that would help them convince Congress or the public about the merits of a policy. They

were most frustrated with information that was politically impossible to use and generally sceptical about the incremental value of added information for policy-making purposes.[27]

Third, intelligence produced by the intelligence community is not the only source of information available to the policy makers. Inputs are received from interest groups, lobbyists, the media and personal acquaintances leaving the president free to choose which intelligence he wishes to listen to. No one can make a policymaker accept or act on a piece of intelligence.

4.4. Congress

By constitutional design and according to the democratic model, Congress should be responsive to public preferences; and it should have a substantial impact on policy. According to the pluralist model, Congress ought to represent group interests and to provide a forum where conflicts among those interests are resolved by bargaining and compromising. We also expect power to be decentralised in Congress' internal procedures; and we further expect Congress to be in continual conflict with the executive branch as a result of the constitutional provisions for 'checks and balances'. In contrast, the ruling elite model assumes that Congress is unresponsive to public preferences and interests; that its membership is widely agreed on conservative policies; that it is dominated by a few members; and that it is in a co-operative relationship with the president, the bureaucracy, and big business.

Thus, the following questions are raised: What specific roles does Congress play in the policy process? How is Congress related to the Executive branch in the policy process? What internal procedures does it follow? What impact on policy does it have?

4.4.1. Relations with the Executive Branch

4.4.1.1. Shared Power

Several constitutional provisions give Congress specific functions in foreign policy-making; declaration of war, appropriation of funds, ratification of treaties, regulation of foreign trade, and confirmation of appointments to high-level positions in the executive branch. But the executive branch is also very much involved in each of these five functions. As commander-in-chief, the president is involved in war making. Requests for funds originate in the executive agencies and are reviewed and decided upon by the president, who recommends them to Congress; and the executive agencies spend the funds that are appropriated by Congress. Treaties are negotiated by the executive branch and then submitted to the Senate for ratification. Foreign trade agreements are negotiated by the executive branch, under authority delegated by Congress. The president nominates ambassadors and cabinet and sub-cabinet officials, and then the Senate decides whether to confirm those nominations.

Thus, the congress shares authority in its performance of these functions with the executive branch in general and the president in particular. These facts about congressional-executive relations in foreign policy-making require modification of the common notion that their relationship is one of separated powers or functions. In fact, only the institutions are separated; the powers (or functions) are actually shared, not separated.

In any case, a constitutionally-based interpretation of congressional involvement in policy-making and its relationship with the executive branch provides only a superficial understanding of congressional power. This approach refers only to authority, or formalised potential power, rather than actual power. Furthermore, there is a constant struggle between Congress and the executive branch over authority in foreign policy-making. The struggle may wax and wane over time, but there is nevertheless a constant and continuing tension. The tension with the executive branch and the limitations on Congress' power are evident in several congressional roles in policy-making.[28]

4.4.1.2. Declaration of War

Since World War II, there have been two wars and numerous military interventions or other acts of war without any formal congressional declaration. These cases include not only Korea and Vietnam but also Lebanon in 1958, the Congo in 1964 and 1967, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Cambodia in 1970. There have also been cases of direct support of military operations, such as happened in Guatemala in 1954 and Cuba in 1961.

In several of these cases and on other occasions, however, Congress did pass joint resolutions that provided support in advance for some kind of presidential action. In the case of Vietnam, Congress passed the 1965 Guild of Tonkin Resolution, which provided support in advance for administration action. It said, in part, that the congress approved of the 'determination of the President...to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression'. In 1955 Congress passed the Formosa Straits Resolution, which authorised the president to 'employ the armed forces of the United States as he deem[ed] necessary' to defend Formosa. Two years later in 1957, Congress passed a Middle East Resolution, which also authorised the president to 'employ the forces of the United States as he deem[ed] necessary' to protect the area against 'overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism'.[29]

Furthermore, in the cases of both Vietnam and Korea, Congress passed defence appropriation bills and supplemental appropriations that included funds specifically for the war, thereby providing at least tacit consent. During the Vietnam War in particular there was considerable controversy over the legal question of whether these resolutions and appropriations constituted the equivalent of a declaration of war and provided a legal basis for the administration's conduct if it - legal questions that were never resolved by the Supreme Court. However, the practical effect of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution became clear in 1971, when Congress voted to rescind it. The Nixon

administration simply said that the resolution was not necessary to provide a legal basis for the conduct of war; the president, they argued, had sufficient constitutional authority as commander-in-chief to continue American involvement in it.

Apart from formal congressional declarations or resolutions of appropriations, members of Congress have sometimes become involved in war policy-making through consultations with the president. In 1954, when the French were being defeated at Dien Bien Phu, President Eisenhower was considering the possibility of sending American combat troops into Southeast Asia; he solicited the advice of several leaders of Congress before reaching a decision. The congressional leaders advised the president that he should intervene with combat troops only if he could obtain a promise of active support from several other countries. Since that promise was not forthcoming, Eisenhower decided against military intervention. In that particular case, a limited form of congressional involvement clearly had an impact on the decision.[30]

Later in 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Act (Public Law 93-148) over the veto of President Nixon. This act provides that the president can deploy American combat troops abroad without prior congressional approval such as declaration of war - but that he can do so only if he finds that the United States is threatened with an attack or that it is necessary in order or protect American troops or citizens abroad. The act also provides that the president must consult with Congress 'in every possible instance' before he makes such a decision (a restriction that clearly gives the president an opportunity not to consult with Congress in advance). The act also provides that the president has to report to the House and the Senate within forty-eight hours after taking action; he must provide information about the circumstances in which he acted and the nature of the action he took. These provisions, then, clearly provide the president with ample opportunity to take the initiative and allow the Congress only a passive role - at least in the initial stage of an incident.

Other provisions in the War Powers Act, however, enable Congress to restrict the deployment of troops. Within sixty days, it can pass a concurrent resolution prohibiting

the continuation of the troop deployment, and this concurrent resolution cannot be vetoed by the president. After a period of sixty days from the time of the initial action, Congress must pass a concurrent resolution to permit the continuation of the troop deployment. In other words, in the first sixty days congress must take a positive action to prohibit the president from continuing the deployment, whereas after the first sixty days it must take positive action to allow the president to continue the deployment. There is another provision, though, that qualifies the sixty-day limit; the president can have an additional thirty days to withdraw the troops if he declares that the time is necessary to accomplish their withdrawal safely.

4.4.1.3. Treaties and Executive Agreements

In 1920, in a dramatic exercise of its power, the Senate refused to ratify the Versaille Treaty, which included the World War I peace treaty with Germany and the covenant of the League of Nations. But such a dramatic exercise of its power was also a rather rare event. In two centuries, the Senate has failed to ratify only eleven treaties. It has ratified over 1,200. Since 1945 alone, it has ratified over 400 and failed to ratify only one. Furthermore, the Senate normally ratifies treaties by substantially more than the necessary two-thirds of voting. In 1975 and 1976, the 94th congress ratified all thirty three treaties submitted to it by favourable votes of more than eighty percent of those voting. All but five of the thirty-three were ratified by unanimous votes.

On the other hand, the Senate has occasionally qualified its ratification by amendments or reservations to treaties. Before it ratified the Panama Canal Treaties in 1978, the Senate adopted twenty-four amendments, conditions, reservations, and understandings. One of them, named after its sponsor, Senator DeConcini, imposed an important change in the terms of the treaty; it provided that the United States could 'use military force in Panama' if the canal were closed.[31]

For the past several decades, the treaty ratification process has been substantially circumvented by 'executive agreements'. The Supreme Court has declared that

executive agreements have the same legal standing as treaties, even though they are not ratified or otherwise specifically approved by congressional action. The vast majority are 'statutory executive agreements' that the executive branch has negotiated with a foreign government on the basis of a congressional statute giving the executive branch the authority to do so. But other executive agreements have been reached without any such congressional delegated authority. Figure 6 indicates the dramatic increase in the number of executive agreements, particularly statutory executive agreements, compared with the relative constant number of treaties.

Some of these executive agreements have entailed major policy decisions. They have included, for example, the significant World War II agreements at Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, and more recent important air base agreements with Spain, Portugal, and Bahrain. Furthermore, executive agreements have often been kept secret from Congress. An investigation by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee found that the United States had secret agreements with Ethiopia, Laos, Thailand, South Korea, Spain, and other countries.

As a reaction to the number, importance, and secrecy of executive agreements, Congress passed the Case Amendment in 1972. It requires the president to send executive agreements to the House International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee within sixty days after they are signed. Those committees, however, cannot act on the executive agreements, either to accept them or to reject them; nor can Congress as a whole act on them. Rather, the two committees are given copies of the agreements only for the purpose of being informed about their contents. Further, the president can request that the committees keep the contents of the agreements secret from the rest of Congress. However, there has also been a change in the procedures prior to the initiation of a negotiation that might lead to an executive agreement or a treaty: The State Department consults with the leaders of Congress and the relevant committees in the House and the Senate to determine whether the negotiations will be formalised in an executive agreement or a treaty.[32]

Figure 6. Changes in the number of treaties and executive agreements.



SOURCE: Computed by the author from data in Congressional Quarterly, *Guide to Congress*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1976), p. 257; and U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, *International Agreements,* report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), Figure 1, p. 21.

4.4.2. Appropriations

In general, Congress must approve expenditures before executive agencies can make them. Congress passes authorisation bills that establish spending limits and appropriation bills that establish funds for agency use. In the exercise of this power, congress sometimes imposes substantial cuts in the agencies' requests or restricts the kinds of expenditures that are permitted. The budget requests for the operations of the State Department and the Agency for International Development, in particular, have frequently been subjected to careful scrutiny and detailed control in the subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee. During the 1950s and 1960s, Congress normally reduced the administration's economic assistance budget requests by 20 to 30 percent.

Until the 1970s, however, Congress typically had only a marginal impact on the defence budget. Although it did occasionally make some changes in the total amount (and in the distribution of the total among kinds of expenditures) it usually changed the administration's total request by only 1 or 2 percent. Congress as a whole has exercised no direct influence in the appropriations process for the Central Intelligence Agency. The details of the intelligence agencies' budgets are actually kept secret from the vast majority of the members of Congress. Those figures are known only to a few members on the intelligence, armed services, and appropriations committees.

Even when Congress has appropriated money for a specific purpose, an executive agency has sometimes not spent it or has spent it for other purposes. In 1961, when Congress appointed $700 million for manned bombers that the administration did not want, Secretary of Defence McNamara announced that none of the money would be spent. In the late 1960s, during the height of Vietnam War, the Pentagon shifted several million dollars of funds appropriated by Congress for Taiwan to Vietnam and then later asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation to replace the funds that had

been diverted. In the fiscal years of 1969, 1970, and 1971, the Navy spent $110 million more than its appropriations for personnel moving expenses.

In an effort to gain more control over executive expenditures, Congress passed the Budget Reform Act 1974. This law increased congressional control over expenditures through its provision concerning impoundment (an administration decision not to spend fund appropriated by Congress). Both houses of Congress must now approve of any proposed 'rescission' within forty-five days after being notified by the president of his intention not to spend the funds. In the absence of congressional approval, the president must spend the funds.

In another attempt to gain greater control over the appropriations process, specifically concerning weapons development, Congress passed a 1975 amendment to the Arms Control Disarmament Act. It requires executive agencies to submit 'arms control impact statements' to congress along with their budget requests for weapons development. The initiative in the preparation of these impact statements, however, lies in the agencies that are responsible for the weapon development programmes and in the National Security Council. Furthermore, the actual impact statements are prepared by the same agency developing the weapon, and the early impact statements were superficial - in many cases only a few sentences long. As a result, they did not substantially affect the weapons procurement budgeting process.

4.4.3. Confirmation of Nominations

The president is occasionally unable to obtain Senate confirmation of a person he has nominated to a high administration position. A notable instance was the Carter administration's inability to obtain approval for Theodore Sorensen to be the Director of the CIA. Previous administrations had also occasionally encountered sufficient opposition for them to withdraw nominations or decide not to submit names for formal consideration. The Nixon administration decided not to nominate Paud Nitze to be the

assistant secretary of defence for international security affairs in view of the opposition from Senator Goldwater. Goldwater was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which would have made its recommendation to the full Senate. There have been other occasions when an informal poll or consultations with key committee members have revealed so much opposition that the president decided not to proceed with a formal nomination.

Yet there is rarely sufficient opposition to prevent presidents from obtaining the confirmation of the vast majority of the people they want in their administrations. Confirmation hearings are often rather friendly and uncritical proceedings in which the nominee is not subjected to careful scrutiny and does not have his or her views on policy issues analysed in any detail. Indeed, except for cabinet-level officials, Congress typically has little interest in the confirmation process. Subcabinet officials and other officials routinely receive *pro forma* confirmation of the appointments. Moreover, many high-level appointments in the executive branch are not subject to Senate confirmation at all. The special assistant to the president for national security affairs and members of the White House staff are not within Congress.

4.4.4. Interest Groups and Dynamic

Although it is generally acknowledged that US foreign and security policy is hierarchically determined, especially in the era covered in this study, there are several influences that can affect the policy process at the level of congress. This includes interest group lobbying, the role of elections and the need to raise funds to fight elections. An example of the lack of influence of interest groups can be seen in the role of oil interests during the Clinton Administration and its policy of dual containment. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran's geo-strategic position has increased in relation to the natural oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region. US commercial wants to be allowed to be involved in developing these resources but the presidential policy of

the unilateral economic boycott is harming its own domestic industry. On the other hand, these same oil interests were able to influence president Eisenhower but not president Truman to move against Mossadeq when he nationalised oil in Iran.

The influence of elections and fund raising is best illustrated by the Jewish lobby again in the Clinton administration. During the 1992 elections, funds of almost $4 million were raised for 403 candidate in the congress elections.[33]

The lobby was then successful in having Martin Indyk. A pro-Israeli appointed as presidential advisor and ensuring the administrations pro-Israeli approach to the peace process

4.5. Public Opinion and the Media

Public opinion and the media stand at the periphery of the foreign policy decision-making process. Public opinion tends to be permissive and supportive of presidential decisions in foreign policy. Indeed, the level of public support for the president, increases dramatically in a foreign policy crisis - whether the resolution of the crisis is favourable to the American position or not.[34] Furthermore, public opinion is not always marked consistency: Polls may indicate that a large percentage of the American people consider a specific policy decision to be a mistake but nevertheless will support a presidential decision with which it disagrees. Critics of the policy can cite the first set of poll results, the administration the second. Each is partially correct, but the net result of the confusion is that the president can cite public support for his actions and use the power of his office to continue pursuing his chosen policies. Our discussion of public opinion will begin with a consideration of the broad limiting role of public view-points - of when public opinion is weak, when it becomes stronger, and the forces pushing it in various directions. We shall then consider the role of public opinion in a somewhat different context - the ways in which public opinion might be translated into policy decisions.

4.5.1. Support of Opposition to the President and his Policies

The role of public opinion in foreign policy is permissive and supportive of presidential discretion. The principal reason is that the vast majority of Americans are poorly informed about and uninterested in foreign policy. Most foreign policy issues are simply too far removed from their everyday frames of reference. A voter, who may be a worker, a farmer, a businessman, or a professor, will have (or will believe that he has) a certain degree of knowledge and familiarity in dealing with issues related to his sphere of livelihood(e.g. unemployment and job security or farm price subsidies), and he is also likely to hold views on various topics that relate to him as a citizen, father, and so forth (open housing, equal job opportunity, police protection, drugs, the quality and cost of medical care and education). On domestic policies he will therefore be more likely to hold his own views, even if they should differ from those of the president. On foreign policy issues, however, most voters do not have the knowledge, frame of reference, or sense of personal competence that they do with affairs that are less remote.[35] This lack of factual content and intellectual structure of public opinion means that the mass public tends to react to foreign policy issues in terms of moods and seeks guidance from the president.

> "A reassuring statement will be received with complacency The general public looks for cues and responses in public discussions of foreign policy. It does not listen to the content of discussion but to its tone. A presidential statement that a crisis exists will ordinarily be registered in the form of apprehension reactions. In both cases, the reaction has no depth and no structure."[36]

Two things should be clear. First, it is the president to whom the public looks for information and interpretation of the outside world and how it affects American security interests. This means that he has considerable freedom to set his direction and mould public opinion. Second, public opinion does not usually guide the president; it is

more frequently formed as a response to presidential action, not only because of public ignorance but because in foreign policy presidents frequently have to act before any firm public opinion has been formed. Gabriel Almond found two factors of particular importance in attracting and reducing public attention to foreign policy: '(1) the extreme dependence of public interest in foreign affairs on dramatic and overtly threatening events; (2) the extraordinary pull of domestic and private affairs even in periods of international crisis'.[37] Perhaps the best way of summing up the role of public opinion in foreign policy is to emphasise its followership.

Since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, public opinion has been responsive to presidential leadership and, therefore, has been as rigid or flexible as presidential policy. As will be briefly descussed in chapter five, the reason for restricting US aid to Iran during the period from 1948 to 1950, compared to Greece and Turkey, was caused by public opinions. Truman's administration considered that Congress and American public would not regard Iran as sufficiently important to warrant high level of US aid. It has supported hard-line anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese policies when they were official policy (as they were from Truman's day right through to Johnson), and it has supported moves toward a relaxation of tensions and negotiating conflicts of interests (as during the Nixon era). Both kinds of moves received widespread popular acclaim. The public looked to the president for its cues. In a crisis this phenomenon is particularly noticeable; the public rallies around the president even if the crises was bungled by the president, as Kennedy did the ill-fated refugee invasion of Cuba in 1961. During the opening periods of the two limited wars in which the United States has become engaged since World War II, the initial commitments received very high levels of public and congressional support, and they stayed high despite great costs, including high casualty rates, during the opening phase of the war. The fact that presidential action is prerequisite to the formation of public opinion on foreign policy issues was especially clear during the Vietnam War. There was little in the way of any opinion - either for or against - during the Kennedy Administration's incremental commitment of advisers, or

even after the Gulf of Tonkin. Extensive public awareness of Vietnam came only with the sudden, visible commitment of more than 500,000 men. But perhaps a more astounding example of public opinion's followership role and inconsistency occurred with President Nixon's decision to send American troops into Cambodia. Just prior to the decision, only 7 percent of the respondents favoured such a move; after the move 50 percent approved! Ford's approval rating jumped 11 percent immediately after the Mayaguez incident. Indeed, the public is so predisposed to view the foreign policy postures of chief executives positively that a July, 1974 Gallup poll found 54 percent of the respondents approving of how Nixon handled foreign policy. The president, who was to resign within a month in the midst of the Watergate scandal, had an overall approval rating of only 26 percent favourable responses.

Yet, while permissive and supportive, public support is not unlimited.[38] If a presidents policies are not successful, if they fail to achieve their objectives in a reasonable amount of time and at a tolerable cost, the public reserves the right to punish the president and his party at election time. A Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Western Europe, while sizeable in scale, received large-scale support. It had a time limit of four years and was not particularly burdensome for the taxpayer, and the result of a rebuilt and reinvigorated Europe was highly visible. In contrast, foreign aid programmes for developing areas have always been relatively unpopular. The aid seems to be unending and it clearly wins little overtly expressed goodwill for the United States. Nor does it stimulate fairly rapid modernisation to the point where economic progress becomes increasingly self-sustaining. Since forecasts predict an increasing gap between the rich industrialised western countries and the poor, essentially rural non-western countries, the future seems to hold only a continuous, almost external aid programme with no promise of quick success and relief from this capital transfer effort.

Military interventions follow the same pattern. When the president first announces an intervention the public - and Congress - will support him. Indeed, this recurrent phenomenon has led John Mueller to suggest that as long as presidents can commit

troops, proposals that wars can be avoided if Congress were required to vote its approval are unlikely to work, for once the commitment has been made the tendency will be to 'rally around the flag'.[39] An intervention such as the Dominican intervention in 1965 may be widely criticised by foreign policy experts in and out of government, congressmen, and journalists, but if it is brought to a successful conclusion, or at least what appears to be a successful conclusion, relatively quickly, the president will suffer no electoral reprisals. On the other hand, popular support for a Korean or Vietnamese war will decline over time if the price appears to be disproportionate to the objectives sought.

Public and congressional support for the conduct of the war does not decrease significantly, despite high casualties and/or taxes, while the general belief in a reasonably short war and success on the battlefield remains prevalent. Conversely, this support erodes as hostilities drag on and the continued high costs of the conflict appear increasingly pointless as the expectation of the victory disappears. In Korea, Chinese entry into the war led to a major drop of support for Truman five months after the American intervention; in Vietnam, the drop took longer, starting in the spring of 1965 and reaching a low point in late 1967, which after a brief upsurge, was reconfirmed by the Communist Tet offensive in early 1968.[40] Even President Johnson, a skilful manipulator, could not hold off the cost of the war forever; he had postponed this cost by not drafting most American middle- and upper-class males, mainly students; not calling up the reserves; and postponing a war surcharge tax. But the support eroded, and Tet was the final proof that victory was no nearer than before and that the high costs of the war were fruitless.

Thus, in limited wars, public opinion does not become relevant. Support for the wars in Vietnam and Korea declined as the costs, especially the casualty rates, increased over time. The impact of the casualty rate on the level of opposition to the war was considerably stronger for the Vietnam conflict than for Korea.[41] That may be an indication that the nightly exposure of Vietnam casualties by the television networks

had a considerable effect on the increase in opposition to the war. In both the Vietnamese and the Korean cases, the evaporation of presidential support permits other sources of information to gain a public following.

The two principal alternative sources are congressional hearings and the media. Lacking the power to change the president's Vietnam policies, Senator Fulbright used the mechanism of his Foreign Relations Committee hearings to dramatise opposition to the war. At times, the major television networks would carry live coverage of these hearings. At a minimum, the hearings would be covered on the evening network news programmes and in the major newspapers across the country. The influence of such hearings - which are often long and tedious and may not bring out any new information - may be slight, but it is often almost all that opponents of a policy have in their attempt to affect public opinion. With the growth of the medium of television, the roles of the congressional committee hearings and the media have become ever more closely intertwined. Television gives opponents of a policy a more direct line to the public than did newspapers or radio - it provides for visual contact as well as the reporting of events. However, the gains that opponents of a policy have made through this newest medium have also accrued to the president. Indeed, the chief executive can always obtain free network time for an address to the nation, and he can use such speeches to rally public opinion behind his policies. On balance, the advent of television probably has meant more to opponents of the president's policy than to the chief executive himself. Since public opinion is generally permissive and supportive of presidential initiatives, any gain in exposure of the opposition's point of view may well enhance the opponents' strength. A president simply needs less exposure to rally support for his position than does the opposition.

The media are more than just devices for presenting alternative views of public officials to the mass public or, in turn, representing the mass public to the foreign policy establishment. The media also have their own impact on public opinion. Although most voters are not terribly concerned with foreign policy issues, the nightly

television coverage of events in Vietnam brought an overseas war into millions of American homes each night. Furthermore, the media have not always presented presidential decisions in a favourable light. Virtually every president of the United States in recent years has believed that the press was hostile to him, 'out to get him'. Indeed, the Nixon administration brought its hostilities toward the media - the television networks and national news magazines as well as the newspapers - out into the open. Johnson was less hostile to the press but did criticise several reporters and nationally syndicated columnists for their opposition to his Vietnam policies. Johnson once had occasion to query Senator Church about the senator's anti-war position at a White House reception. The president asked the senator where he was getting his information on the war effort. Church replied that his information came from the columns of the noted journalist Walter Lippmann. The president reportedly replied, 'Well the next time you want a dam in Idaho, ask Walter Lippmann for it'.

Yet, even when public opinion has been mobilised - by the media, the congressional critics, or just be sheer uneasiness over the course of a foreign policy - its role still remains rather limited. The problem is that the public does not always speak with one voice. Sixty-four percent of a November, 1965, sample of Americans did not think that American involvement in Vietnam was a mistake, as compared to 21 percent who believed that it was. By October, 1967, the balance had shifted to the position that the war was a mistake (44 percent in favour, 46 percent opposed to the initial involvement). By the summer of 1968, a sizeable majority took the position that the war was a mistake.[42] Yet the pattern of support for proposals to end the war - including both a stepped-up military posture and total withdrawal - had not changed accordingly from 1965 to 1968. Meuller has thus argued that, at any given time, 'support should be considered a chord rather than a note'.[43] The president can use this pattern of inconsistency among the voters to indicate that there is not enough support for any other alternative policy warranty a shift in his position. If the lack of consistency in public opinion polls does not provide the president with a distinct message on how to

choose foreign policy alternatives, might not be the electoral arena? It is to his facet of public opinion's impact on foreign policy - and to the linkage between public opinion and congressional opinion - that we now turn.

4.5.2. Popular Control of Foreign Policy

Public opinion, according to many theorists of democratic government, does not serve as a guide to policy-makers who must choose among alternative courses of action every day. Rather, at election time the citizenry is called upon to choose its leaders and then to let those leaders determine policy choices until the next election. The electoral mechanism thus gives the voter what has been called 'popular control of government'. The voter, according to this thesis, does not instruct the men and women he chooses at the ballot box on what policies to adopt. Rather, he selects a candidate who represents policy politicians closest to his own. This is the electoral function of public opinion.[44] An even stronger demand upon public opinion is made by other democratic theorists: that public opinion should be 'converted' into public policy by the representative system of government. These theorists expect a member of Congress to represent - or, 're-present' - the views of his constituency in his voting behaviour in Congress. How well the public's viewpoints are translated into policy decisions of their representatives gives us an idea of how well the democratic political system is working. This 'conversion' function of public opinion demands more than the electoral function. The latter merely assumes that the voter can replace an office-holder whose views he does not like at the next election. The conversion function assumes that it is the task of the office-holder to represent faithfully the majority position in his constituency between elections as well.[45] In this section, we shall examine both views of the function of public opinion.

The concept of electoral system as a choice between two competing sets of policy choices does not indeed seem to hold true for the 1952 election. The evidence is rather straightforward that Truman's decline in popularity and the subsequent Republican

victory in 1952 can be attributed to the public's adverse reaction to the Korean War.[46] In general, however, there appears to be no great amount of policy voting on either domestic or foreign policy issues. On the one hand, the two parties have not always offered the voter a clear-cut choice on policy alternatives. On the other hand, there is even less evidence that voters are aware of whatever differences there may be between two candidates for an office.

Since voters tend to be less interested in questions of foreign policy than in domestic policies, it is not surprising to find that policy voting on foreign affairs questions is rather rare. A study of voters in the 1956 and 1960 presidential elections led Warren E. Miller to conclude that, an absolute minimum, the net contribution of the parties' foreign policies stands toward changes in voting behaviour from one election to the next was one-half of one percent.[47] In an election as close as the 1960 contest, this margin may be substantial. When looked at by itself, however, the effect of policy-stands on voting is negligible. A Roper poll reported that in the 1976 elections, voters saw domestic issues as more important in their voting decisions than foreign policy issues by a margin of more than 12 to 1. The results for foreign policy for more recent studies are no more heartening for the advocate of a political system that converts public opinion on foreign policy into public policy through elections. A study by Gerald M. Pomper found that, from 1956 to 1972, voter attitudes and partisan affiliation became more strongly associated in five areas of domestic policy but did not change for the one foreign policy measure (foreign aid) he examined.[48] There remained in 1972, as there had been in 1956, 1960, 1964, and 1968, virtually no relationship between public opinion and party identification on this foreign policy measure.

If the parties do not take divergent policy stands on issued, then the voter has no way of holding either party responsible for the decisions that are actually reached. And, since the party label of a candidate is the easiest way a voter can separate him from his opponent, this lack of consistency on foreign policy position offers little hope that the effects of public opinion will be felt through the ballet box. There is some evidence of

a relationship between general dissatisfaction with Johnson's performance as president and anti-Democratic votes in 1968.[49] However, there was virtually no policy voting on the Vietnam issue in that election: The patterns of support for Humphrey and Nixon were almost totally unrelated to the voters' positions on Vietnam.[50] The reason however, was not that the voters were not polarised on Vietnam. Rather 57 percent of the sample saw either no difference or very little difference in the Vietnam planks of the two candidates![51]In fact, Nixon appeared to do slightly better among advocates of pulling soldiers out of Vietnam than did Humphrey,[52] and considerably better among advocates of a stronger military posture. Indeed, the evidence is mixed as to whether there was any relationship at all between Johnson's popularity and the increasing opposition to the war in Vietnam.[53]

If there is little support for the concept of popular control of governmental policy through the electoral arena, then we should not expect a much stronger linkage between the public and their representatives in Congress. If this is the case, then the democratic dilemma becomes even more pronounced. If Congress finds the means to reassert itself on foreign policy but is acting otherwise than its constituents want it to, what does this mean for foreign policy under a democratic government? The very idea behind the conversion process is that public opinion is translated into public policy through the actions of the representatives in the legislature. To do so, members of Congress must of course know the views of their constituents.

In studies of the influence of constituency views upon the attitudes and behaviour of members of the House, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes found that the conversion process works quite well on civil rights, moderately well on social welfare issues, and virtually not at all on foreign policy questions. On civil rights questions in particular, the views of constituents were in general consistent with the representatives' roll call votes.[54] If we assume that a congressman might not always be able to identify the feelings of his constituents and instead bases his voting behaviour on what he believes his constituents think, then the conversion process on civil rights roll calls is

extremely strong. This is not surprising, since civil rights questions are redistributive issues. Both the representative and his constituents perceive 'winners' and 'losers' domestically, and it is reasonable to suppose that they identify the same groups as 'winners' and the same groups as 'losers'.

For foreign policy votes, on the other hand, there is at least a weak tendency for members of the House to take stands different from those espoused by their constituents. When representatives' perceptions of constituency attitudes are employed instead of simple constituency attitudes only a moderately positive relationship between perceptions and votes in noticeable. The upshot is that most representatives do not have a very good idea of what their constituents want. The linkage between actual and perceived constituency attitudes is more than three times as great for civil rights bills as it is for foreign policy roll calls. And, finally, the personal attitudes of representatives show virtually no relationship to constituency attitudes on foreign policy votes.[55] It is thus hardly surprising that Richard F. Fenno found that members of the House International Relations Committee saw their service on that body as not particularly helpful to their re-election efforts, in contrast to membership on such committees as Interior and Post Office.[56]

These results suggest that measures designed to strengthen the role of Congress in the foreign policy process will not necessarily bring foreign policy more in line with public opinion. If anything, public opinion seems to follow presidential opinion more than it does congressional opinion. Even when guided by opinion leaders in opposition to the president, the public tends to be more responsive to the chief executive. Yet, when opinions do become divided on a policy area, such as the war in Vietnam, the failure of the party system to play the role of opinion leader serves as a strong check on the conversion of public preferences into public policy in the foreign policy arena.

Still, a president cannot forget public opinion before he makes decisions; he is indeed very conscious of it, as it affects his desire to be re-elected or for his party's candidate to win, and he is therefore quite aware of what might happen if the citizen-

consumer does not like his policy-products (Carl Friedrich has called this 'the law of anticipated reaction'). Before World War II, the isolationist consensus set the constraints within which foreign policy decisions had to be made. Even joining the International Court of Justice became impossible; Roosevelt's call in 1937 for the democracies to 'quarantine' the aggressors met with a public furore. After World War II, Truman did not oppose the rapid demobilisation of the armed forces despite increasing tensions with the Soviet Union. The public wanted to relax, to bring boys back home, to concentrate once more on domestic and private affairs. Not until eighteen months after the war against Japan had ended, after the perception of repeated demonstrations of Soviet hostility and numerous vetoes in the United Nations, did the Soviet threat appear sufficiently clear that Truman felt he could go before Congress and the public and ask them to support the policy of containment. And the reaction to Vietnam and our frequently criticised role as world policeman suggests that U.S. policy in the post-Vietnam period will have to assume a 'lower profile' if it is to retain public - and congressional - support.

The four circles of power we have proposed do seem to indicate the relative impact of each set of actors on the foreign policy process. The president, because he can listen to whom he wished, and because he can generally command the support of the public (and Congress as well), stands at the centre of the decision-making process. Surrounding him are key personal advisers and the leaders of the major foreign policy agencies in the government. These leaders in turn depend upon the actors immediately below them in their respective departments for detailed advice and recommendations, which they carry into the innermost circle.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has generally traced the constitutional framework of US security policy process. The basic purpose of any state's foreign policy is promotion of its

national interests, and US foreign policy is no exception. Also the function of each institution is designed to achieve its national goal. Therefore, the policymakers in major institutions try to achieve these purposes by employing their available means effectively. Even though, each institution tries to enhance the national interests, they are not always co-operative, rather competitive or conflicted due to its own interest.

The part two of the case study of US and Iran relations, we will examine and appraise decision making process between the presidents and related institutions to develop the cliency relationships. The people who make decisions and determine policy for nation-states do not respond necessarily to the objective facts of a situation and the international environment. It is what a state's decision makers think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines their behaviour and essentially the output of the policy process which becomes identified as a nation's foreign policy.[57] It will be helpful to remember throughout the analysis in this study that no one factor alone is responsible for structuring the foreign policy of a state: therefore, in the case of the US fundamental national values, strategic debates, role definitions, bureaucratic conflicts, and the variables of the American civic culture intersect and conflict in the foreign policy arena before final policy outcome is established.

In sum, foreign policy is not the outcome of a logical, one-track, step-by-step process; rather, it is the end result of a tough, competitive battle in both an internal national political process and an external international political arena. These concepts will provide one of the objective standards to analyse the US foreign and security policy towards Iran in part two of US and Iran case study.

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PART TWO- CASE STUDY OF US AND IRAN RELATIONS

CHAPTER V

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND GREAT POWER INFLUENCE, 1800 - 1951

This chapter establishes the basis for examining the impact of cliency on Iran's domestic politics by discussing the trends and dynamics of Iranian politics in the previous era. Two main interpretative themes are stressed. The main theme is that the first half of the twentieth century saw the gradual emergence of an authentic democratic movement in Iran. This movement had its historical and intellectual origins in the constitution and republican movements of 1906-1925. Its social base was expanded substantially with the modernisation programmes of the 1920s and 1930s. The Iranian democratic movement reached its peak in the 1941-1953 period, which was characterised by widespread popular political activity, a vocal and largely uncensored press, relatively free elections, a broad spectrum of challenge to the power of the royal court. This period stands out in sharp contrast to the previous era in which Iran was ruled by a modernising autocrat and the subsequent era of authoritarian dictatorship under a client state.

The second theme stressed in this chapter is that while foreign involvement in Iran's internal affairs had been extensive in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it declined markedly after 1925. In contrast to the previous period in which Iran was divided into spheres of influence, its military was controlled by foreign powers, and its economy was burdened with foreign loans and concessions, Iran after 1925 became much more independent, despite Allied military occupation during World War II. Iran's greater independence during this period, particularly after 1946, helped to nurture the incipient democratic movement. Conversely, the re-establishment of a foreign

presence in Iran with the creation of a client state in 1953 had an extremely destructive effect on Iran's democratic movement.

5.1. The Great Powers in Iran before US Involvement, 1800 - 1941

Although Iran was never formally colonised, a number of European countries became deeply involved in its affairs in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The two main foreign actors in Iran before World War II were Great Britain and Russia. As Britain extended its formal control over India and as Russia expanded into the Caucasus and Turkestan (on Iran's north-western and north-eastern borders) in early and mid-nineteenth centuries, the interest and rivalry of these countries in Iran became keen. Iran and Britain concluded several treaties between 1801 and 1814, aimed primarily at blocking Russian expansionism. Iran fought and lost wars with Russia over the disputed region of Georgia in 1804-1813 and 1826-1828. This dispute was ended in 1828 with a treaty establishing the present Russia-Iranian border west of the Caspian Sea, followed in 1881 by a treaty establishing the eastern border. Iran also fought a war with Britain in 1856-1857 over the region of Heart in western Afghanistan, which was followed by a treaty recognising Afghanistan, which was followed by a treaty recognising Afghan independence.[1]

The economic penetration of Iran by foreign powers began in the second half of the nineteenth century, as Nasr al-Din Shah (1848-1896) and Mozaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1907) sold concessions to foreign agents to finance a standing army, luxury imports, and royal journeys to Europe. The first major concession was for a British telegraph line to India, signed in 1863 and completed in the following year. In 1872 a far-reaching concession was granted to Julius Reuter (a naturalised British subject), covering all transportation and mining (other than precious stones and metals) in Iran. The Reuter concession was cancelled in 1873 due to pressures from Russia, Reuter's inability to secure a British loan, and opposition in Iran from wealthy merchants

adversely affected by the concession. A concession was granted in 1888 to Britain for commercial navigation of the Karun River in south-western Iran, followed by an 1889 agreement with Russia that it would be given all future railroad concessions. Banking concessions were granted to Reuter of Britain and to Russia in 1888 and 1891. In 1900 Russia was given control of all customs receipts in exchange for a major loan.[2]

The rapid growth of foreign involvement in Iran's economy began to provoke broad popular opposition in the late nineteenth century. An 1890 British concession for domestic sales and exports of tobacco led to a massive nation-wide boycott, organised by influential clergymen and merchants. This boycott is generally regarded as the first major nationalist movement in modern Iran.[3] The Russian banking concession and the loan granted in exchange for customs receipts mentioned above gave Russia great influence over the wealthy classes in Iran and amounted to a virtual surrender of the country's finances. These actions also provoked popular opposition, particularly among elements of the middle class, and were an early impetus to the constitutional movement. In 1901 a concession was granted to William D'Arcy of Britain for oil and gas rights in all but the northernmost parts of Iran. This concession, which was re-negotiated in 1933, became the basis for all subsequent activities by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and was the subject of frequent controversy in Iran during the next half century.[4]

In the nineteenth century Britain and Russia were the main foreign actors in Iran. These countries competed vigorously, first over strategic issues and later over commercial concessions. However, with the polarisation of the major European powers into hostile camps before World War I and with the entrance of Germany into the Middle East (symbolised most prominently by the Berlin-Baghdad railway, begun in 1902), a rapprochement gradually developed between them. This was codified in the 1907 Anglo-Russian convention establishing spheres of influence in Iran. Under this agreement, Russia gained control over roughly the northern half of Iran, including the most commercially-attractive areas other than the oil-rich south-west. Britain gained

control over the south-eastern region bordering on what is now Pakistan, with the central and south-western sectors remaining neutral. Russian predominance under this agreement reflected its political and economic hegemony in Iran at this time, due mainly to its proximity to the most populous and dynamic areas in the Northwest and its dominance of Iran's trade and finances. The 1907 Anglo-Russian agreement was to remain for decades a source of bitter animosity on the part of Iranian toward Britain and Russia.

After 1907 Russian and British agents were active throughout Iran. In 1909 Russian troops entered the country. Despite its neutrality, Iran was occupied by various foreign powers during World War I and was the scene of widespread hostilities. Russian forces confronted Turkey in the west. German agents intrigued in Tehran and stirred up tribal rebellions in the south-west. Following the Russian Revolution, those parts of northern Iran occupied by Russian troops, as well as Turkestan and the Caucasus, were plunged into a state of near-anarchy. Russian forces disintegrated and British troops advanced north from Baghdad through Iran to counter a German-Turkish drive through the Caucasus toward Baku. Independent states were proclaimed in northern Iran, the Caucasus, and in Turkestan. British troops remained in Iran until 1921, aiding anti-Bolshevik forces throughout Central Asia.[5]

After the war, Britain sought to re-establish its influence in Iran by concluding a treaty in 1919 in which it undertook to reorganise Iran's army and treasury. This treaty was extremely unpopular in Iran, and was repudiated in 1921. Following the British evacuation from the Caucasus in 1920, Soviet forces established control in this area and subsequently entered northern Iran in pursuit of White Russian forces. Soviet troops remained in the province of Gilan until September 1921, propping up the independent Soviet Republic which had been established there. A 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty repudiated all Czarist claims on Iran and paved the way for the removal of Soviet forces. Soviet policy toward Iran in the interwar period was generally restrained, with Reza Shah portrayed in the Soviet press as a "national reformist".[6]

With the British treaty of 1919 and British and Soviet intrigues in Azerbaijan and Gilan immediately after World War I, it was apparent that these two countries were seeking to re-establish the dominant positions they had held in Iran before the war. However, after the rise to power in the early 1920s of Reza Khan (who was crowned Shah in 1925), the influence of these and other Western powers in Iran declined significantly.

The first acts of the government established in 1921 by Reza Khan were to conclude the treaty. Renouncing Soviet claims on Iran and repudiating the 1919 British treaty. As minister of war Reza Khan quickly removed all foreign officers from the military and took other steps to improve its loyalty, morale, and effectiveness. Arthur Millspaugh, an American financial advisor, was hired to reorganise and strengthen the economy, but was eventually undermined and forced out by Reza Shah. Trade with the Soviet Union and later with Germany was increased to weaken the British domination over Iran's economy. The Trans-Iranian railroad was built with local capital raised by a tax on tea and sugar and with advisors and equipment drawn from a variety of foreign countries. Measures such as import substitution and foreign exchange controls were taken to broaden and protect the domestic economy. Iranians with foreign ties were frequently harassed by Reza Shah and the system of capitulation for foreign merchants was removed. A variety of less dramatic measures were also taken, such as an attempt to purge Arabic words from Iran's Farsi language.[7] By the late 1930s Iran had been transformed from a backward country whose government and economy were dominated by agents to a modernising country with a strong central government and considerable independence from foreign actors.

5.2 The Politics of Iran, 1900-1941

The Qajar dynasty, which had ruled Iran since the end of the eighteenth century, became seriously weakened by the beginning of the twentieth century. Growing foreign

debt and the concessions granted by Nasr al-Din Shah and Mozaffar al-Din Shah made the royal court increasingly susceptible to foreign influence. Foreign leadership in the military made it less effective as an instrument of royal domination. The nation-wide response to the 1890 tobacco concession demonstrated to both the monarchy and those who opposed it the nascent strength of popular movements. In 1896 Nasr al-Din Shah was assassinated by a follower of Jamal al-Afghani, an itinerant cleric and activist who had inspired the tobacco boycott and who promoted Islam as a basis for struggles against Western imperialism throughout the Middle East and southern Asia. Nasr al-Din's successor, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, continued the policy of granting concessions. Most notable was the 1900 Russian concession for customs revenues, which led to widespread protest and rioting. In 1906 a series of public agitation's was staged in Tehran. These led to the granting of a constitution and the establishment of a parliament (the Majles) in July of that year.

5.2.1. The Social Structure of Iran under the Qajars

The traditional structure of Iranian society had begun to undergo a series of profound changes by the end of the nineteenth century, associated largely with Western political, economic, and cultural penetration. In the early Qajar period four main classes existed in Iran, in addition to the royal court: a traditional dominant class of tribal khans and large landowners (including a few top clerics); a broad, heterogeneous middle class of petty landowners, middle-level bureaucrats, bazaar traders, and rank-and-file clergy; a lower class of artisans and wage-earners in the bazaar and the urban *lumpen-proletariat*; and a large, impoverished rural mass of poor peasants and itinerant tribal groups. These class divisions were embedded in a mosaic of regional, tribal, ethnic, and religious divisions which effectively prevented any kind of large-scale class or nationalist consciousness from emerging.[8]

Following the first war with Russia in 1804-1813, modest efforts were begun to establish a standing army to replace the ineffective tribal contingents. This involved the conscription of some 6000 troops, the establishments of small industries to manufacture arms and uniforms, the hiring of European advisors, the establishment of a secular secondary school, the funding of limited opportunities for education in Europe, and increases in taxes and tariffs to finance the entire effort. These measures fostered a degree of contact with Western ideas and the beginning of a nationalist consciousness among the small strata of educated bureaucrats and professionals. This brief period of modernisation ended in 1951 under pressure from Britain and Russia and from domestic elements which were adversely affected by the taxes and tariffs.

Western economic penetration in the second half of the nineteenth century gradually produced a much stronger and broader nationalist consciousness, clearly visible in the reactions to the 1872 Reuter concession, the 1890 British tobacco concession, and the 1900 Russian loan. This consciousness emerged primarily among three segments of the middle class. First, traders and merchants from the bazaar reacted vehemently to the higher taxes and competition from foreign goods (particularly textiles) and foreign merchants, who were protected by a series of capitulation. Second, elements of the clergy became increasingly hostile toward foreign penetration, for reasons ranging from their desire to protect Islamic traditions to their need to reinforce their main base of support in the bazaar. Finally, a small, diverse strata of Western-oriented intellectuals which began to emerge in this period became increasingly incensed at the surrender by Qajar rulers of Iran's political and economic independence. The orientation of these intellectuals toward Western nationalist and democratic ideas was to provide the main ideological foundation for the constitutional movement of 1906 and the republican movement of the early 1920s.[9]

5.2.2. The Constitutional Revolution and its Aftermath, 1906-1925

The constitutional movement was a direct outgrowth of the protests which had begun on a large scale with the tobacco boycott. Its immediate antecedent was an economic crisis in 1905 which resulted from a bad harvest and the disruption of trade with Russia caused by the Russo-Japanese War and the 1905 Russian Revolution. Tehran merchants petitioned the court in the summer of 1905 to rectify some of the damage done to them by the various foreign concessions and to dismiss the Belgian administrator of the Russian customs concession. After the merchants' demands were ignored a general strike erupted in December 1905 reiterating these demands and calling for the establishment of a "House of Justice". Major demonstrations were organised by merchants and elements of the clergy after a series of violent confrontations in the summer of 1906, and the British legation was occupied by a crowd estimated at 14,000. After receiving threats of armed uprisings and the defection of the Cossack Brigade, Mozaffar al-Din Shah relented, permitting the establishment of a parliament and the drafting of a constitution.

The constitutional movement was strongly opposed by Muhammad Ali Shah (who succeeded his father in early 1907), and by Britain and Russia. The first Majles blocked a new Anglo-Russian loan, condemned the 1907 convention establishing spheres of influence in Iran, and sought to impose a number of reforms on the royal court. The shah and his supporters responded by organising anti-constitutional demonstrations which drew mainly from the urban *lumpen-proletariat.* In June 1908, the shah's Russian-officered Cossacks bombarded the parliament building, closing the first Majles. A number of constitutional leaders were subsequently tortured or murdered, and a pro-constitutional revolt in Tabriz was crushed by the 1909 Russian invasion, following a protracted siege. The Majles was restored in 1909 when a force of constitutionalists from Rasht (the capital of Gilan) and Baktiari tribesman invaded Tehran and ousted the shah. However, further Russian and British pressures, including the development of more troops and a series of ultimatums demanding the dismissal of the pro-constitutional American financial advisor Morgan Shuster, led to a coup in

November 1911 by the pro-shah cabinet which closed the Majles and ended the early nationalist period.[10]

Between 1911 and 1914, Iran was nominally governed by a cabinet dominated by Bakhtiari tribal leaders. However, Russian and British influence in the cabinet and the presence of over 12,000 Russian and British troops left actual control in the hands of these powers. With the collapse of the central government tribal uprisings and separatist revolts emerged in several outlying areas. These increased with the outbreak of World War I, as German agents intrigued among remnants of the constitutional movement in Tehran and as Soviet agents and sympathisers later aided separatist movements in the Northwest. Ahmad Shah was crowned in July 1914, followed shortly by elections for the third Majles, which were manipulated by the Russians and British. Anarchy reigned in much of the country during World War I, particularly after the collapse of the Czarist forces. Rebel governments were established in Gilan and Azerbaijan and famine was reported in many areas.

With the collapse of Czarist Russia, Britain sought to extend its influence in Iran after World War I by advancing the treaty of 1919. This treaty was almost universally opposed in Iran and provoked strong anti-British sentiments. Elections for the fourth Majles were rigged by Prime Minister Vosuq al-Doleh in an attempt to achieve ratification of the treaty, raising further public outcries. By late 1920, opposition to the treaty and to the Vosaq government which favoured it and had failed to end the Gilan revolt was strong.[11] Several groups apparently contemplated coups at this time, particularly in the military, which opposed the introduction of British advisors and blamed its White Russian leadership for the failures in Gilan. In February 1921 a coalition of Cossack officers under Reza Khan and liberal nationalists under Sayyed Ziaal-Din seized power, installing Sayyed Zia as prime minister in 1923, and crowning himself Shah in 1925. His accession to the throne was opposed by a handful of Majles deputies led by Mohammed Mossadeq,[12] who was later to become the chief symbol of Iranian nationalism.

5.2.3. The Regime of Reza Shah Pahlavi, 1925-1941

Reza Shah came to power because of the weakness of the Qajar state. The Qajars had mortgaged much of their sovereignty to the Russians and British by contracting loans and concessions to finance their extravagant lifestyles. This had emptied the treasury, requiring tax and tariff increases and making large-scale reforms and modernisation impossible. Particularly crucial to their fall was the inability of the Qajars to finance a strong, loyal army which followed the constitutional period and which would certainly have made the 1921 coup more difficult. Foreign concessions and the weakness of the Qajars also alienated the middle-class elements whose emerging consciousness and growing political power became evident during the tobacco boycott and the constitutional period. Although Reza Shah's rise to power was based primarily on his control over the military, it occurred initially with the active support and later with the acquiescence of the middle-class.

During the early years of his rule, Reza Shah was a nationalistic, modernizing monarch who bore a greater resemblance to his Turkish contemporary Kemal Ataturk than to his Qajar predecessors. The actions taken by Reza Shah to reduce foreign influence in Iran have been described above. Reza Shah also undertook a large-scale programme of modernisation. This effort transformed Iran from a backward, largely feudal country heavily dependent on the outside world for market, manufactured goods, and administrative expertise to a semi-industrialised country dominated by a strong state and considerably less dependent on the outside world.

Reza Shah's first modernisation efforts focused on the military and the civil service, which served as his consolidation of power and in his years as Iran's uncontested ruler. After the 1921 coup Reza Khan acted quickly to unite the diverse military units under a reorganised, all-Iranian officer corps. Nation-wide compulsory conscription was established in 1925, with mandatory literacy training and subsequent

reserve duty for all recruits. The civil service was thoroughly reorganised in 1922, when regulations governing hiring, promotion, and professional conduct were established. Between 1923 and 1943 the number of civilian government employees increased from 25,000 to 100,000, and the army grew to nearly 400,000.[13]

The growth of the officer corps and civil service groups was closely tied to the establishment of a secular educational system in Iran. The number of students enrolled in secular primary and secondary schools increased by an astonishing 1300 percent between 1925 and 1929. The University of Tehran was established in 1934, and by 1941 36 teacher's colleges and 32 vocational schools had been established. Beginning in 1928, 100 state scholarships for overseas study were awarded annually, and over 1500 students had returned from overseas by 1938. Schools for the military and civil service and a large adult education programme were also established. In addition to fostering a Western-oriented, non-aristocratic civil service and officer corps, the establishment of a secular educational system helped undermine Islamic values and the role of the clergy in Iranian society. This trend was further augmented by the secular reforms of the civil code and judicial system which were carried out between 1928 and 1936.[14]

Economic development was also extensive in this period. Primary emphasis was placed on the expansion of industry and infrastructure at the expense of agriculture. Large-scale industrialisation occurred in the mid-and later-1930s. Industrial employment increased by 250 percent from 1934 to 1938, and the share of industry in Iran's GNP grew from nearly 0 to around 5 percent between 1926 and 1947. The main industries established were textiles, matches, cements, and tobacco and food processing plants. These used domestic raw materials almost exclusively, and constituted an initial stage of import substitution.

The state played an extensive role in Iran's industrialisation under Reza Shah. A national bank was established in 1927. By the late 1930s 20 percent of the national budget was allocated to industrialisation, exceeding defence expenditures in 1939-1941.

State-operated foreign and domestic trade monopolies were established. By the end of Reza Shah's regime roughly 50 percent of industrial production and employment (excluding the oil industry) were in state-owned industries. Great advances in transportation and communications were also made under state sponsorship. The Trans-Iranian Railroad, which connected the Persian Gulf and the main northern cities, was constructed under Reza Shah. Not surprisingly, many of these industries, particularly those operated by the state, were inefficient and unprofitable. It is evident that much of the industrialisation and development of infrastructure (particularly the railroad) undertaken in this period served the state goals of achieving greater economic independence and a stronger military apparatus rather than the rational criteria of economic planning.[15]

5.2.4. The Social and Political Structure of Iran under the Reza Shah

Reza Shah's modernisation efforts had profound consequences for the social structure of Iran, which had evolved only modestly since the early nineteenth century. The most important new class to emerge under Reza Shah was an educated middle class or intelligentsia, composed mainly of the professionals and middle-level bureaucrats who had benefited from Reza Shah's educational reforms. This class mainly grew out of the traditional middle class described above, many of its members having come from bazaar or petty land-owning families. It had very heterogeneous political loyalties, providing both the middle-level employees of the state apparatus and much of the leadership of the various political movements which emerged after the fail of Reza Shah in 1941. Closely related to the educated middle class (and in fact overlapping considerably with it) were the lower levels of the officer corps, which had been greatly expanded along with the civil service and the rest of the military by Reza Shah. The emergence of the educated middle class corresponded with a decline in the

position of the clergy, which was seriously weakened by Reza Shah's secularising reforms.[16]

Because of the dominant role played by the state in industrialisation under Reza Shah, the Iranian bourgeoisie remained comparatively small and subservient to the state in this period. Furthermore, since foreign investment in Iran was confined to the oil industry until the mid-1950s, very little of the Iranian bourgeoisie could at that time be described as dependent on foreign capital. The main industries open to the private sector under Reza Shah were matches, some textiles, certain food processing industries, and service industries such as transportation and construction. Most of the industrialists who did emerge in this period came from either the bazaar or from Reza Shah's close circle of top military officers and state officials.[17]

The great expansion of the economy under Reza Shah enlarged the traditional petty bourgeoisie located in the bazaar, which had ties with both the industrial working class, which grew from about 1500 at the turn of the century to 50,000 in 1941, with another 40,000 in the oil industry. This modern working class was drawn mainly from the poorer peasants and the urban lumpen-proletariat. Since labour unions were outlawed before the main period of industrial expansion in the 1930s the working class remained largely unorganised under Reza Shah. However, several strikes were staged under communist leadership between 1929 and 1931, and the industrial working class gave strong support to the communist Tudeh party in the 1940s and 1950s. [18]

Reza Shah's regime was a mixed blessing for the landed aristocracy. Landowners benefited from the sale of crown lands and from a series of laws passed in the 1920s and early 1930s which firmly established the institution of the land-ownership. Furthermore, the granting of universal male suffrage under the fourth Majles enabled landowners to dominate that body, not only under Reza Shah (when it was completely subordinated), but in the subsequent era as well. However, as much as 15 percent of the arable land in Iran (including almost the entire province of Mazandaran) was acquired privately by Reza Shah, much of it through confiscation

from wealthy landowners. Very little attention was devoted to the modernisation of agriculture in Reza Shah's development programme. Much of the land-owning tribal aristocracy was severely weakened by the pacification and forced settlement of the tribes.[19]

Needless to say, Reza Shah's actions brought very little change to the lives of the poor peasants. The Iranian peasantry remained on the brink of survival throughout this period. Other than those who migrated to the urban areas, Iranian peasants played no significant role in Iranian politics.[20]

Despite his efforts to reduce foreign influence and modernise Iran, Reza Shah was a tyrant and a dictator who ruled arbitrarily and used the crown to amass a great fortune. After initially supporting the movement to establish a republic, Reza Khan changed his mind in 1924 on the grounds that Iran was not yet ready to rule itself. Political parties were outlawed in 1927, after making a brief appearance. Elections were routinely manipulated, and the Majles served essentially to legislation handed down by Reza Shah. Press censorship was severe, and labour unions were outlawed in 1931. The tribes were ruthlessly suppressed by the army, disarmed, and forced to settle into villages. Those intellectuals, military officers, or clerics who opposed Reza Shah or became too powerful were imprisoned, tortured, or murdered.[21]

Reza Shah's dictatorial methods served to temporarily neutralise the democratic movement which had triumphed during the constitutional period. This movement remained very much alive, however, and was paradoxically strengthened by the modernisation efforts of Reza Shah, which greatly expanded its social base in the middle and working classes. Iran's democratic movement re-emerged with great vigour upon the demise of Reza Shah to present the most serious and protracted challenge to the autocratic ambitions of his successor.

5.3. World War II and the Post War Period, 1941-1951

Reza Shah's dictatorial regime came to an abrupt end in 1941 when Britain and the Soviet Union Jointly invaded Iran. The immediate motive for the invasion was to secure the Trans-Iranian Railway, through which some 30 percent of the supplies sent to the Soviet Union from the West between 1942 and 1944 were eventually shipped. The rapid growth in Iran's trade with Germany and increasing German involvement in Iran's heavy industries and transportation system had given Germany a prominent position in Iran by 1941. Strong pro-German sentiments and extensive German fifth column activities in Iran were seen as a threat to Allied plans to use the Persian Corridor as a supply route for the vital eastern front. British and Soviet demands prior to invasion that Reza Shah eliminate German agents and sympathisers were ignored. After the invasion, Reza Shah was exiled to Mauritius and subsequently to South Africa where he died in 1944, leaving the throne to his 21 year old son Mohammed Reza.[22]

5.3.1. Iranian Politics during World War II and its Aftermath

The fall of Reza Shah initiated a twelve year period of fervent political activity in Iran. Censorship was lifted, and a general amnesty for political prisoners was declared. Political parties were reintroduced, with as many as 42 appearing by early 1944. The occupation of Iran by both Soviet and British and American forces helped to promote a large measure of ideological diversity in Iranian politics, unlike earlier foreign involvement which had generally contributed to national disintegration.[23]

The broad spectrum of social groups and political parties which were active in this period and the degree to which these groups were mobilised contrasted sharply with the previous and subsequent eras. Of the parties which emerged during the war, the communist Tudeh party quickly established itself as the most active and most popular. It was formed in late September 1941 by the survivors of a group of 53 Iranian communists who had been jailed in 1937 and recently amnestied. It portrayed itself until mid-1944 as a democratic, anti-fascist, and leftist but non-Marxist organisation. It

participated in elections, supported the constitution, strongly opposed the Axis powers and the remaining vestiges of Reza Shah's regime, and found itself frequently at odds with the Soviet Union and with veteran Iranian communists.

The Tudeh party sought to attract a broad spectrum of progressive elements in this period, ranging from bourgeois nationalists to peasants and the new industrial working class. The latter quickly emerged as its primary base of support, while its leadership was drawn mainly from the educated middle class. It also received strong support from regional and ethnic populations seeking greater autonomy from the central government in Tehran, such as the Kurds and Azerbaijanis. The Tudeh party was very popular and remained highly visible in this period, staging large demonstrations and publishing a variety of newspapers. It elected 8 of the 126 representatives in the fourteenth Majles elections of late 1943 and early 1944 (more than any other party) and received 13 percent of the vote nation-wide. A *New York Times* reporter later estimated that it could have received 40 percent of the vote for the fifteenth Majles elections in 1946, had they not been rigged by the government.[24]

Many of the other parties established in the years immediately after the fall of Reza Shah had little popular sport and quickly disappeared from the political scene. By the time of the fourteenth Majles elections five main parties had emerged, in addition to the Tudeh. They were the conservative, royalist National Union party, supported mainly by wealthy landowners; the conservative, pro-British Fatherland party, which was headed by Sayyed Zia (who returned from exile in 1943) and represented the tribal aristocracy, the conservative clergy, and elements of the bazaar; the centrist Justice party, composed mainly of anti-Communist intellectuals; the progressive, nationalist Iran party, which backed Mossadeq's re-entry into politics in this period and was supported by moderate and left-wing intellectuals and bazaar elements; and the radical Comrades' party, which split from the Tudeh in late 1942 and consisted mainly of anti-Stalinist intellectuals. Together with the Tudeh party, which had by far the largest popular base, these parties essentially defined the political spectrum of the time.

Elections for the thirteenth Majles (which sat from November 1941 until November 1943) had largely been completed before the Allied invasion, and consequently the emergence of these parties had little effect on its composition. However, they played an important role in the elections for the fourteenth Majles (March 1944 through March 1946). Although only a small number of its deputies actually belonged to these parties, the fourteenth Majles quickly split into a number of fractions or caucuses which espoused platforms similar to those held by the parties. The main point of cleavage among them was between the pro- and anti-shah fractions. The royalist National Union caucus held less than 25 percent of the seats, giving the Majles a decidedly anti-shah character.

Conflict between the young shah and the fourteenth Majles began with his attempts to influence the elections and to subsequently prevent it from convening. Once the Majles was convened, the anti- shah forces gained control over the most important committees and began to establish a cabinet and institute a series of procedural reforms which solidified their position. The major confrontation between the shah and his Majles opposition occurred when it attempted to assert control over the military by restricting its budget and forcing it to enact major reforms. This posed a serious threat to the shah, for whom the military was an essential base of power. The effort by the Majles to rein in the military was thwarted by a series of protracted and violent strikes by textile workers in Isfahan, apparently led by the Tudeh party. Local tribal leaders feared Soviet intervention on behalf of the striking workers and joined forces with the military and the shah. Calls to strengthen the armed forces and a strong anti-Tudeh reaction emerged in the Majles, ending the drive to rein in the military and weakening the anti-shah coalition.[25]

Since early 1943 the government had been quietly negotiating for new oil concessions in the north and south-east with British and American oil companies. The government had initially invited Standard of New Jersey to submit a bid, apparently in an attempt to increase American influence to counter Britain and the Soviet Union.

This promoted the Soviets to demand the northern concessions for themselves, marking the beginning of a period of growing antagonism between the Soviets and the Iranian, British, and American governments, and between Soviet supporters and opponents in Iran.[26]

The Tudeh party quickly backed the Soviet demands, an action which openly identified it as pro-soviet and signalled its increasing radicalisation. The progressive and nationalist elements in the Majles broke their anti-shah alliance with the Tudeh party and joined with conservatives elements in outlawing all further oil concessions, a move which was led by Mosadeq. Hostility between the Soviet Union and Iran and the radicalisation of the Tudeh party increased further after April 1945, when a government which had attempted to placate the Soviets was replaced by one which was more hostile, headed by the arch-conservative Mohsen Sadr.

Attacks by the Sadr government against Tudeh offices and news - papers in August 1945 provoked uprisings in the Tudeh strongholds of Mazandaran and Gorgan in the north and in Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan. Soviet troops which occupied those areas prevented the local garrisons and outside reinforcements from responding to the uprisings. The Tabriz uprising was accompanied by demands for the autonomy of Azerbaijan led by Pishevari's Democratic party, which quickly absorbed the local Tudeh branches. Further uprisings culminated in the establishment of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan in December 1945 and the Kurdish People's Republic in western Azerbaijan in January 1946.

The Soviet Union was instrumental in establishing and protecting those separatist movements. It continued to press for oil concessions and refused to consider withdrawing its occupation forces. However, a combination of strong diplomatic pressure by the United States and brilliant diplomatic manoeuvring by Ahmad Qavam, who became prime minister in March 1946, led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the subsequent collapse of the autonomous republics in December 1946. The proposed

Soviet oil concession, which had been left for the Majles to ratify, was overwhelmingly rejected in October 1947.[27]

The aggressive Soviet actions in Iran during this period were a major source of East-West tension in the early years of the Cold War, and undoubtedly contributed to the rigid view of Soviet intentions in Iran and elsewhere which subsequently prevailed in Washington.[28] Soviet actions in this period can in part be explained by the declining importance of the Persian Corridor after the Black Sea supply route was secured in October 1944 and by the desire of the Soviet Union to establish friendly buffer states on its borders. However, Nazi documents captured by the Allies revealed a November 1940 agreement between the Axis powers and the Soviet Union which acknowledged Soviet territorial aspirations in the area to its south, including Iran. The existence of such an agreement was apparently suspected by some Iranians at the time, and was certainly known to US policymakers in the early days of the Cold War.[29] While one may question the extent to which Soviet officials still held such intentions in the post-war period (particularly after the death of Stalin in March 1953), it is clear that the containment of Soviet expansionism remained a cardinal principle of US policy toward Iran in the 1940s and 1950s.

5.3.2. The Post-war Struggle for Power in Iran

With the departure of Soviet troops and the collapse of the Ajerbaijan and Kurdish republics, external forces again assumed the secondary role in Iranian domestic politics which they had come to occupy under Reza Shah. However, in the open political environment which prevailed after 1941, the withdrawal of foreign actors left Iran turbulent and in a state of flux.

The immediate consequences of the Soviet withdrawal were a collapse of the Tudeh Party's broad base of support and a surge in the popularity of Qavan's Democratic party, which briefly gained control of the fifteenth Majles. An extensive

government crackdown on the Tudeh party and its affiliates began in October 1946 and continued during the reoccupation of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. In the invasion of these provinces by government forces some 500 rebels were killed, over 10,000 fled to the Soviet Union, and hundreds of top leaders were executed or imprisoned. This was a serious blow to the Tudeh, whose main base of support had been in Azerbaijan. During the next two years the party underwent a period of reorganisation and ideological purification, purging its top leadership, identifying itself more closely with Marxist-Leninist principles and with the Soviet Union, and boycotting the fifteenth Majles elections.[30]

Since those elections were held in the six months after the collapse of the autonomous republics, Qavam's party obtained a strong majority in the fifteenth Majles. However, much like the anti-shah coalition in the previous Majles and the National Front movement which later emerged under Mossadeq, Qavam's Democratic party contained very diverse elements. These ranged from wealthy landlords and industrialists to tribal leaders, the urban middle class, and the industrial working class. Friction among these groups soon emerged over a variety of issues, leading to defections from the party and ultimately to the ouster of Qavam in a vote of no confidence in late 1947.

Defection from the Democratic party left four fractions of roughly comparable size in the Majles: the loyal Democratic (who continued to support Qavam), the royalist National Union Caucus, the pro-British National Caucus, and a diverse group of independents. In addition, the Tudeh party, which had boycotted the fifteenth Majles elections and was still in the process of reorganising, began to be an important political force in 1948. In the elections within the Majles for Qavam's successor the royalist/pro-British candidate Hakami defeated the Democrat/independent candidate Mossadeq by one vote. The Hakimi government opposed efforts (led by Mossadeq) to renegotiate the 1933 British oil concession and continued Qavam's harassment of the Tudeh party. It also made a number of proposals which would have made the shah

more powerful, such as increased military spending and the establishment of an upper house of parliament (the Senate), half of whose members were appointed by the shah.

After seven years as head of state and in the absence of a unified opposition such as that headed by Qavam or the Tudeh/Soviet collaboration of 1944-1946, the shah apparently felt in 1948 that he could attempt to re-establish the dominant position held by the court under the Reza Shah. The size and quality of the military had been growing steadily, due in part to US aid (see chapter 6, below). This not only increased its ability to suppress mass-based groups such as the various autonomy movements, the Tudeh party, and the tribes, but also increased its loyalty to the shah. The shah also began to intrigue among the major political figures of the time, aiding those who were loyal to him and undermining those who opposed him or remained independent (such as Qavam, who was forced into exile when his government collapsed).

In attempting to re-establish the monarchy, the shah also sought to strengthen Iran's ties with the United States and weaken the pro-British fraction in the Majles, which brought down the Hakami government after only six months in office. The royalists then formed a government in collaboration with Qavam's Democrats. This government, which began secret negotiations to revise the British oil concession, collapsed after four months because of obstructionism by the pro-British fraction, aided by the populist cleric Ayatollah Kash-ani. The Majles was unable to agree on a new government, and strongly opposed as unconstitutional the shah's efforts to appoint one. The impasse was ended, however, in February 1949 when an attempt was made on the shah's life. Seizing this opportunity, the shah declared martial law, installed his candidate as prime minister, convened a constituent assembly which created the upper house of parliament mentioned above, and instituted a wide-ranging crackdown on his opposition, including a ban on all Tudeh party activities.[31]

5.3.3. The Emergence of the National Front

The shah's crackdown and his subsequent attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections (held between July 1949 and February 1950) provoked a large demonstration in the royal palace grounds in Tehran. The demonstrators elected a committee of twenty prominent activists to negotiate their demands with the shah, headed by Mohammed Mossadeq. The committee obtained a promise from the court that free elections for the sixteenth Majles would be permitted. It then retired to Mossadeq's home, where it agreed to form a national organisation to continue pressing for various reforms. This organisation became known as the National Front.

The National Front elected eight representatives to the sixteenth Majles (which sat from February 1950 until May 1951), including Mossadeq and several other members of the original committee of twenty. Although the sixteenth Majles was overwhelmingly pro-shah, the National Front deputies immediately called for cuts in the military budget, denounced the constituent assembly, and voiced other demands aimed at reducing the power of the shah and improving the position of the middle classes. In June 1950 the pro-shah government submitted proposals to a Majles committee calling for revisions in the 1933 oil agreement with the AIOC. In order to aid passage of the proposals, the shah at the same time nominated Ali Razmara to be the new prime minister. Razmara was a top general who favoured renegotiation of the treaty but had otherwise been independent and frequently critical of the shah. Razmara was quickly elected, despite opposition from the National Front. He then sponsored measures in the Majles embodying the new proposals, along with a number of reforms such as higher taxes for the rich, an anti-corruption commission, proposals for provincial and local assemblies, a relaxation of anti-Tudeh measures, and a land reform bill.

Razmara was assassinated in March 1951 by a member of the Fedayan-i Islam, a Muslim extremist group which was closely associated with Kashani at the time. Razmara's assassination was clearly tied to his support for the oil agreements, and apparently involved Kashami and several other National Front leaders. By the time of

Razmara's assassination, opposition to the oil agreements was nearly universal and the National Front had begun to lead a movement for nationalisation of the AIOC. Recognising the strength of this movement, the Majles rejected the shah's nominee to replace Razmara and elected the moderate Hossein Ala as the new prime minister.

Ala brought a top National Front leader into his cabinet and permitted a bill calling for nationalisation to be adopted by the Majles. This bill, which was sponsored by Mossadeq, was later approved by the Senate (half of whose members were appointed by the shah) and signed into law by the shah, indicating the strength of the nationalisation movement. In late March a series of Tudeh-sponsored strikes calling for nationalisation and protesting working conditions swept the oilfields and the major industrial cities. On April 29 the shah was forced to appoint Mossadeq prime minister. This initiated a period of confrontation in which Mossadeq and the National Front were pitted against Britain, the shah, and eventually the United States.[32]

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

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CHAPTER VI

US INTEREST AND OIL ISSUE, 1940 - 1950

Before World War II, the strategic and economic interests of the United States in Iran consisted mainly of missionary activity, archaeological expeditions, and the Shuster and Millspaugh advisory missions. Isolationist sentiments and the traditional strength of the British in the Middle East kept Iran well out of US strategic considerations. Oil concessions in Iran were of some interest to US oil companies in the 1920s and 1930s, but these proved to be impractical because of the dominant role of the AIOC. US contractors played a small part in the construction of the Trans-Iranian Railroad, and the volume of US trade with Iran reached several million dollars per year in the late 1930s. However, US commercial investments in Iran were negligible, being for overshadowed by the holdings of the various US missionary organisations in buildings, equipment, etc. Diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran were evidently of such little importance that they were broken between 1936 and 1939 over derogatory statements made in the American press about Reza Shah.[1]

The United States was initially drawn into Iran by its role in the effort to supply the Soviet Union through the Persian Corridor during World War II. The first large contingent of US troops arrived in Iran in December 1942, and by early 1944 nearly 30,000 US soldiers were there manning the supply operation. The United States undertook extensive improvements to Iran's transportation system and to the AIOC facilities during the course of the War. Plants for assembling aircraft, trucks, and oil drums were also built. Arthur Millspaugh was brought back to Iran and given broad authority to set prices, supervise civilian transportation, raise taxes, and manage the nation budget. Military missions under Colonel Norman Schwartzkopf and General Clarence Ridley were brought in to train and supervise the Gendarmerie (a rural police force) and the Iranian army. Lend lease aid was extended to Iran in March 1942,

consisting of both military and non-military items. By December 1946 the total value of lend lease aid had reached $8.5 million.[2]

During World War II and in the first year after the war, two major concerns emerged which were to dominate subsequent US policy toward Iran. The first was a desire to increase and protect Middle East oil production. While the position of ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia made that country the main focus of the Middle East oil policy of the United States, Iran remained the largest producer in the region until 1951 and served as a crucial buffer between the Soviet Union and Persian Gulf reserves. Secondly, as Cold War tensions mounted, US policymakers increasingly viewed Iran as an important pawn in their strategy of containing the Soviet Union. Containment of the Soviet Union in Iran was inextricably linked with the protection of Persian Gulf oil. However, US policymakers also feared that control over Iran would enable the Soviets to increase their pressure on Turkey and bring other countries in the area under their domination as well.

These concerns led US policymakers to maintain close relations with Iran and give it the years immediately after World War II. However, it was not until 1950 that the United States extended large amounts of aid to Iran, and only in 1953 did it begin to undertake the kind of commitments to Iran which embody a cliency relationship.

6.1. Oil and US Policy towards Iran

6.1.1. Middle East Oil during World War II

Although oil had been plentiful in the United States in the 1930s (selling for as little ten cents per barrel in 1931), World War II placed heavy demands on US productive capacity. By 1943 serious questions were being raised about the adequacy of US oil supplies for the duration of the war and for the post-war period. The US Senate heard testimony in June 1943 that serious shortages would appear by early 1944.

Concern was nearly universal among government policymakers and oil industry analysts that domestic supplies would not be sufficient in the post-war era for peacetime requirements or for the needs of another war.[3]

These concerns led the Roosevelt administration to undertake a variety of measures to increase domestic oil supplies. In May 1941 the Office of Petroleum Co-ordinator for National Defence (later known as the Petroleum Administration for War) was established and given broad powers to regulate US oil production and distribution. Gasoline and fuel oil rationing were introduced in May 1942 after a series of supply reductions proved to be unworkable. Numerous other actions were taken by this body as well, such as the promotion of pipeline and tanker construction, measures to co-ordinate refining and distribution, and efforts to stimulate domestic exploration and production.[4]

Despite these actions, it soon became clear that domestic sources of crude oil would not be sufficient to meet wartime or post-war needs. Because of its vast reserves, the Middle East became the object of particular interest by US policymakers. The Roosevelt administration established the government-owned Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC) in June 1943, which sought to gain public control over foreign sources of crude by attempting to purchase the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which had extensive holdings in Saudi Arabia. After this effort collapsed the PRC attempted to build a refinery and later a pipeline in Saudi Arabia. These efforts also failed, due to pressures by the US oil industry and the British government. In December 1943 Roosevelt initiated talks with the British about the world petroleum situation, focusing particularly on the Middle East. Although the agreements reached as a result of these talks were never ratified by Congress, they helped establish a basis for post-war co-operation by the major oil-producing powers.[5]

As part of this strategy of obtaining foreign sources of crude during World War II the US government also actively assisted US oil companies attempting to secure concessions in northern and south-eastern Iran. The Iranian government had

approached Standard of New Jersey in February 1943 about a possible concession, and in March 1944 Sinclair also began to negotiate with Iran. The State Department, working mainly through the US embassy in Teheran, gave important assistance to these two companies. It acted as an intermediary in their negotiations with Iran and denied taking on an active role to the British. The embassy exerted pressure on Iranian officials to favour bids by the American companies over British bids. It also passed important information to the US companies from two Americans who were acting as private consultants to the Iranian government. Despite these actions and indications that Iran wanted to engage US companies as a way of countering British and Soviet influence, all negotiations for oil concessions were broken off by the Iranian government in October 1944.

6.1.2. Oil in Post-war US Foreign Policy

As wartime fell off in 1945, concern about oil supplies briefly declined as well. Oil industry analysts testifying before a Senate subcommittee in October 1945 predicted that US petroleum consumption would resume the steady growth rate it had followed before the war and that supplies would be adequate and imports from the Middle East unnecessary through 1965. However, declining coal production, rapid conversion to oil for home heating, and post-war recovery in general quickly pushed US consumption past its wartime peak, despite substantial price increases. This growth in US consumption was exacted by insufficient tanker capacity and by shortage of the steel pipe needed for drilling new wells. Spot oil shortages in the winters of 1946, 1947, and 1948 led to Senate investigation and task of talk of rationing. Although shortages did not reappear until the 1970s, the United States became a net oil importer in 1948, and has remained so ever since.[6]

In addition to concern about domestic oil supplies, US policymakers were also concerned in the late 1940s and early 1950s about the world situation and Middle East

production in particular. One reason for this concern was the growing awareness that oil would play a key role in European recovery. Western Europe produced less than three percent of its oil needs in 1948 and 1949, with most of its imports coming from the United States and the Caribbean. Dollar shortages in post-war Europe and increasing US demand for western hemisphere production made sources in the Middle East increasingly attractive to European consumers.[7]

Of more direct interest to US policymakers as the Cold War deepened was concern about the adequacy of oil supplies for a future war. As early as October 1946, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) considered Iran and its oil supplies to be "of major strategic interest". By early 1948 US military planners believed that the Middle East and its oil-fields should be held as long as possible in the event of war, "regardless of the risk involved". Joint US-British plans were drawn up for the defence of oil wells, pipelines, and refineries. By November 1951 the National Security Council felt that an all-out war with the Soviet Union could not be fuelled for more than six months without holding Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. The situation was expected to be even worse by 1956, and numerous contingency plans were drawn up. Similar ideas were expressed in 1952 and 1953.[8]

It is evident that, except when it tried to obtain concessions in Iran for American oil companies in 1943 and 1944, the US government focused primarily on Saudi Arabia rather than Iran in its efforts to expand Middle East oil production. This was mainly because Iranian oil was controlled by the British through the AIOC whereas Saudi oil was controlled by US companies. The execution of US oil companies from Iran did not keep Iran out of US policy in the Middle East was fundamentally regional in nature, and was closely co-ordinated with British policy. Nevertheless, while US policymakers maintained close ties with Iran in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the absence of tangible US interests in Iran gave them little incentive to substantially strengthen these ties or become deeply involved in Iran's domestic politics.

6.1.3. The major US institutions' Role in Oil Policy

It is important to emphasise here that while US policy towards Iran in this period was motivated in part by concern about the security of Middle East oil, this concern involved more than just a desire to protect private US interests in the region. Several key policy decisions can be cited which indicate that US policy was based on broad considerations of US national security rather than simply a desire to protect the interests of American oil companies.

As mentioned above, the Roosevelt administration established a state-owned oil company (the PRC) and entered into an agreement with Britain to manager world oil supplies. These efforts were vigorously opposed by the US oil industry, and collapsed only after they had become unnecessary. After the war recommendations were made that some domestic fields be impounded and that domestic producers maintain a 10-15 percent excess capacity. Foreign production was encouraged in order to conserve US reserves and case the European dollar shortage. This hurt domestic producers and contributed to a decline in domestic exploration. It also boosted the sales of European companies and led to periods of excess capacity for US overseas producers. European refinery construction was financed under the Marshall Plan, weakening the share of US companies in the European market. During the 1946-1947 Soviet-Iranian imbroglio, the State Department sought to prevent US companies from obtaining oil concessions in Iran, but did not oppose a Soviet concession.[9]

These tensions between the US government and the US oil industry indicate that private interests were frequently sacrificed in this period for broader considerations of national security. At least three national security concerns were evidently more important to US policymakers at this time than private interests. First, the paramount concern of US policymakers in the 1940s was to ensure that sufficient supplies of oil would be available for wartime needs or for the needs of a future war. Second, US policymakers intervened in the international oil market in order to promote post-war

recovery in Europe. Finally, the interests of US oil companies were sacrificed in 1946 and 1947 in an attempt to lessen tensions between Iran and the Soviet Union.

In as much as US policy toward Iran in this period and in the subsequent era was based on security concerns such as these rather than the interests of US oil companies, the relationship that resulted between the United States and Iran constitutes a very different kind of international relationship than that embodied in the concepts of dependency and imperialism discussed in chapter 1.

6.2. The Evolution of the US Containment Strategy in Iran

Containment of the Soviet Union became an important element in US policy toward Iran after the establishment of the autonomous republics of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in late 1945 and after the post-war dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union came to a virtual standstill in early 1946. Indeed, the crisis precipitated by the failure of the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Iran in March 1946 was something of a test case for the Truman administration in using a tough approach to stop Soviet expansionism. Although the 1946 crisis served in some ways as a model for subsequent US actions in Greece and Turkey, Iran was not included with these countries under the Truman Doctrine. US aid to Iran was almost negligible before 1950, and only reached high levels after the overthrow of Mossadeq in 1953. Consequently, US policymakers and while Iran was an important cornerstone in the US containment strategy, these interests were not sufficient before 1953 to warrant the establishment of a cliency relationship.

6.2.1. US Policy during the 1946 Crisis

As discussed in chapter 5, the Soviet Union began to pressure Iran for an oil concession after the Persian Corridor ceased to be an essential supply line in late 1944.

This was accompanied by strong Soviet support for the autonomy movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and by increasing friction with the United States over the presence of US troops in Iran without a formal mandate. Although some US policymakers advocated efforts to free Iran from Soviet (and British) domination at this time, the desire to maintain harmony among the wartime allies apparently overshadowed concern in Washington about Soviet intentions in Iran. The Roosevelt administration made no serious attempt to block Soviet efforts to obtain an oil concession and weaken the position of the central government in Azerbaijan. Roosevelt, in fact, sought to accommodate the Soviet Union at Iran's expense by suggesting that the Iranian railroad and a Persian Gulf port be placed under international control to serve as a warm-water outlet for Soviet exports.[10]

As the war in Europe came to an end, and especially after the death of Roosevelt, US-Soviet relations began to deteriorate rapidly. The main issues of contention between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union were the future status of Germany and Eastern Europe (particularly Poland), the question of German reparations, and the incipient civil war in Greece. Several major disputes were left unresolved at the Potsdam conference in July 1945, and others were merely papered over. In the late summer and fall of 1945 a new reality of confrontation began to emerge in US-Soviet relations. Domestic political pressures also began to affect the Truman administration as the 1946 election year approached. The Republican party accused it of "betrayal" and "appeasement," and public opinion increasingly favoured a tougher attitude toward the Soviet Union.[11]

As a result of three conflicting pressures, a much harder line was taken by the Truman administration in the first months of 1946. Truman's new approach toward the Soviet Union was precipitated in part by the agreements reached at the December 1945 Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference, which he regarded as "an empty promise". In a meeting with Secretary of State Byrnes (who had just returned from negotiating these agreements), Truman spoke very harshly of the Soviets and ruled out further

compromise. In February 1946 this tough new approach was given a coherent analytical framework in the widely-circulated and much-publicised "long telegram" sent from Moscow by George Kennan. Kennan interpreted Soviet policy in Terms of rigid Marxist-Leninist principles and traditional Russian territorial aspirations. In early March 1946 the first public expression of this new hard line came in Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech. While Truman did not publicly embrace Churchill's ideas, he and other US officials had read the speech beforehand and clearly approved of it.[12]

The continued occupation of Iran by Soviet troops soon became the main focus of the Truman administration's new hard line. Several attempts were made in the summer and fall of 1945 to convince the Soviets to withdraw their troops. These had little effect. Truman had intended that Iran be a major topic of conversation at the December 1945 Moscow conference. Instead, Byrnes had focused on agreements regarding the Balkan situation, atomic energy, and East Asia, failing to make any progress on Iran. Furthermore, Stalin suggested for the first time at the Moscow conference that Soviet troops might remain in Iran past the March 2 deadline established in the 1942 Tripartite Treaty. Truman subsequently berated Byrnes on the Iran issue, which he described as an "out-rage" In January 1946 Iran brought the question of Soviet troops before the UN Security Council. After heated debate it was decided that discussion of this issue would be postponed, pending further negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union.[13]

Tensions escalated rapidly as the March 2 deadline passed without compliance by the Soviets. Iranian Prime Minister Qavam was told by Stalin that Soviet troops would remain in Iran, "pending examination of the situation". US notes delivered in Moscow on March 6 and 9 protesting the continued occupation were ignored. Soviet troop movements in the Balkans and in Azerbaijan in late February and early March led Truman to believe that an attack on Turkey was imminent. On March 8 it was

announced that the battleship *Missouri* would sail to Istanbul to return the body of the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, who had died in November 1944.[14]

The issue was again brought before the Security Council on March 18. Soviet Ambassador Gromyko immediately attempted to end debate on the issue. Secretary of State Byrnes forcefully defended Iran, and Gromyko stormed out of the meeting. A note was delivered to Qavam in Tehran on March 24 declaring the Soviets' intention to withdraw, but implicitly linking withdrawal to an oil concession. This was found to be unacceptable by the United States, and Byrnes refused to end the Security Council debate. In early April reports began to circulate that Soviet troops had begun to evacuate. It soon became clear that the Soviets were backing down. On April 4 Byrnes agreed to postpone future debate for a month to allow for bilateral negotiations between Iran and the Soviet Union. The evacuation of Soviet troops was completed in early May, although the issue remained on the Security Council agenda.[15]

Despite the complete evacuation of Soviet troops in May, it soon became apparent that Soviet non-military personnel still remained in Azerbaijan. Attempts by Qavam in the summer and fall of 1946 to bring the autonomous republics under the control of Tehran were unsuccessful. Instead, Qavam was forced to make a number of concessions to the Soviets and their Iranian allies, including negotiations for Soviet control of oil and airline rights in the northern provinces and Tudeh representation in the cabinet. In July a Tudeh-led strike by oil and workers turned into a bloody riot. In September the southern Qashqai tribe revolted and laid siege to Shiraz over growing Tudeh and Soviet influence in Tehran. In early October the Iranian ambassador in Washington told the State Department that Iran "had arrived at a cross-roads where it must choose between exclusive orientation toward Russia and a more balanced policy". A request for $250 million in aid was made in September to the US Embassy in Tehran, and repeated in October and November.

These alarming events led the State Department to undertake a thorough review of US policy toward Iran in September and October of 1946. The views of the JCS on

US strategic interests in Iran were solicited. However, despite the gravity of the situation, no fundamental changes in US policy emerged from this process. Although the JCS considered Iran to be an area "of major strategic interest," it recommended only token military aid. The State Department suggested only that Iran "be encouraged to hope" for US aid. In fact, a $10 million loan for Iran had been contemplated as early as June 1946 and had still not been approved in late November. While an agreement in principle covering this loan was reached in December 1946 it was not formally signed until June 1947 and was re-negotiated in May 1948. After initially hedging on the question, the state Department in early October cautiously offered US support for an appeal by Iran to the Security Council. George Allen, the US ambassador in Tehran, later lamented that Qavam's appeals for US help were answered only with advice to depend on the United Nations. As late as October 30 the State Department continued to pressure Qavam not to hold Majles elections, fearing that they would strengthen the Tudeh party.

These elections were announced by the shah on October 5, after heavy Soviet pressure. On October 10 Ambassador Allen received information that the Tudeh cabinet members had been engaged in secret negotiations with the Soviets. He brought this to the attention of Qavam and the shah, who forced Qavam to dismiss the Tudeh ministers. This enraged the Soviets and brought an end to Qavam's policy of balancing Soviet and Tudeh pressures with conciliatory gestures and minor concessions. Qavam then began to seriously contemplate using force to liquidate the autonomy movements. He expressed his intentions to Allen in late November and received assurances of US support in the Security Council. Under the pretext of securing Azerbaijan for the elections the Iranian army marched on Tabriz in early December. Spontaneous uprisings in Tabriz overthrew the Pishevari government while the army was still 100 miles outside of the city.[16]

Although US policymakers were deeply concerned about these events their actions were limited to promises of token military and economic aid, guarded

assurances of Security Council support, and informal representations made by Ambassador Allen on his own initiative.[17] In the dispute over Soviet troops in Iran in the first half of 1946 the United States had given Iran important support in the Security Council but had not committed itself further. The two US military missions established during World War II were maintained throughout this period, but military and economic aid were not provided on even a moderate scale. This policy of limited US assistance to Iran continued in 1947.

6.2.2. The Truman Doctrine and its Aftermath

In response to appeals from Britain in February 1947, the Truman administration embarked on a massive programme of aid for Greece and Turkey. This programme, which became known as the Truman Doctrine, established as a cornerstone of US policy toward underdeveloped countries the use of economic aid to achieve security goals.[18] As discussed above, the 1946 crisis in Iran had served as something of a precedent for the active approach to Soviet expansionism begun by the Truman administration in early 1946 and later epitomised by the Truman Doctrine. Both Truman and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who played a key role in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine) feared that Iran and other countries in the Middle East would fall into Soviet hands if the United States failed to aid Greece and Turkey. Despite Congressional testimony by Acheson to the contrary, it is clear that the Truman Doctrine was meant to apply to other counties as well. The Mashall Plan and aid programmes for a number of underdeveloped countries were formulated and implemented concurrently (see table 6.1). Nevertheless, although Iran was clearly a prime candidate for such an aid programme, US assistance to it continued to be limited in 1947.[19]

- Table 6.1 will be seen next page -

Table 6.1. Major Recipients of U. S. Military and Economic Aid, 1946-1952

Country	(millions of U. S. dollars)						
	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952
Great Britain	79.9	3757.0	0	1613.7	1008.9	551.4	634.5
France	302.	42.8	363.7	1313.3	1162.3	1762.9	1698.5
West Germany	195.8	298.3	850.3	1257.6	733.4	652.8	310.3
Italy	423.3	416.7	331.0	684.1	445.7	665.9	567.1
Greece	195.2	180.9	332.8	362.0	256.6	317.3	351.2
Turkey	6.1	2.6	72.1	117.3	182.2	219.8	259.0
Iran	3.3	22.5	0	0	11.8	27.8	44.1
China (Taiwan)	128.7	464.1	50.9	344.6	51.1	193.8	275.8
Japan	106.7	389.3	483.7	501.5	365.3	290.3	63.6
South Korea	5.6	75.5	100.1	141.8	102.6	93.9	159.8
Philippines	31.4	161.5	136.4	237.7	154.8	158.8	161.2

SOURCE: US Department of States, Agency for International Development, unpublished worksheets for *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organisations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1980* (Washington, 1981).

Two weeks after Truman's March 12 speech to Congress calling for aid to Greece and Turkey the shah complained to Ambassador Allen that US treatment of Turkey because it involved a loan with interest rather than a grant. Allen replied that the high levels of US aid given to Greece and Turkey were justified by the immediate Soviet threat faced by those countries. In an April 14 discussion about the proposed military credits for Iran the Iranian ambassador in Washington was told that Iran "should keep the best possible relations with the Soviet Union". Further requests were made by Iranian officials in the following months that payments on the proposed loan be waived and that a grant of $100 million be made to Iran. While US support for Iranian independence was reaffirmed, these requests were denied. The JCS viewed Soviet military action toward Iran as unlikely at the time. Further US aid would be seen as provocative by the Soviets, and would not appreciably enhance Iran's security.[20]

The pattern of relations established in 1946 and 1947 between the United States and Iran continued to hold in 1948 and 1949. The United States continued to express

strong support for Iran's independence and remained in close contact with Iranian decision-makers. However, aside from a $ 10 million "token" military aid grant made in 1949, substantial military and economic assistance for Iran was not forthcoming. The shah, the Iranian ambassador in Washington, and the various prime ministers made frequent requests that the existing aid agreements be expanded and that as much as $500 million in aid be granted. Iran also made several other attempts to engage the United States and Britain in formal and informal security agreements. These were rejected as well. The issues of aid and a security agreement were raised again by the shah during his first visit to Washington in November 1949. Although this trip ended amicably, the shah's inability to obtain a stronger US commitment to Iran left him deeply disappointed and fuelled growing anti-American sentiments in Iran.[21]

US policymakers gave three main reasons in rebuffing Iran's requests for a closer relationship in this period. First, after the Soviet Union backed down during the crises of 1946 it became apparent that Soviet leaders were unwilling to risk the political consequences of an outright invasion of Iran. US policymakers thus had no compelling reason to enhance Iran's ability to resist a Soviet invasion, and feared that increased military aid would be seen as provocative. Second, it was felt that Soviet subversion was the greatest threat to Iran, principally in Azerbaijan and through the Tudeh party. The low levels of military aid extended to Iran in 1947 and 1949 were intended to meet this threat by promoting domestic order. Concern about Soviet subversion also led US policymakers to advocate economic development and political reform, including a crackdown on corruption and opposition to the shah's attempts to expand his constitutional powers. Finally, it was argued that Iran's relative economic stability and strong balance of payments position qualified it for loans from the International Bank rather than the sort of aid that had been extended to Greece and Turkey.

Privately, several other reasons were expressed for restricting US aid to Iran. For one thing, it was felt that Congress and the American public would not regard Iran as sufficiently important to warrant high levels of US aid. US policymakers also feared

(with great prescience) that aid might be used by the shah or by top military leaders to establish a dictatorship rather than promote development and political reform.

However, perhaps the most important reason why the United States avoided a closer relationship with Iran in this period is that Iran (and the Middle East generally) was still regarded as primarily a British military responsibility. Britain had as much as 500 million pounds invested in Iran, and more in Kuwait. By contrast, US investment in the region was still quite small. The Middle East was considered "vital" to British interests in the sense that its loss would present a "mortal danger". US policymakers also considered the Middle East vital, but used this term much more loosely. The JCS did not include Iran on its April 1947 list of strategically-important countries targeted for aid. Britain had some 80,000 troops stationed in the Middle East, and a naval base with 8 ships on Bahrain Island in the Persian Gulf. US military plans did not call for the use of force in Iran, while British plans called for the introduction of army and air force units into Iraq and southern Iran in the event of a Soviet invasion. Both the United States and Britain considered the Middle East to be secondary in importance to Europe. In the Middle East both countries gave the highest priority to defending the "inner ring" of countries centred around Egypt rather than the "outer ring" including most of Iran and Turkey.[22]

6.3. The Reorientation of US Policy toward Iran: 1950

By early 1950, several major changes had begun to take place in both US foreign policy and in Iran's domestic and international affairs which soon led US policymakers to significantly reorient their policy toward Iran. The first was a fundamental re-evaluation of overall US foreign and security policy. This re-evaluation was prompted by the Soviet atomic test of September 1949 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in the following month. These events, together with the first rumblings of McCarthyite attacks on the State Department, led to emergence of a

more aggressive US global strategy. This new strategy was codified in the National Security Council paper NSC-68, written in February and March of 1950. NSC-68 called for a "renewed initiative in the Cold War," beginning with a substantial US military build-up and large increases in US overseas military and economic aid. The full realisation of NSC-68 was to come in the summer and fall of 1950, when the United States sent troops to defend South Korea and then invaded North Korea.[23]

US policy toward Iran at this time was also affected by increasing concern about its domestic stability. As discussed in chapter 5 Iran had entered into serious depression by early 1950. This was caused mainly by the bad harvest of 1949, which was followed by a decline in private consumption and consequently higher unemployment and numerous business failures. Furthermore, broad public opposition had emerged to the oil agreement negotiated by the Iranian government with the AIOC. These factors and the growing strength of the Tudeh party led to fears of increasing unrest. A top State Department official visiting Iran in late March described the situation as "dangerous and explosive". After a similar visit in early April, the US Army Chief of Staff warned that Iran might become a "second China". Policymakers in the State Department criticised the shah's leadership as ineffective, and called for increased US aid and pressure on the shah to install a more capable government. At the London Foreign Ministers' Conference in May 1950 the British were pressured to make greater concessions to Iran in order to resolve the oil dispute and thus placate the Iranian public.[24]

These changes in the international situation and in Iran itself did not change the basic principles which had guided US policy toward Iran in 1949. Rather, they changed the policy prescriptions which followed from these principles. A Soviet attack on Iran was still considered unlikely, and Iran was still assumed to be a British responsibility. The deteriorating economic situation and renewed Tudeh activity had led to increased fears of Soviet-inspired subversion. As in the past, economic development was seen as the best means of combating subversion. However, Iran's deepening depression now

required foreign aid to stimulate economic development. Furthermore, increased military aid was deemed necessary to control the growing unrest and strengthen the government. While US policymakers continued to press the shah for reforms, the immediacy of the economic situation clearly took precedence over concerns about an incipient dictatorship. Finally, although British military predominance was still recognised as late as May 1952, the continuing failure of the British to resolve the oil dispute was clearly frustrating and undoubtedly led US policymakers to contemplate strengthening their role in Iran.

This stronger US role in Iran emerged in 1950, after a State Department review of the crisis there and of US options for dealing with this crisis. In May a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement was signed which provided for an average of $23 million per year in military aid through 1956. In October a $25 million Bank loan was granted and a modest Point 4 aid programme was begun. The United States also supported Iran's request at this time for a $10 million International Bank loan.[25] By the eve of the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis began in May 1951 the US had positioned itself to take an active role in Iran's affairs, first an intermediary in negotiations with the British and later as a patron power when it established a client state under the shah.

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CHAPTER VII

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A US CLIENT STATE, 1951-1953

Chapter 5 and 6 discussed Iranian domestic politics and US policy toward Iran in the era before the appointment of Mohammed Mossadeq as prime minister on April 29, 1951. In chapter 5 it was argued that the 1941 Allied invasion which ended the dictatorship of Reza Shah ushered in a 12-year period of intense political activity in Iran. This period was considerably more democratic than either the previous or subsequent eras. It was characterised by a plurality of political actors, relatively free political institutions, and a vocal parliament willing to challenge the established power of the royal court and the traditional ruling class. Moreover, with the emergence of effective political parties and a growing number of gifted leaders, the trend toward democracy in this period was becoming strongly established in Iranian society. The intellectual and social origins of this democratic movement were traced in chapter 5 to constitutional movement of the early 1900s and to the broad socio-economic changes which began in the nineteenth century and accelerated under Reza Shah. It was also argued in chapter 5 that while foreign powers had played a major role in Iran's affairs since the early nineteenth century their role had declined substantially after 1925, except in the period of Allied occupation during World War II.

Chapter 6 discussed US interests and policies in Iran before 1951. The US role in Iran was never substantial in this period, although it gradually increased with wartime occupation and the deepening Cold War. Before 1951 US policy toward Iran was motivated primarily by strategic rather than economic concerns. US policymakers were content to let Britain play the leading role for the West in Iran during this period.

This chapter ties these themes together by examining the events which led to a fateful confrontation in August 1953 between the movement toward democracy in Iran and the strategic views held by the Eisenhower Administration. By 1951 the

democratic movement in Iran had become closely bound up with the oil nationalisation issue and with Mossadeq and the National Front, who were its main proponents. Mossadeq and the mainstream of the National Front were extremely popular in Iran and had strong democratic ideals. Moreover, while nationalisation was the most prominent issue pursued by the National Front, a more fundamental goal of this organisation was the achievement of a more democratic distribution of power in Iran. At the height of Mossadeq's popularity in late 1951 Iran appeared to be on the verge of establishing a non-aligned, populist (if not truly democratic) state, not unlike those existing at the time in India and Argentina.

The enactment of the nationalisation law in April 1951 set the stage for a confrontation between the National Front and Britain. The Truman Administration adopted a relatively neutral position in this dispute, supporting the British embargo on Iran but also encouraging the British to negotiate and restraining British interventionism. However, with the inauguration of the Eisenhower administration Mossadeq became the target of new US approach toward Third World nationalism. The United States played a crucial role in ousting Mossadeq in August 1953 and in the post-coup consolidation of power by the shah and Prime Minister Zahedi. By helping to destroy the National Front and install an authoritarian regime, the United States, acting largely on strategic considerations, dealt a decisive blow to the long-term prospects for democracy in Iran.

7.1. Iran on the Oil Nationalisation Efforts

7.1.1. The Oil Problem

With the collapse of the Soviet-supported autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in late 1946, Iran could once again begin to focus on internal issues. Chief among these was the status of the 1933 oil agreement negotiated by Reza Shah.

This agreement was widely regarded in Iran as a sell-out to the British and a surrender of Iranian sovereignty. Knowledgeable Iranians were well aware of the successful nationalisation by Mexico of its foreign-controlled oil industry and of the favourable deals which Mexico and Venezuela had obtained from US oil companies. Pressure in the Majles led to the passage of a bill in October 1947 requiring the government to re-negotiate the agreement with the AIOC. After the AIOC announced a 100% increase in profits between 1946 and 1947 a special Majles commission was established to study the oil question.

Secret negotiations aimed at securing a new agreement were begun with the AIOC in August 1948. The Iranian negotiating team presented an elaborate 25-point list of complaint, which the AIOC promptly rejected. Talks continued intermittently until July 1949, when a Supplemental Agreement was signed. This Agreement called for increased payments to Iran but did little to satisfy the Iranian list of demands. The presentation of the Supplemental Agreement to the Majles caused an immediate uproar, which precluded ratification before the Majles adjourned in late July. Oil remained an explosive issue during the ensuing elections. The prime minister who had begun the secret negotiations (Hazhir) was assassinated by the xenophobic Fedayan-i-Islam. The new Majles convened in March 1950 was even less sympathetic to the Supplemental Agreement. In June the issue was turned over to an 18-member oil commission studied the agreement and finally rejected it in November, amid calls by the National Front and the Tudeh party for nationalisation.

By late 1950 oil had come to dominate Iranian politics. Shortly after the commission rejected the Supplemental Agreement ARAMCO announced that it had concluded a 50-50 profit-sharing arrangement with Saudi Arabia, the first such agreement to be reached in the Middle East. The AIOC quickly offered to re-negotiate the Supplemental Agreement along similar lines (nearly doubling its previous offer), but by this time had waited too long. In January 1951 67 proposals dealing with the oil issue were submitted to the Majles, including one authored by Mossadeq which called

for nationalisation. Prime Minister Razmara publicly opposed the nationalisation bill and was assassinated in early March by the Fedayan-i-Islam. Following a series of protracted and violent strikes in the oil-fields in March and early April, the oil committee approved Mossadeq's nationalisation bill on April 26. On the same day a new proposal was presented by the British calling for the establishment of a new British company having Iranian representation on its board of directors which would control Iran's oil and divide profits on a 50-50 basis. This proposal differed only superficially from the previous AIOC offer, and was lost in the rush of events. Yielding to popular pressure, the shah appointed Mossadeq prime minister on April 29 and signed the nationalisation bill into law on May 1.[1]

7.1.2. The Iranian Political Scene in 1951

By May 1951 most of the proponents of nationalisation had aligned themselves with the National Front. The National Front had been organised in 1949 to protest the shah's attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections. It quickly became an umbrella organisation for a variety of groups favouring nationalisation and seeking a change in the political status quo. The main organisations grouped in the National Front in 1951 were the progressive, nationalist Iran party, led by Allahyar Saleh and Karim Sanjabi, which was formed in the early 1940s and was composed mainly of left-wing, anti-Soviet intellectuals; the Toilers party, led by Mozaffar Baqai, which stood to the left of the Iran party and contained both intellectual and working class/bazaar elements; and the Mojahadin-i-Islam, led by the demagogic Ayatollah Kashani and composed mainly of bazaar workers, merchants and rank-and-file clergy. The National Front also attracted a large number of individuals with no organisational affiliation, particularly among the growing urban middle class. The main organisations favouring nationalisation which were not aligned with the National Front were the Tudeh party and the fanatical Fedayan-i-Islam.[2]

The diverse elements of the National Front shared one primary goal: the nationalisation of Iran's oil resources. British control over Iran's oil was widely viewed as the main obstacle to Iran's independence and as a hindrance to its social and economic development. However, for virtually all elements of the National Front a more fundamental objective lay behind the oil issue: a redistribution of political power away from the royal court and the land-owning class toward the emerging middle and lower classes. The court and the land-owning class were linked with the British position in the oil dispute because of their long-standing ties with the British and because they had consistently opposed full nationalisation. These links made the oil issue an ideal medium for attacking the political power of these groups. They also gave the oil nationalisation movement a popular character, tying it to the democratic movement which had begun with the constitutional revolution.

While a redistribution of political power was favoured in one form or another by virtually all elements of the National Front, there were considerable differences, mainly of an ideological nature, over the extent a redistribution of power should take and over the groups it should be targeted at. The liberals and centrists in the National Front (whose views most closely corresponded with those of Mossadeq) favoured reforms oriented toward the middle class but did not challenge fundamental institutions such as the constitutional monarchy or the capitalist economy. The Marxists in the Toilers party and in the Iran party were split into various factions which called for the establishment of a socialist state modelled along particular ideological lines. Kashani's supporters in the Mojahadin-i-Islam sought the abolition of secular laws and implementation of Sharism much like the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini in post-revolutionary Iran.

The various groups in the National Front differed over tactics, particularly on the question of adherence to legal and constitutional means of political activity. The most loyal elements of the National Front (i.e., those which continued to support Mossadeq until his overthrow in 1953) were Western-oriented and were committed to

working within the framework of the constitution. These included both the liberals and centrists grouped closely around Mossadeq and the left-wing intellectuals of the Toilers party and the Iran party. Although the latter were, for the most part, Marxist who had at one time supported the Tudeh party, they are best described as democratic socialists. Thus the Toilers party, despite its socialist rhetoric and programme, continued to favour retention of the constitutional monarchy.[3]

Mossadeq himself had spent much of his life in public service and was deeply committed to democratic principles. Although he was a wealthy landowner, he led an austere life and had a reputation as a scrupulously honest politician. As a young man he had been involved in the constitutional movement. Exiled in 1906 for his political activities, he studied law in France and Switzerland, where his political beliefs were further developed. After returning to Iran he held several administrative posts and became a Majles deputy. In 1925 he publicly opposed the confrontation of Reza Shah on the grounds that the monarch could not, under the constitution, retain the prime ministership and the war ministry. Reza Shah sent him into internal exile. He returned to public life in 1944 as a Majles deputy and authored the 1944 bill outlawing all future foreign oil concessions. This bill was designed to guarantee that Iran's oil revenues would be used for domestic purposes rather than to pacify the superpowers. Mossadeq campaigned in 1944 on the issues of neutrality in foreign policy, parliamentary control over the armed forces, and electoral reform. He continued to stress these basic themes as prime minister in 1951-1953.[4]

While Mossadeq and his closest supporters were thus committed to upholding the principles of the constitution, the same cannot be said for all elements of the National Front. Ayatollah Kashani and his supporters in the Mojahadin-i-Islam made no pretences about working within the framework of the constitution. Kashani openly bragged about his links to the killers of Prime Minister Razmara and maintained close ties with sports club gangs which could be hired to stage demonstrations or attack his opponents. Much the same can be said for Baqai and his supporters in the working

class/bazaar wing of the Toilers party, and for Hossein Makki, a popular Majles deputy from Abadan who was secretary of the government's oil committee. Following their defection from the National Front in late 1952 and early 1953 Kashani, Baqai, and Makki used these tactics to help undermine and eventually overthrow Mossadeq himself.

In addition to their democratic proclivities Mossadeq and the mainstream of the National Front were also by far the most popular political force in Iran at the time. Mossadeq's Majles opposition never grew beyond a hard core of some fifteen conservative, pro-British deputies. Virtually all outside observers, including top policymakers in both the United States and Britain, admitted to the popularity of the National Front and of Mossadeq in particular. Throughout the tenure of the Truman administration the State Department recognised Mossadeq's popularity and viewed him as the most effective barrier to a communist take-over in Iran. A State Department study in early 1952 expressed concerns that Mossadeq's popularity in the army made its loyalty to the shah doubtful in the event of a shah-Mossadeq power struggle. Much the some views were held in CIA, who described Mossadeq as "the dominant political force in Iran" because of his "popular prestige". Even the British, while making continual efforts to unseat him, were forced to admit to Mossadeq's "personal popularity". Similar views about Mossadeq were also expressed in both the British and the American press.[5]

Although Mossadeq was clearly the most popular figure in the National Front, other prominent figures in this organisation enjoyed considerable popularity as well. Kashani, Baqai, and Makki were able to mobilise extensive popular support on the basis of their personal appeal and their ties to sports club leaders. The defection of these key leaders from the National Front weakened it to some degree by reducing its base of support. However, the ability of Mossadeq and the National Front to remain in power after their defection and to survive repeated coup attempts (in which these men were deeply involved) indicates Mossadeq's great popularity and his fundamental role

in the organisation. Of the National Front figures who remained loyal to Mossadeq, Khalil Maleki, leader of the intellectual wing of the Toilers party (who split with Baqai to form the Third Force in late 1952), and the leaders of the Iran party also enjoyed considerable public support.

Aside from the National Front, the only other political organisation which can have enjoyed any broad-based popularity in Iran at this time was the Tudeh party, while still outlawed which was making a strong recovery from the defeat it had suffered in late 1946. It had well-disciplined cells in all the major cities, which operated through front organisations and published a variety of newspapers. CIA estimates in early 1952 placed Tudeh membership in Tehran at 8,000, with three to four times as many sympathisers. In addition, the Tudeh had successfully penetrated several government departments and, apparently without the knowledge of the CIA, was installing an elaborate network in the Iranian army. The Tudeh party continued to be extremely popular among the oil workers in the south-west, where it was able to stage massive demonstrations.[6]

Although the main orientation of the National Front was toward Iran's emerging middle class, it enjoyed considerable support from the urban lower class and the industrial working class as well, primarily through Kashani and the Toiler party. The popularity of the National Front among the working class and its essentially liberal policies led it into frequent conflict with the Tudeh party, which denounced it as "the last hope of the decadent ruling class".[7] Although the two shared some similar goals and collaborated at times, notably in a series of violent demonstrations in July 1952 which returned Mossadeq to power after a brief period in which he had been replaced by Qavam, the National Front government frequently harassed the Tudeh and was careful to keep it under control. Oddly enough, several State Department studies at the time portrayed Mossadeq and the National Front as anti-Communist and anti-Tudeh. The lack of Tudeh support for the National Front remained a major point of self-criticism within the party for years after Mossadeq's overthrow.[8]

Aside from the Tudeh party, the only opposition to the National Front before the defection of Kashani, Baqai, and Makki came from a loosely-organised group of wealthy landowners, businessmen, and top military officers. Although the young shah was quite indecisive in this period, he invariably sided with this group against the National Front. This traditional ruling elite had no significant popular support, but managed to retain a number of Majles seats by buying votes and encouraging peasants to vote for the candidates designated by their landowners. In addition to its small Majles faction (led by Jamal Emami), the ruling elite controlled the upper house of parliament, had strong influence in the royal court and in parts of the security apparatus, and worked closely with the British. The conflicts between this group and the National Front consequently amounted to a confrontation between the popular branch of parliament and the crowds in the streets on the one hand, and the royal court, the senate, and parts of the military (all backed by the British) on the other. Despite its various strengths, the CIA saw little chance of this group coming to power or staying in power without making concessions to nationalist sentiments and using authoritarian tactics.[9]

7.2. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, 1951-1952

7.2.1. The Oil Negotiations Process

After the nationalisation bill was signed into law on May 1, 1951, the primary British objective was to retain effective control over the production and marketing of Iran's oil. In order to achieve this goal the British were willing to make minimal concessions on price and accept the principle of nationalisation, provided that this would not jeopardise their position of control. This objective was pursued both through direct negotiations with the Iranian government and through appeals to the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. The British also sought to pressure Iran by instituting a series of economic embargoes against it and conspiring with opposition

groups to remove Mossadeq from office. Beyond this, both the United States and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development became involved in attempts to mediate the dispute.

After the enactment of the nationalisation law the first act of the British was to appeal to the International Court for a ruling on the oil dispute. Iran's position was that the court was not competent to rule on the matter since the AIOC was, in fact, on an Iranian company and the dispute was thus a domestic issue. At the same time the AIOC sent a negotiating team to Tehran. This team proposed on June 19 that, in exchange for recognising the principle of nationalisation, the AIOC should be hired to produce and market Iran's oil on a 50-50 profit-sharing basis. This proposal differed little from the previous British offer and was rejected by Iran. The AIOC meanwhile begun a production slowdown and took steps to prevent tankers from loading oil at the port of Abadan. These actions gradually evolved into a full-fledged oil blockade, which reduced production to virtually nothing by the end of July. The other major oil companies, fearing that nationalisation would undermine their own positions in other producing countries, co-operated fully with the AIOC. Since only the majors had sufficient tanker capacity to market Iran's oil their co-operation was crucial. On July 5 the International Court recommended that both sides return to the status quo as of May 1, but withheld judgement on the question of its competence in the case. This latter issue was finally settled in July 1952 when the court ruled that it was not competent to rule.

With the collapse of the June round of negotiations tensions began to escalate rapidly. The Iranian government began to take control over the oil-fields and Britain sent several warships into the Persian Gulf. In an attempt to resolve the deepening crisis President Truman sent Averell Harriman to Tehran to try to mediate the dispute. Harriman was greeted in Tehran on July 15 with bloody riots, apparently sponsored by the Tudeh party. After two weeks Harriman finally succeeded in arranging a formula to reopen direct negotiations. A British mission under Richard Stokes was dispatched to

Tehran and presented an 8-point plan on August 13. This proposal again differed little in substance from previous British offers and was eventually rejected. Mossadeq then delivered a counter-proposal to Stokes on August 22. Stokes indignantly rejected this proposal and returned to London the next day.

Upon Stokes' return the British Foreign Office made an ominous announcement accusing the Mossadeq government of violating the terms of Harriman's negotiating formula and stating that it would pursue the issue further at the International Court. Mossadeq waited until September 5 for a reply to his counterproposal and then announced that all British technicians would be expelled from the oil-fields unless Britain resumed negotiations. Britain then announced that negotiations had been cancelled and that it saw no hope of reaching a settlement with the Mossadeq government.[10]

With the failure of the Stokes mission, British abandoned direct negotiations and adopted a three-track strategy designed to pressure Iran into a settlement on more favourable terms. The first component of this strategy involved the implementation of a plan to remove Mossadeq from office. This plan had been developed over the previous months in conjunction with certain pro-British Iranian political figures. It appears to have been co-ordinated with a large military build-up made by the British in mid-September in response to Mossadeq's ultimatum. The second component of the British strategy called for further economic sanctions which, together with the oil blockade itself, were designed to turn domestic public opinion increasingly against Mossadeq. These two components will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

The third component of the British strategy involved an attempt to mobilise world opinion against Mossadeq through an appeal to the UN Security Council. To the great dismay of the British, Mossadeq announced that he would personally lead the Iranian delegation. Through a combination of great showmanship and strident anti-imperialist rhetoric, Mossadeq was able first to water down the British resolution and

then to block it entirely by having debate postponed until after the decision of the International Court. Mossadeq made further gains during his stay in the United States by meeting with President Truman and other top US officials. He impressed them with his willingness to negotiate and got Truman to agree to consider a $120 million loan package for Iran. Mossadeq returned to Iran in late November and received an overwhelming vote of confidence in the Majles. Buoyed by his victories in the United States, he immediately called for new elections.[11]

Elections were also held in Britain in late October, bringing Churchill, Eden, and a new Conservative government to power. As members of the shadow cabinet, Churchill and Eden had been deeply involved in the British plans of the previous summer to overthrow Mossadeq.[12] They were, of course, staunch defenders of the British empire, and as Tories they had no difficulty in opposing oil nationalisation or Third World nationalism in general. Eden quickly made it clear to Acheson that he was not interested in the discussions then being held in Washington with Mossadeq, which US policymakers were quite optimistic about. He told Acheson that "no agreement would be better than a bad one," and disputed Acheson's view that communism was the only alternative to Mossadeq.[13]

From this point on the United States took the leading role in trying to revive the stalled negotiations. It strongly backed a series of proposals by the International Bank, the first of which was made during Mossadeq's stay in New York and pursued further after his return to Tehran. This proposal called for a three-way division of profits between the Bank, the AIOC, and Iran. It also called for a neutral operating company (with some British staff) to operate the oil-fields and the refinery. Mossadeq rejected this idea but left the door open for further negotiations. The Bank revised its offer several times in the following months, making further concessions on price and on the issue of British representation in the proposed operating company. However, none of these proposals made more than nominal recognition of the principle of nationalisation,

and were thus rejected by Iran. The Bank negotiations eventually reached an impose, and were indefinitely suspended on March 16.[14]

With the collapse of these efforts negotiations came to a complete halt. No further high-level talks were held until August 1952, after the International Court had ruled in favour of Iran on the issue of its competence and after Mossadeq had left office for a brief, tumultuous period in late July. The latter events touched off a frenzy of activity on the part of the United States, which feared an imminent communist coup. On August 11 the Associated Press reported that the United States was "prepared to press for a radical change in British policies". This effort resulted in the release of a joint US -British proposal, which was co-signed by Churchill and Truman.

The Churchill-Truman joint note called for the issue of compensation to be submitted to the International Court on the basis of the pre-nationalisation status quo and for a resumption of direct negotiations between the AIOC and Iran. In exchange for this the British economic sanctions would be lifted, oil production would be resumed by the AIOC, and the United States would make an immediate cash grant of $10 million to Iran. This proposal entirely ignored the fact of nationalisation and called for the return of the AIOC. Mossadeq did not reject this proposal outright, but rather discussed it for two weeks with his cabinet and with the British and American ambassadors. On September 16 he announced a series of counterproposals and made a veiled threat that diplomatic relations with Britain would be broken unless it took a more constructive attitude toward the dispute. These counterproposals were flatly rejected by the British on October 14. Two days later Mossadeq announced that diplomatic relations with Britain would be suspended.

A final attempt to reach a settlement was begun by the United States in November 1952. Negotiations were held in Tehran in January and February 1953 between Mossadeq and the US ambassador, Loy Henderson. The United States proposed that a purchasing company staffed by American, British, and other unspecified nationals be formed to market Iran's oil, that the compensation issue be

submitted to the Internationals Court for arbitration, and that an immediate $100 million US loan be extended to Iran. These talks dragged on until March 20, when they were finally ended by Mossadeq. In calling for a purchasing company the US proposal resembled previous US and British efforts, which Iran had rejected as inconsistent with the principle of nationalisation. The US embassy personnel involved in these negotiations became convinced that Mossadeq was not bargaining in good faith. After the negotiations collapsed Henderson soon came around to the view held by his two top assistants that Mossadeq would have to be removed from office. From this point on the United States and Britain entirely abandoned serious negotiations with the Mossadeq government and began to implement a covert plan to overthrow it.[15]

7.2.2. British Intervention in Iranian Politics

By 1951 Britain had been involved in Iran's domestic affairs for well over a century. The most visible aspects of this involvement were Britain's frequent military interventions and its extensive economic interests in Iran. During the oil crisis the British government used both military power and economic coercion in conjunction with the diplomatic efforts described above to weaken the Mossadeq government. As an equally important aspect of Britain's involvement in Iran at this time was the elaborate network of agents, informers, and influence peddlers it had developed through the years. This network was employed during the oil crisis to further weaken Mossadeq and to press for his replacement by a more compliant, pro-British government.

The British network in Iran had long been co-ordinated through the Freemason lodge, which counted among its members many of Iran's top politicians, military officers, and businessmen. In the 1940s and early 1950s a key element of the British net was the Rashidian family. The Rashidians had made a huge fortune in military construction during World War II with help from the British. They subsequently served as a primary contact point for Iranians seeking British favours and as a liaison between

the British embassy and the shah, with whom they regularly played poker. Another important element of the British net was a group of prominent, pro-British politicians. These included Sayyid Zia and the Majles faction headed by Jamal Emami. In addition to these two groups the British had access to a broad assortment of journalists, bazaar figures, and mullahs who could influence opinion and organise crowds and gangs of sports club toughs on their behalf.[16]

Operating through this network, the British began to work against nationalisation even before it became law. Their principal objective in the months before the nationalisation bill was signed was to bring to power a government "with which negotiations could be conducted reasonably". This was to be achieved through pressure on the shah to appoint Sayyid Zia as prime minister.[17] The shah was apparently agreeable to this, and was reportedly discussing the matter with Sayyid Zia when the Majles nominated Mossadeq for the prime ministership on April 28, 1951. After Mossadeq was appointed the British continued their efforts to install Sayyid Zia. This goal was pursued despite strong reservations expressed by the British ambassador in Tehran (Sir Francis Shepherd) and by the head of the Eastern Department in the Foreign Office.[18]

With the appointment of Mossadeq as prime minister Britain set in motion the diplomatic efforts described in the previous section. These were accompanied by a heavy round of sabre-rattling. A paratroops brigade was dispatched to Cyprus in mid-May and the cruiser *Mauritius* was sent to Abadan in June. These actions led the National Front to announce that the first shot fired would "signal the start of World War III".[19] In London British policymakers and academic advisors began to formulate long-term plans in anticipation of a breakdown in negotiations. Plans for covert action and economic sanctions were discussed. Christopher Montage Woodhouse, an MI6 officer who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, was dispatched to Tehran to co-ordinate covert activities with the British net. Efforts to install Sayyid Zia were apparently put on the back burner pending a break in the negotiations.[20]

The first round of oil negotiations collapsed in late June. Soon after, opposition leaders Churchill and Eden began to press the Foreign Office to seek a joint US-British approach to the shah to remove Mossadeq. This meant, in their words, bringing about 'a coup'.[21] Plans for covert action had already been developed. The removal of Mossadeq was viewed as 'objective number one'.[22] He was presumably to be replaced with Sayyid Zia. Oddly enough, Fitzroy Maclean and several other MPs participated at this time in a protracted lobbying effort on behalf of a bid to the Foreign Office by Qavam for the prime ministership. The Foreign Office responded that "certain other plans are now under way" and "we have our money on another horse," apparently referring to Sayyid Zia.[23] Pressures were evidently brought to bear on the shah to replace Mossadeq. He vacillated throughout July, first opposing the plan and then favouring a joint Sayyid Zia-Qavam government. He changed his mind again when negotiations were resumed under the Harriman and Stokes missions.[24]

The Stokes mission appears in retrospect to have been the last serious British effort to negotiate with Mossadeq. When this effort failed, British immediately mounted a multi-pronged offensive against Mossadeq designed to remove him from office. Of the many attempts undertaken by domestic or foreign forces to overthrow Mossadeq during his tenure as prime minister (including the one which finally succeeded), this was the most determined and is most deservedly described as a coup attempt.

Soon after the Iranian team rejected his proposals, Stokes met with the shah and implored him to dismiss Mossadeq.[25] A memo written several days later by the permanent under-secretary in the Foreign Office recommended that Mossadeq be brought down as soon as possible. This memo referred to actions in Iran which were "Indirect and behind the scenes," and pointedly noted "an encouraging growth of opposition to (Mossadeq) in the Majles".[26] This was presumably a reference to efforts by Jamal Emami and his faction to disrupt the Majles and block votes of confidence by

preventing a quorum. Ambassador Shepherd followed up on Stokes' appeal to the shah with a strong recommendation on August 29 that Sayyid Zia be brought in to replace Mossadeq. Meanwhile, the Foreign Office was busy developing an elaborate set of guidelines for dealing with Mossadeq's successor, whom it presumed would be Sayyid Zia. These included a large AIOC loan and a *modus vivendi* (which Sayyid Zia had agreed to) calling for a resumption of oil shipments and a return of the AIOC under a different name. The Minister of Fuel and Power optimistically speculated that these arrangements might just enable Britain to avoid full nationalisation.[27]

These behind-the-scenes efforts were accompanied by a series of economic sanctions and an expanded British military presence. The blockade of Iranian oil organised by the AIOC with help from the other major oil companies had by this time reduced Iran's oil exports to a trickle. Britain's European allies were asked in late August to discourage their citizens from seeking employment with the newly-formed Iranian oil company. The AIOC announced on September 6 that it would take legal action against any company or individual buying oil from the Iranian government. Plans were drawn up in early September and quickly implemented to embargo British exports to Iran of iron, steel, oil processing equipment, sugar, and goods which could be resold for dollars. Privileges for currency conversion were cancelled on September 10 and other financial restrictions were subsequently imposed, violating a memorandum of understanding which Britain had signed with Iran. Four British destroyers arrived in the Persian Gulf on September 5. Plans were also made to strengthen British land and air forces in the region. Together with the covert actions described above, these efforts constituted a serious and concerned attempt on the part of the British government to overthrow Mossadeq.[28]

Ambassador Shepherd took these efforts one step further in early September by sending a message to the Foreign Office which prompted its September 6 statement that negotiations had been suspended and that Britain saw no hope of reaching an agreement

with Mossadeq. This statement, which was 'designed to encourage the opposition group headed by Sayyid Zia,' led Mossadeq to accuse the British of trying to overthrow him.[29] Shepherd reported that the shah favoured a change of government and suggested that the opposition was on the verge of overthrowing Mossadeq. These views were heatedly disputed by Stokes, who argued that "mucking about with discredited old men....will get us nowhere"[30] In fact the shah had told Shepherd on August 31 that he preferred Qavam to Sayyid Zia, and on September 17 he stated that Mossadeq could not be replaced at that time. Shepherd appears to have been the only British official who felt the shah would dismiss Mossadeq. Deputy Under-secretary of State Sir Roger Makins argued that only two alternatives could come from the policy pushed by Shepherd: either Mossadeq would fall (which he doubted) or the British would be expelled from Abadan.[31] The latter soon occurred. Not surprisingly, Shepherd was soon named ambassador to Poland.

After the September 6 announcement Shepherd continued to press the shah to dismiss Mossadeq. The United States became aware of these activities and protested vigorously. When Harriman suggested that Sayyid Zia was "not capable of governing," Shepherd was merely told not to mention Sayyid Zia by name when pressing the shah to replace Mossadeq.[32] US policymakers felt Mossadeq was "anxious to reach an agreement," and suggested that Britain receive an Iranian delegation.[33] Rather than negotiate, the British decided to step up their pressure on Mossadeq's September 20 announcement that British workers must leave Abadan, Prime Minister Atlee apparently addressed a personal note to Truman suggesting that he was considering the use of force against Iran. Truman responded that the United States would not support this. A second message stated that the United States was "gravely concerned" about the present course of events, and again recommended negotiation. After British troops were positioned in the Persian Gulf and warships held firing practice in the river off Abadan, the British cabinet decided to take the matter to the Security Council rather

than use force. Although they were "tired of being lectured by the United States," it appears that lack of US support helped force the British to moderate their policies.[34]

Mossadeq triumphed in the Security Council and returned to Tehran in late November, stronger than ever. It was quite clear that the British had suffered a serious setback and that Mossadeq would remain in power for some time to come. Two major changes occurred in British policy as a result of these failures. First, while they continued to look for a way of ousting Mossadeq, they appear to have accepted the US argument that Sayyid Zia was too discredited to assume power. His name is rarely mentioned in British documents after this period. Instead of Sayyid Zia the British began to back Qavam as a replacement for Mossadeq. Qavam stepped up his lobbying efforts, and the British Minister of Fuel and Power suggested that he be put "in funds".[35] The US State Department believed that "the British are pinning their hopes for a settlement of the oil issue on the replacement of Mossadeq by Qavam".[36] Other candidates to succeed Mossadeq, such as Javad Bushier, Mossadeq's Minister of Roads, were subsequently also discussed.[37] The second major change in British policy made at this time was a greater effort to co-ordinate policy with the United States. This was most evident in a series of joint appraisals made by the two embassies in the following months.

The British continued to develop covert plans to oust Mossadeq in the winter and spring of 1952. However, his strong domestic position and the absence of a suitable alternative appear to have left them with no opportunity to implement these plans. As discussed in the previous section, the British also took little interest in oil negotiations with Mossadeq after August 1951. Their main strategy was to weaken Iran's economy by maintaining the oil blockade and the other economic sanctions they had imposed. Mossadeq's options for countering this strategy were expected to run out in mid-1952. He would thereafter face growing domestic unrest, which would lead either to his fall or to negotiations on more favourable terms.[38]

In July 1952 Mossadeq suddenly resigned as prime minister in a dispute with the shah over control of the armed forces. The Majles then elected Qavam to replace him. Qavam remained in office for five tumultuous days, after which violent demonstrations by the National Front and the Tudeh party forced the shah to relent and re-appoint Mossadeq. This episode set off a flurry of activity by both the United States and Britain. Hoping to stabilise what it regarded as a more co-operative government, the State Department quickly made plans to offer economic aid to Qavam. The British agreed "in principle" with these plans, and Qavam even made a formal request for aid to the US embassy.[39] However, before anything could be done to help Qavam Mossadeq was triumphantly swept back into office.

In the aftermath of the Qavam episode both the United States and Britain again re-evaluated their policies toward Iran. Discussions were held in Washington on July 29 between the British ambassador and Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade on methods of stopping Iran from 'going down the drain', Byroade suggested that 'most unorthodox methods' might be necessary, and 'was perfectly willing that the possibility of a coup should be examined'.[40] Loy Henderson, the US ambassador in Tehran, was instructed to prepare a joint reappraisal of the situation with his British counterpart, including a review of possible alternatives to Mossadeq and ways of bringing these alternatives to power. George Middleton, the British charge' d'Affaires who headed the Tehran embassy after the removal of Shepherd, reported to London that only a coup could stop Iran from falling into communist hands. No outstanding candidate had yet come forward, although General Fazlollah Zahedi was described as available and adequate.[41] A year later Zahedi led the coup which finally toppled Mossadeq.

While these discussions were going on Ambassador Henderson sent a cable from Tehran which prompted Secretary of State Dean Acheson to press the British for a new round of negotiations with Mossadeq. Acheson suggested that the United States would immediately extend a $10 million grant to Iran and that Britain should buy some Iranian oil and resume negotiations. The British replied that in their view Mossadeq

should not be helped. They argued that morale in the Iranian army was improving and that it might soon intervene against Mossadeq. This conflicted sharply with a pessimistic report on army morale made a few days earlier by Middleton. Henderson's reappraisal arrived in Washington at about this time. He also reported that army morale was low and suggested that Mossadeq's removal might benefit the Tudeh. On August 9 British Foreign Secretary Eden addressed a note to Acheson stating again that the army's morale was improving and that it might soon intervene. Two days later the Associated Press ran a story indicating that the United States was "prepared to press for a radical change in British policies toward Iran".[42] The next day Acheson told the British ambassador in Washington that the United States could not accept the British position and reserved the right to pursue an independent policy toward Iran.[43]

The British talk of a military coup apparently ceased at this point. Discussions between the United States and British soon led to the drafting of the Truman-Churchill joint note, which was presented to Mossadeq and eventually rejected. While there is no reason to believe that the British did anything more than contemplate a coup against Iran in this period, it is evident that the United States sought again to restrain the British in this regard as they had in September 1951.

Mossadeq's rejection of the joint note was soon followed by a decision to break diplomatic relations with Britain. Deprived of both diplomatic contact with Iranian government and a base of operations inside Iran, the British were now forced to rely on the United States to resolve the oil crisis.

7.2.3. The US Role in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Negotiations

As discussed in chapter 6, US strategic and economic interests in the Middle East were focused more on Saudi Arabia than on Iran in the years after World War II. Saudi oil was controlled by US companies, while Iran's oil was controlled by the British. Although Iran played a key role in the US containment strategy, it was not

covered under the Truman Doctrine and responsibility for its defence was left to the British military. In 1950 US policymakers began to take greater interest in Iran as its internal situation deteriorated and as the Cold War deepened. However, while economic aid was increased somewhat, no fundamental changes were made in US policy toward Iran.

US policy in the Middle East was closely linked with British policy in the early 1950s. The United States and Britain held similar views about Soviet intentions in the area and were firmly committed to keeping it in the Western sphere of influence. Joint military policies were consequently formulated by the two allies for regional defence. The United States also shared Britain's interest in keeping down oil prices and maintaining US-British control over the region's oil. A glut in the oil market and pressure from the oil-producing countries to raise production levels kept the two powers from encroaching on each other's oil concessions. These ties led to a high level of co-operation between the United States and Britain and made it difficult for US policymakers to distance themselves significantly from the British.

Nevertheless, some differences did emerge. The United States had supported the anti-colonial movement in India several years earlier and was sympathetic to the nationalist movement in Iran, which was vehemently anti-British. US policymakers were clearly more worried than their British counterparts about the communist threat in Iran. Also, since the AIOC was a British company US officials were less concerned about its plight and more willing to reach a settlement at its expense than were the British. While US policy was ultimately supportive of British interests, these factors led to important differences on a number of key issues.

US policymakers became increasingly concerned about the situation in Iran as the nationalisation movement began to pick up steam. In March 1951 the National Security Council concluded that "failure to reach (an oil agreement) carries with it such undesirable consequences that no opportunity should be impart to both governments our sense of urgency in this matter". Recommendations were made that military and

economic aid to Iran be increased and that the British be pressed for an "early and equitable settlement".[44] In April the British were urged to accept an arrangement recognising the principle of nationalisation but assuring effective British control. According to US officials the key was to pay "lip service" to Iranian nationalism while safeguarding British interests. The British were pressed to accept a 50-50 division of profits, but were warned that a larger share for Iran would upset other pricing arrangements in the Middle East.[45]

After the nationalisation law went into effect the United States publicly sought to portray itself as neutral in the dispute. On May 18 the State Department called for a negotiated sefflement between Britain and Iran. It urged both sides to avoid threats and intimidation and stated that it would not get involved in the specifics of a settlement. Several days later General Omar Bradley announced that US troops would not became oinvolved if fighting broke out. On May 24 Secretary of State Acheson pledged that the United States would not intervene in Iran's internal affairs. Privately the British were told that the United States opposed pressure on the shah for a change of government. US officials said they would view "with grave concern" the use of force in Iran, except under very limited conditions. [46] British officials complained that they were "bothered" and "annoyed at the American attitude of relative indifference".[47]

While US policymakers pressed both sides for an early end to the dispute, they quietly began to formulate a strategy for restructuring the world distribution of oil to make up for the impending loss of Iran's production. On June 3 the Foreign Petroleum Committee (composed of officials from the Departments of Defence, State, and Commerce) adopted a plan under which US oil companies would voluntarily provide oil to US allies whose supplies had been disrupted by the cut-off of Iranian production. This plan ultimately provided some 46 million barrels of oil products to affected countries in the first year of the blockade, which amounted to 20% of Iran's total 1950 production. These actions were carried out under the Defence Production Act of 1950 in order to ensure that adequate oil supplies would be available in the event of an

outbreak of hostilities. However, they had the effect of strengthening Britain's oil blockade and hence helped to undermine Iran's economy and weaken the Mossadeq government.[48]

As the first round of oil negotiations broke down in June, the United States maintained its neutral posture but stepped up its efforts to mediate the oil dispute. After Iran rejected the British proposals on June 19 Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee met with British officials and again expressed their opposition to efforts to unseat Mossadeq. Acheson was quite alarmed at the breakdown in negotiations and on July 4 proposed to the British ambassador that Averell Harriman be sent to Tehran as a mediator. Harriman was greeted in Tehran with large-scale demonstrations, but soon managed to arrange a resumption of negotiations under the aegis of the Stokes mission. Although this effort ultimately failed, Acheson credits Harriman with preventing on outbreak of hostilities between Britain and Iran.[49]

With the collapse of the Stokes mission Britain began to implement the elaborate plans described above to overthrow Mossadeq. The United States continued to oppose these efforts. US officials felt that Mossadeq was the only Iranian political figure capable of getting an agreement through the Majles. They also believed that the shah was unwilling to replace Mossadeq. Harriman told British officials that he was deeply disturbed at their covert activities on behalf of Sayyid Zia. He suggested that either the United States or Britain should offer economic aid to Mossadeq. Other US officials repeatedly pressured the British to resume negotiations. Even after the September 20 announcement that British workers were to leave the oil-fields the United States continued to oppose plans to overthrow Mossadeq. On September 26 President Truman sent a message to Prime Minister Atlee stating that the United States would not support the use of force by Britain. He also urged a resumption of negotiations.[50] On the following day Atlee's cabinet decided not to use force and instead sent the matter to the Security Council. Although Acheson initially opposed this move on the grounds that Britain had little chance of success, US policymakers quickly became involved in

the ensuing deliberations.[51] Talks were also held with Mossadeq in New York and Washington on the International Bank proposal and other matters.

The grave crisis which had emerged by the end of September led to a subtle but important shift in US policy away from the British position on the oil issue. On October 10 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a memo which stated that "Iran's orientation towards the United States in peacetime and maintenance of the British position in the Middle East now transcend in importance the desirability of supporting British oil interests in Iran."[52] This memo was subsequently adopted as official US policy by the National Security Council. At the same time a new approach to the oil dispute reflecting this view was pursued with the British. US officials suggested that a multinational consortium be established to market Iran's oil. Royal Dutch/Shell was suggested as a possible leader of this consortium, and there was talk that US companies might also participate. A modification of this arrangement was finally adopted three years later, after Britain was expelled from Iran and Mossadeq was overthrown. However, in October 1951 the British were still hoping to oust Mossadeq and gain a more favourable settlement. Hence they had little enthusiasm for this approach. In any case it is doubtful that Mossadeq would have accepted it.[53]

Throughout November 1951 the United States continued to oppose efforts to overthrow Mossadeq, arguing that the only alternative to him would be a communist take-over. Although the British continued their efforts to unseat Mossadeq they shared this concern. A joint appraisal made by the two embassies on November 19 stated that "the immediate, mutual and overriding United States-United Kingdom objective in Iran is to prevent that country falling into communist hands."[54] These fears increased when large-scale Tudeh demonstrations broke out in early December. Opposition deputies occupied the Majles building, and a *New York Times* reporter was expelled from Iran for writing lies and insults about the government. Rumours circulated that Mossadeq was about to sell oil to the Soviet Union. Mossadeq announced that aid from the West would only be accepted on an unconditional basis.[55]

US policymakers were greatly disturbed at these events. A report in mid-January of 1952 expressed the fear that Iran might collapse within thirty days. By the end of the month US officials viewed as "highly probable" the possibility that Mossadeq would turn to the Soviet Union for aid.[56] British officials felt that their American counterparts had 'fallen completely for (Mossadeq's) propaganda' and were "obsessed by their over-riding fear of communism".[57] Feeling that economic collapse was imminent, the United States announced on January 21 that the point 4 aid programme in Iran would be greatly expanded.[58] Discussions on the International Bank plan, which had begun in October, were pressed with renewed vigour.

Unrest continued in Iran in the first few months of 1952. The seventeenth Majles elections were accompanied by bloody riots in early February. The Fedayan-i-Islam shot and seriously wounded Deputy Prime Minister Hossein Fatemi and threatened to kill Mossadeq. The Tudeh party continued to stage violent demonstrations. In late January Mossadeq ordered all British consulates closed, charging interference in Iran's internal affairs. A dispute erupted with the United States when Mossadeq refused to accept the terms under which the US military mission was to operate. The US-sponsored International Bank negotiations broke down in March and President Truman announced that the $120 million loan first discussed in October would be contingent on a settlement of the oil dispute. US policymakers came to doubt Mossadeq's willingness to reach a settlement. However, after his success in the Majles elections they began to take a more optimistic view about his ability to remain in office. While financial pressures were expected ultimately to lead to a collapse, it was felt that Mossadeq would remain in power for at least another 2-3 months. By May US officials no longer felt a serious crisis or a Tudeh-sponsored coup was imminent.[59]

In mid-July Mossadeq unexpectedly resigned and was replaced by Qavam. Qavam remained in office for five tumultuous days, after which massive demonstrations forced the shah to re-appoint Mossadeq. As discussed in the previous section, the United States had sought to bolster Qavam with a $10-20 million aid

package. After Mossadeq returned to office US and British officials made thorough re-evaluations of their policies. Acheson proposed a new plan for negotiations to the British, who quickly rejected it. He then warned that the United States was prepared to act independently if the British would not co-operate. Discussions between the two allies were resumed, culminating in the Truman-Churchill joint note. This note was rejected by Mossadeq. Diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran were soon broken.

With the rejection of the joint note US officials began to search for another approach to the oil problem. They soon turned their attention to the consortium arrangement which had been considered briefly in the fall of 1951 and then dropped. The ensuing discussions over this approach and the crisis atmosphere then prevailing led to a quiet debate within the US government over how closely the United States should align itself with the British position. In the end the State Department disregarded suggestions by the Department of Justice and Joint Chiefs of Staff, choosing to maintain the generally pro-British position it had hitherto followed.

The consortium arrangement discussed in October 1951 was modified slightly in 1952. Where the AIOC had been excluded in the previous formulation, the new plan called for the AIOC to purchase 75% of Iran's oil output, with the remaining share to be distributed among several US companies. In addition, a $100 million payment was to be advanced to Iran by the US government against future oil purchases. The British were told that US companies were reluctant to participate because of anti-trust actions then pending against them and because it would upset their arrangements with other producing countries, who would oppose the necessary production cutbacks. US companies were to be included only because this was necessary to secure the $100 million from the export-import Bank.[60]

The views of the Justice Department on the anti-trust implications of this arrangement were solicited. After examining the proposed arrangement, Justice concluded that it would constitute "an unreasonable restraint upon...foreign commerce"

and would thus violate federal anti-trust laws.[61] Two days later the Justice Department issued a memo suggesting that the goal of keeping Iran out of Soviet hands could be achieved without violating anti-trust laws by enabling Iran to sell its oil on the open market, i.e.,by doing away with the consortium arrangement and, by implication, with the AIOC concession as well.[62] The State Department apparently ignored this suggestion. It eventually chose to circumvent the anti-trust issue when a consortium arrangement was finally implemented in August 1954 by citing urgent national security concerns.

A second dispute arose with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following Mossadeq's rejection of the joint note the National Security Council decided to re-examine the US position in the oil dispute. The Joint Chiefs proposed that the United States be prepared to act independently of Britain if necessary in order to prevent a communist take-over. In doing so they explicitly recognised that this might jeopardise the close US relationship with Britain. The State Department opposed this recommendation, and it was not included in the revised Security Council position paper eventually adopted.[63]

The reluctance of the State Department to distance itself from the British became even more apparent during discussions over two notes issued by the State Department in late November. The first note was a transcript of conversations held on November 20 between Acheson and Eden. During this conversation Acheson apparently warned Eden that the United States would consider buying Iranian oil if the AIOC could not purchase sufficient quantities to meet Iran's financial needs under an agreement then being discussed. When a transcript of this conversation was shown to British officials, they strongly protested Acheson's statement. US officials agreed to retract the statement and delete it from the transcript. However, they refused to rule out the possibility of taking such actions in the future if the need arose.[64]

The second note was a statement issued to the press by the State Department on December 7. This note stated that the question of whether US oil companies should buy Iranian oil would be left to the companies themselves to decide. It was clearly

directed at smaller, independent oil companies, since the majors had already expressed their reluctance to the idea of buying Iranian oil. While it appeared to indicate that the US government was not opposed to such purchases, this note gave no indication that the government would provide further assistance in the form of help on anti-trust matters or possible AIOC lawsuits. It stated further that the US government did not think purchases by independents could contribute significantly to Iran's problems. Nevertheless, the British were quite unhappy with this note. Although they were not successful in blocking its release, they did manage to convince State Department officials to delete a crucial sentence which declared that the Department "will take no action to advise, dissuade, or prevent" purchases by US companies. The message which finally emerged was consequently quite ambiguous about the US attitude toward purchases by US companies.[65]

The consortium arrangement which re-emerged in November 1952 gradually evolved into the set of proposals made by Acheson to Mossadeq in December of that year. Negotiations on these proposals dragged on until early March, when they finally terminated by Mossadeq. After almost two years of discussion, the positions of the Iranian, British, and US governments had changed very little. Further negotiations seemed pointless. The United States had by this time begun to develop covert plans to overthrow Mossadeq. The coup which followed on August 19, 1953 was a decisive turning point in Iran's political evolution. It also set something of a precedent for US covert action in the Third World which still holds today.

7.3. The Downfall of the Mossadeq Government

7.3.1. The Coup of August 19, 1953

After the British embassy was closed in October 1952 a decision was made by the British Foreign Office to approach US officials about the possibility of a joint US-

British covert operation to oust Mossadeq.[66] Christopher Woodhouse, who had been directing British covert activities in Tehran before the embassy was closed, was dispatched to Washington with an elaborate plan for Mossadeq's overthrow. This plan called for a co-ordinated uprising to be engineered (with or without shah's support) by the British network in Tehran and by pro-British tribes (presumably the Bakhtiari) in south-western Iran. Both the State Department and the CIA were approached. Not surprisingly, State Department officials showed little interest at time. However, the CIA, particularly Deputy Director Allen Dulles and Deputy for Plans Frank Wisner, were quite receptive. At the same time Kermit Roosevelt, chief of CIA operations in the Middle East and a grandson of Teddy Roosevelt, was approached in London with the same plan by top MI6 officials. The British were told that nothing could be done under Truman, but that Eisenhower, who was to be inaugurated in January, might be more receptive.[67]

Further meetings were held in Washington in December between Foreign Office and State Department officials. The latter were now willing to discuss a coup, but wanted to wait until Eisenhower had been inaugurated and the oil negotiations then being conducted with Mossadeq had been given a chance. They also suggested that the coup be directed against Tudeh party and other radical elements, and that it be undertaken in co-operation with Mossadeq. Needless to say, this idea horrified the British. It is indicative of the very different views held by the State Department on the one hand and by the CIA and the British on the other about Mossadeq and how he should be dealt with.[68]

Serious planning without the knowledge of Eisenhower for the coup begun in early February 1953, although it was to be implemented only if necessary. In a meeting of top diplomatic and intelligence officials from both countries it was decided that planning for the coup would go forward under Roosevelt, who was to lead the operation. At this meeting the Rashidian network and a well-known British agent named Ahmed Aramesh were made available to Roosevelt. It was also decided that

General Fazlollah Zahedi would be supported to replace Mossadeq as prime minister, apparently because he was the choice of the shah.[69]

Zahedi was well known to the British. He had been arrested in 1941 by Fitzroy Maclean for helping the Germans plan an uprising against the Allied occupation forces. Maclean later described him as "one of the worst grain holders in the country".[70] Zahedi was interned in Palestine for the remainder of the war. The British also arrested Ayatollah Kashani during the war and brought him to Palestine as well. Many Iranians believe that these two men became British agents at this time and that Kashani later worked secretly with Zahedi against Mossadeq. British documents cast some doubt on this. Ambassador Shepherd described Zahedi in May 1951 as "vain" and "completely untrustworthy". While he was Interior Minister in Mossadeq's first cabinet Zahedi had helped strengthen the National Front and worked for nationalisation. He had been discussed by the British as a possible coup leader since 1951, but was never their principal candidate. As for Kashani, his father had been killed by the British and he himself had led an uprising against the British in Iraq in 1919. His speeches in the post-World War II era were rapidly anti-British. British officials at various times suspected him of having ties with the United States and the Soviet Union.[71]

Planning for the coup, now given the CIA code-name TPAJAX, continued after the February meeting. Roosevelt travelled frequently to London, Beirut, and Tehran where he met with British officials and members of the local CIA stations. The CIA chief in Tehran at this time is identified in Roosevelt's memoir *Counter-coup* as George Cuvier.[72] Cuvier opposed the coup, but helped Roosevelt in his preparations. He was replaced in July 1953 by Bill Herman, who had previously served as Cuvier's intelligence deputy. As an Associated Press reporter Herman had covered the Azerbaijan crisis in 1946 and had become acquainted with a broad spectrum of Iranian political figures. Roosevelt and Herman were helped in the planning and later in the

coup itself by three other station operatives. Two of these are inexplicably combined in Roosevelt's account into a character named Peter Stoneman, and the third is identified as Fred Zimmerman. One Peter Stoneman, was brought to Tehran in July 1953 to maintain liaison with the Iranian military officers involved in the coup. He had previously been stationed in South Korea, where he had directed paramilitary operations. Zimmerman and the other Peter Stoneman were both in their late twenties, on their first CIA assignment.

Two other important CIA figures in Iran at this time were Roger Black and a "Persia expert," who is described but not named by Roosevelt.[73] These two were well-known American academics with long-standing CIA/OSS ties in Iran, apparently working in the Tehran station on a contract basis. In 1950 Roger Black had recruited the Iranians who in 1953 worked with Roosevelt's team in the plot against Mossadeq. These agents, code-named Nerren and Cilley, ran a propaganda operation for the CIA which was code-named TPBEDAMN.[74]

TPBEDAMN was the only major CIA operation targeted at Iranian political groups in the early 1950s. It had been set up in 1950 or 1951 (possibly after the assassination of Razmara) by the "Persia expert". and was subsequently transferred to Dick Manville(another CIA officer mentioned by Roosevelt) sometime before the 1953 coup. It reportedly had an annual budget of $1 million, and continued to operate for at least a year after the 1953 coup.

TPBEDAMN was mainly a propaganda operation directed against the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party.[75] However, other small-scale operations were carried out under its aegis as well. Sports club toughs were hired to break up Tudeh demonstrations. Money was given to the right-wing, ultra-nationalist Pan-Orients party. An attempt was made to counter the great influence of Kashani by building up a clerical organisation around the mullah Falsafi. These operations were all carried out through Nerren and Cilley, who had their own network of agents. The CIA had little or no direct contact with this network (other than through Nerren and Cilley), and its

members presumably had no direct or indirect contact in the National Front. However, despite its relatively large budget,[76]the operations carried out under TPBEDAMN had little real impact on either the Tudeh party or the National Front. Its primary significance lay in the network of agents it made available to the TPAJAX operation.

Nerren and Cilley were the only Iranians directly employed by the CIA who played a role in TPAJAX. By 1953 the Tehran station had developed a wide network of agents who were used to gather intelligence on events inside Iran and Soviet and Eastern Bloc activities. These included informants in all levels of the government bureaucracy, in Mossadeq's cabinet and among his closest advisors and assistants, in the Tudeh party, and in several Eastern European embassies. While information contributed by these agents was undoubtedly of some use in planning TPAJAX, none of them played an active role in the operation. In addition to Nerren and Cilley, the Rashidian brothers and Aramesh (who had been loaned to Roosevelt by the British) played important roles in the coup.

Final approval for TPAJAX came in a meeting on June 25 at the State Department. Present at this meeting were Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, Loy Henderson, Roosevelt, and several top officials from the Departments of State and Defence. A plan for the coup, based in part on the original British proposal, was unanimously adopted at this meeting.[77]

Roosevelt soon left to lead the coup, arriving in Tehran on July 19. Since the shah had not yet been told about Roosevelt's plan, arrangements were made to contact him. US Airforce Major Charles Mason (this is the pseudonyms used by Roosevelt) and Norman Derbyshire, an MI6 officer who had been Woodhouse's assistant in Tehran, were sent to Paris to encourage the shah's sister Ashraf to go to Tehran and notify her brother of the plan. Mason and Derbyshire finally located Ashraf, who liked to gamble, in the French casino town of Deauville. She reluctantly agreed to speak to her brother, after receiving an unauthorised promise from Mason that the United States would support her brother in the style to which he was accustomed in the event that the

coup failed. Ashraf arrived in Tehran on July 25, but harassment from the Mossadeq government (which had forced her into exile) prevented her from delivering the message.

A second attempt to contact the shah was made a week later through US General Norman Schwartzkopf, who had commanded the Iranian Gendarmerie from 1942 until 1948. Schwartzkopf managed to see the shah, amid heavy criticism in the local press. He told the shah about the CIA plan and asked him to sign fir-mans (or decrees) dismissing Mossadeq and appointing Zahedi as the new prime minister. (This was the shah's legal prerogative under the constitution.) The shah refused to sign the fir-mans and would not commit himself to the CIA plan. Schwartzkopf then advised Roosevelt to see the shah personally. Arrangements were made through the Rashidians, who had access to the court. Roosevelt and the shah met several times to discuss the coup plans.[78]

Roosevelt's plan was to have the shah sign the two fir-mans and then fly to the Caspian coast and await developments. The fir-man dismissing Mossadeq was to be delivered to him at his home. After the fir-man was delivered armoured units were to take up key positions in the city. It was evidently assumed that Mossadeq would simply give up the prime ministership to Zahedi, since no contingency plans were made.

After a brief mix-up the fir-man was delivered to Mossadeq on the night of Saturday August 15 by Colonel Nematollah Nassiri, Commander of the Imperial Guards and later a notorious chief of SAVAK, the shah's brutal secret police. Mossadeq had been warned of Nassiri's mission by a Colonel Mumtaz, apparently one of the officers Roosevelt's team had been working with. Mossadeq denounced the fir-man as a forgery, tore it up, and had Nassiri arrested. According to some reports the signature on the fir-mans was not the shah's. According to others it was clear that the fir-mans were drafted on a blank sheet of paper which had already been signed by the shah. In either case Mossadeq considered the shah's orders to be invalid. Troops loyal to Mossadeq set up roadblocks throughout the city. Opposition deputies, military

officers suspected of being loyal to Zahedi, and the shah's minister of court were arrested. A massive search was made for Zahedi and a reward of 100,000 rials was offered for his arrest. The armoured column which was to move into Tehran apparently broke up, with some soldiers joining the pro-Mossadeq forces. Without informing Roosevelt's team the shah fled the country in panic, first to Baghdad and then to Rome.[79]

The arrest of Nassiri ended the original coup attempt. Having made no contingency plans, Roosevelt and his team were forced to improvise a new strategy. Their first act was to arrange for the evacuation of Roosevelt, Zahedi, and other key participants.[80] Zahedi was brought to the house of Fred Zimmerman to await evacuation by the US air attaché. He remained there until Mossadeq was finally toppled.

The decision to make plans to evacuate Zahedi and Roosevelt did not end the CIA effort to oust Mossadeq. Several diverse and uncoordinated actions were undertaken by Roosevelt's team and by Nerren and Cilley (who were acting almost independently) in the hope that a successful coup could be triggered.

The first was an effort to publicise the shah's dismissal of Mossadeq and appointment of Zahedi. This was accomplished in two ways. First, it was decided that the royal fir-mans should be copied and distributed to the news media and the public. This was done on Sunday, August 16 in the house of one of the CIA officers identified by Roosevelt as Peter Stoneman. The copies were given to Nerren and Cilley to distribute.[81] Since the Mossadeq government had not announced delivery of the fir-man to Mossadeq's home this was an effective way to make the shah's replacement of Mossadeq known. In a second effort to publicise the shah's actions, Bill Herman brought Kennett Love of the *New York Times* and Don Schwind of the *Associated Press* to Stonemason's house to meet with Zahedi's son Ardeshir. Ardeshir told them about the fir-mans and described Mossadeq's attempt to arrest his father as a coup,

since his father had legally been appointed prime minister. Love and Schwind quickly published this information.[82]

After the shah's actions had been publicised the American and Iranian conspirators took steps to build support in the military for a Zahedi government. Zahedi quickly drew up and distributed a declaration calling for members of the armed forces to support the shah. Military supplies were distributed by the US military advisory mission to pro-Zahedi forces in the Tehran area. Efforts were also made to gain the support of military garrisons in other key cities. Messengers were sent to Kermanshah and Isfahan, using forged travel documents which had been brought in from CIA headquarters in Washington. The elder Peter Stoneman and an American CIA driver went to Kermanshah, where Colonel Teimur Bakhtiar was the garrison commander. Bakhtiar was sympathetic and led a column of tanks and armoured cars toward Tehran in support of Zahedi. Although this column did not arrive in Tehran until after Mossadeq had been ousted, news that Bakhtiar was marching in support of Zahedi reached Tehran immediately and helped turn the tide against Mossadeq. Ardeshir Zahedi was sent to Isfahan where the acting garrison commander, Colonel Zarqam, agreed to co-operate.[83]

As these events were unfolding, Nerren and Cilley arranged on Sunday August 16 to have a large crowd march into central Tehran on the following day shouting Tudeh slogans and carrying signs denouncing the shah. This crowd was organised through the usual sports club leaders and was intended to rally support for the shah by provoking fears of a Tudeh take-over. This was done independently of Roosevelt's efforts, and apparently without his knowledge. It was financed in part with $50,000 given to Nerren and Cilley on Sunday night by Fred Zimmerman, who was handling them while Dick Manville was sick with jaundice. This crowd duly appeared on Monday morning and was soon joined by real Tudeh members, who were apparently unaware that the original crowd had been hired with CIA money. The combined crowd

attacked the Reza Shah mausoleum and then set about tearing down all statues of the shah and his father in Tehran, these demonstrations continued on the following day.

Fearing that the crowd would attack Americans, US Ambassador Henderson met with Mossadeq on Tuesday night and convinced him to send the Tehran police into the streets to break up the demonstrations. Mossadeq also telephoned all the democratic political parties requesting them not to organise any further demonstration. These proved to be a fateful decisions for Mossadeq, as the Tudeh party, which had unintentionally became one of Mossadeq's main sources of support by this time, retaliated by ordering its members off the streets. Another thread in the web undertaken by Roosevelt and Herman was to attempt to trigger popular uprising against Mossadeq.[84]

Once the fir-man had been publicised and stops had been taken to rally the military behind Zahedi, Roosevelt and Herman began to look for a way to trigger popular uprisings against Mossadeq. The most obvious way of doing this was through the clergy, preferably through a popular figure such as Kashani. His religious cridentials, strident opposition to Britain and the US as well as his public challenges to Mossadeq in his role as leader of the Majles made him an ideal candidate around which to coalesce support. James Bill argues that the US were able to use him to support the shah due to his hatred of the politics of terrorism employed by Mossadeq.[85] The CIA station had no ties with Kashani, and apparently had no other religious ties which could accomplish this task. However, the Rashidians were close to Ayatollah Behbehani, a leading figure in the Shiite establishment, and so Roosevelt asked them to arrange an anti-Mossadeq demonstration. He was told that this could not be done until Friday, when weekly prayer would be held.

Fearing that Mossadeq's net would close in around them by the time these demonstrations could be held, Roosevelt asked the Rashidians how he could contact Kashani. The Rashidians directed him to Aramesh. Bill Herman and Fred Zimmerman met with Aramesh on the morning of Wednesday, August 19. They gave him $10,000,

which was apparently passed on to Kashani. Kashani in turn arranged to have a crowd of sports club toughs and bazaar workers march toward the centre of town from the bazaar area. In the following days so much of this American currency had found its way into the bazaar that the black market exchange rate had fallen from over 100 rials to the dollar to under 50.[86]

The crowd organised by Kashani marched toward the centre of town. It was joined along the way by army and police unites and by onlookers who had become disillusioned with Mossadeq or were angered by the Tudeh demonstrations of the previous days. Government office buildings, Tudeh and pro-Mossadeq newspapers, and the offices of several pro-Mossadeq parties were attacked. Mossadeq refused to send loyal army units to break up this crowd and refused a request by the Tudeh party for arms to attack it. A source who was close to Mossadeq at the time told me that Mossadeq, fearing a Tudeh take-over and recognising the strength of the opposition, simply gave up.[87]

On Wednesday morning an army detachment loyal to Zahedi was still hiding in the basement of Fred Zimmerman's house at this time. Hearing denunciations of Mossadeq over the radio and seeing a large pro-shah crowd, Roosevelt rushed over to Zahedi's hideout. On the way he encountered General Guilanshah, commander of the air force. Guilanshah followed Roosevelt to Zahedi's hideout with several tanks. Zahedi and Guilanshah were soon joined by several other tank detachments, led by Colonels Oveissi, Khajeh-Nouri, and others. Together with the pro-shah demonstrators, this unit (reportedly containing 35 tanks) seized the army headquarters and then marched on Mossadeq's residence. There a nine-hour battle ensued in which some 300 people were killed. The walls around Mossadeq's house were destroyed with tank and artillery fire. The crowd stormed the house and Mossadeq escaped over the garden wall. He surrendered to Zahedi the next day.[88]

7.3.2. The Post-Coup Consolidation of Power

The arrest of Mossadeq did not entirely eliminate public opposition to Zahedi's take-over. Sporadic outbursts and demonstrations continued in Tehran and in outlying provincial towns. A number of Mossadeq's closest associates, including Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi, went into hiding and in the following months tried to rally Mossadeq's supporters. The Tudeh party continued to operate clandestinely. Perhaps the most serious threat to Zahedi came from the pro-Mossadeq Qashqai tribe, which was based in south-central Iran around the city of Shiraz. Immediately after the coup the Qashqai khans withdrew from Tehran to consider an attack on Zahedi's forces. After an initial meeting they told CIA station chief Bill Herman that they had decided against an attack. However, in late September they deployed their forces around Shirrs and threatened to invade the city unless Mossadeq was released from prison. Tudeh party members in the air forces sabotaged a number of surveillance planes being used to watch the Qashqai. The stand-off around Shirrs continued until the end of September, when the Qashqai apparently withdraw their forces.[89]

In the weeks and months after the coup Zahedi moved quickly to neutralise what remained of the opposition. Mossadeq and General Riahi (his army chief of staff) were arrested and eventually given short prison terms. Most other National Front leaders were soon arrested as well and given prison terms or sent into internal exile. Only Hossein Fatemi, who had been a particularly bitter critic of the shah and was regarded as a communist sympathiser by the US embassy staff, was eventually executed. Kashani, Baqai, and Makki, who had each contributed to Mossadeq's downfall, were even kept on a short leash by Zahedi. The two leading Tehran newspapers (Kayhan and Ettela'at) were briefly closed down after the coup because they had supported Mossadeq. Frequent sweeps were made for Tudeh suspects, with 1,200 being arrested by the end of October. Tudeh networks in the air force, the court system, and the education ministry were uncovered and large quantities of Tudeh arms and literature

were seized. All demonstrations by the Tudeh and the National Front were broken up. In at least two cases CIA officers worked with Zahedi's forces to break up demonstrations in the fall of 1953.[90]

By the time Mossadeq was overthrown the oil blockade had been in place for over two years. Despite the austerity measures implemented by Mossadeq, Iran's foreign exchange holdings had nearly been depleted. The Iranian government estimated at the time that the blockade had cost it roughly $200 million. Mossadeq had appealed to Eisenhower in May 1953 for economic aid, but was flatly rejected. Now, after the coup, US aid was suddenly available. Five million dollars was immediately given to Ali Amini, Zahedi's minister of finance, by the CIA. This was allegedly followed up with another $2-3 million, which Zahedi is said to have pocketed. On September 1 Eisenhower approved a $23 million point 4 aid grant for Iran. Five days later another $45 million in aid was approved. This brought the total to at least $73 million in the first three weeks after the coup, more than a third of the revenue lost due to the oil blockade under Mossadeq. Several days after the coup Zahedi told Henderson that Iran would fall to communism if aid were not immediately forthcoming. Given the importance of the oil blockade in undermining Mossadeq and the fact that oil sales were not resumed until November 1954, this seems to be a reasonable conclusion.[91]

7.4. Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the United States, acting largely on the basis of strategic considerations, played a crucial role in the overthrew of the National Front government led by Mohammed Mossadeq. It is useful to view the US involvement in Mossadeq's overthrow as occurring in distinct phases, corresponding to the periods in which Presidents Truman and Eisenhower held office. Under Truman the United States facilitated the British oil blockade and refused to grant a large aid package to Mossadeq. These acts contributed to Iran's economic deterioration and in this sense

played a minor role in undermining the Mossadeq government. However, Truman also blocked British efforts to overthrow Mossadeq. Despite his support for the British position in the oil dispute it is clear that Truman had no desire to remove Mossadeq from office. Given his tolerance of Mossadeq and Mossadeq's commitment to an independent and non-aligned Iran, it is also clear that Truman had no interest in turning Iran into client state.

The *de facto* decision to make Iran a US client did not occur until Eisenhower was inaugurated. This was done by engineering the overthrow of Mossadeq and replacing him with the pro-shah government headed by Zahedi. Mossadeq's overthrow was achieved, quite obviously, through covert US intervention in the form of the CIA operation code-named TPAJAX. Other cliency instruments, including military and economic aid and assistance to Iran's security forces, also played important roles in establishing Iran as a US client.

This shift in policy occurred primarily due to Eisenhower's fear of a Soviet take over in Iran. Inherent instability in the area in the form of new state of Israel, the rise of Nasser, disturbances in Iraq and Lebanon all provoked fears of spreading trouble which the Soviets could take advantage of. The withdrawal of Britain as the regions external hegemony left a vacuum for the US to fill. The failure of Mossadeq to agree the oil deal with Britain and his breaking of the negotiations allowed Eisenhower administration to implement his overthrow, which had been sought by oil interests, the British and the CIA.[92]

There can be no doubt that the US role was crucial in overthrowing Mossadeq. Planning for the coup began during Eisenhower's first month from CIA and State Department of the United States. The coup was directed and financed by the CIA. Although it was carried out in a very haphazard manner, the CIA team and its agents conceived and implemented such crucial details of the coup as the publication of the fir-mans, the enlistment of the garrisons at Isfahan and Kermanshah, the use of fake Tudeh crowds to heighten fears of a Tudeh take-over, and the organisation of the crowd

which stormed Mossadeq's house. While these events were unfolding the shah had fled the country in panic and Zahedi, the prime minister-designate, was hiding from Mossadeq's forces in a CIA safe house. After the coup US economic aid and, as will be discussed in the next chapter, extensive US security assistance played a crucial role in consolidating the dictatorship which replaced Mossadeq.

The oil blockade and the other economic sanctions imposed on Iran by Britain clearly helped prepare the way for Mossadeq's downfall. The economic deterioration that followed alienated many of Mossadeq's supporters, particularly among the middle class. This undoubtedly contributed to the defection of key leaders from the National Front and to the willingness of the Tehran crowds to throw their support to Zehadi on the day Mossadeq was overthrown.

While the British blockade thus played a crucial role in Mossadeq's downfall, it should be emphasised that the US role in the coup which brought Mossadeq down was decisive, both in removing him from office and, more importantly, in determining the type of regime which succeeded his. Although Mossadeq's popularity had slipped considerably by August 1953, a royalist coup was, in the absence of a US intervention, perhaps the least likely outcome of Mossadeq's decline. Mossadeq could have regained his earlier popularity by arranging oil sales to countries such as Japan or Italy or by striking a deal with domestic power brokers such as Kashani. It is also possible that Mossadeq's prime ministership and his position as leader of the nationalist movement could have been transferred peacefully to another figure, such as Kashani, Baqai, Daftari, or even Qavam. Probably the most likely alternative in the absence of a US intervention would have been a Tudeh take-over. In any event, Zahedi and royalist forces he conspired with had no significant popular support and thus could not have achieved power peacefully. Had they managed to seize power without US help it is difficult to see how they could have remained in power for long without substantial outside assistance.

It should also be emphasised that British role in the coup itself was not of great importance. The British had originally approached US policymakers with a plan for the coup and had made available to the CIA team part of their intelligence network. The original British plan was thoroughly rewritten, however, and in any case the plan finally adopted provided little guidance for the events which actually took place. The British network was of some use, notably in arranging contact with Ayatollah Kashani to provide the crowd which marched on Mossadeq's house. However, the success of Nerren and Cilley in producing the fake Tudeh crowd which appeared on August 17 suggests that this could have been accomplished in other ways.

The conclusion that the United States played a crucial role in overthrowing Mossadeq thus appears inescapable. What, then, were the consequences of the US intervention and its subsequent role in the consolidation of power by Zahedi and the shah for Iran's domestic politics?

As outlined in the first part of this chapter, Mossadeq was the leader of a popular, democratic organisation known as the National Front. The National Front was founded in 1949 at the apex of a period of intense political activity in Iran to co-ordinate opposition to the shah's attempt to rig the sixteenth Majles elections. Its ideology, tactics, and social bases of support placed it squarely in the tradition of the 1906 constitutional movement. The political organisations included in the National Front ranged across the entire political spectrum and, with the exception of the Tudeh party and certain pro-British elements, included every major organisation active in this period. The main issue addressed by the National Front was the oil nationalisation question. However, equally important and closely bound up with this issue was the goal of a more equitable distribution of power in Iran.

Mossadeq was thus the leader of an organisation which was populist in character, closely tied to the traditions of Iran's democratic movement, and which emerged during a period of fervent political activity to lead the struggle for a new political order in Iran. By removing Mossadeq from office and installing in his place a

dictatorship led by General Zahedi the United States destroyed this organisation and ended the prospects for a transition to democracy, which appeared to have begun under Mossadeq. This had two main consequences. First, it enabled the shah to rule for the twenty-five years without regard for popular political pressures. Second, it destroyed much of the liberal, democratic leadership in Iran, creating a vacuum which was later to be filled by radical elements of both the left and the right. As will be discussed in the conclusion of this study, these consequences had important implications for events which took place in Iran in 1978 and 1979.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

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12 This is discussed in the next section.

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67 Woodhouse, *Something Ventured,* pp. 117-120; Kermit Roosevelt, *Countercoup* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 107-108.

68 Woodhouse, *Something Ventured,* pp.121-122.

69 Roosevelt, *Countercoup,* pp. 120-124. In his account Roosevelt inexplicably confuses the Rashidian brothers with the two principal U.S. agents in Iran. The latter are referred to as the Bosco brothers, while the Rashidians are called Nossey and Caffron (who are said not to be related). Not only are the names confused, but in some places the actual roles played by the two sets of agents are misidentified as well.

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72 Roosevelt uses pseudonyms for the major characters in his book. In most cases it is possible to match the pseudonyms and physical descriptions he gives with those of the CIA people operating under cover in the embassy. Roosevelt's pseudonyms will be used here in order to protedt the identities of the people involved.

73 *Countercoup,* p. 128.

74 Nerren and Cilley are the Iranians Roosevelt mistakenly identities as the Boscoe brothers. See footnote

75 The main propaganda activity undertaken through TPBEDAMN was an ongoing programme in which anti-Soviet and anti-Tudeh stories were planted in the Iranian press. A number of books written in the West were Translate into Farsi and distributed under this programme. Its most dramatic effort was the production of a falsified autobiography of the well-known Iranian poet Lahuti, apparently written by the "Persia expert". In this book Lahuti, a Tudeh member living in the Soviet Union at that time, gives a very bleak description of his life there. After it appeared Lahuti denounced the forged autobiography over Soviet radio.

76 Woodhouse, *Something Ventured,* p. 118.

77 Roosevelt, *Countercoup,* pp. 3-19.

78 Ibid., chs. 9-10; Woodhouse, *Something Ventured,* p. 126.

79 Roosevelt, *Countercoup,* pp. 169-175.

80 Not all of the participants were to be evacuated. At least one CIA employee without diplomatic cover was to be left behind, as were several of the Iranian officers involved.

81 The Peter Stoneman involved here was the younger of the two. Nerren and Cilley were employed by CIA station at that time in a lage propaganda operation (see

82 See *The New York times*, August 17, 1953, 1:4. The interview with Ardeshir Zahedi is described in Kennett Love, "The American Role in the Pahlevi Restoration On 19 August 1953" (unpublished manuscript, The Allen Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, 1960), pp. 31-32. Love implies that only the fir-man appointing Zahedi was copied. He and Schwind distributed copies of the fir-man at the Park Hotel in Tehran.

83 *The New York Times,* August 19, 1953, 1:3-4; U.S. Senate, House, Committee on Foreign Affaira, *The Mutual Security Act of 1954, Hearings,* 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, April 3, 1954, pp. 503-504, 509; Ardeshir Zahedi, *Five Decisive Days, August 14-18, 1953* (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). The latter source is an English translation of a serialized memoir originally published in Ettela'at. It differs substantially from the accounts of Roosevelt and Love referred to above. Many Iranians view Zahedi's account as accurate, and hence discount the role played by the CIA in the overthrow of Mossadeq. Zahedi describes an elaborate plan formulated by his father after the arrest of Nassiri to establish an independent state called "free Iran" in the mountainous region around Kermanshah. This state was to be fortified with loyal army and air force units(including several air force planes) and used as a base to gain control over he country. Plans were apparently also made to sabotage key oil and rail installations in Tehran to create a diversion to aid the escape of Zahedi's group from Tehran to Kermanshah.

84 *The New York Times,* August 18, 1953, 1:7; Loy Henderson Interview, Columbia University oral History Research Office, 1972, pp. 15-18. Henderson had arrived in Tehran from Beirut on Monday, August 17. After the 1953 coup the Tudeh party reevaluated its role in these events and concluded that it should have been more supportive of Mossadeq. See Sepehr Zabih, *The Communist Movement in Iran* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 220 and elsewhere. Some observers have suggested to me that the Tudeh's disengagement on Tuesday night followed its discovery that the original Tudeh crowds had been planted.

85 James a. Bill, *The Eagle and the Lion: the Tradedy of American-Iranian Relations,* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1988), p. 170.

86 Love, "The American Role in the Pahlevi Restoration," pp. 40-41. Roosevelt claims to have used less than $100,000 for the entire operation *(Countercoup,* p. 166), but other participants claim the figure was much higher. The exact figure is unimportant, since crowds could be hired in Tehran for almost nothing. Most of the money paid out during this operation was presumably pocketed by Nerren and Cilley and their associates.

87 Zabih, *The Mossadrq Era,* p. 121; A similar view was related by Hosseim Fatemi to Zabih (see. *ibid.,* p. 133).

88 Roosevelt, *Countercoup,* pp. 176-197; Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolution,* pp. 279-280; *The New York Times,* August 20, 1953, 1:6. Oveissi was later known as "the butcher of Tehran" for his role in the bloody events of the fall of 1978. He was assassinated in Paris in February 1984.

89 *The New York Times,* August 22, 1953, 1:8, August 23, 1953,1:4, August 24, 1953, 1:9, September 26, 1953, 2:1.

90 Ibid., December 16, 1953, 11:1, August 28, 1953, 4:2, October 27, 1953, 6:3, September 11, 1953, 8:3, August 25, 1953, 1:5, and September 26, 1953, 2:1. In one operation, the elder Peter Stoneman is said to have helped Iranian General Dadsetan crush a dissident movement which had begun to develop in the Tehran bazaar.

91 *The New York Times,* September 30, 1953, 8:3; Alexander and Nanes, *The United States and Iran,* pp. 232-235, 250-251, 253-254.

92 Kross A. Samii, *Involment by Invitation: American Strategis of Containment Iran,* (London: The Pennsyvaina State Press, 1987), pp. 132-187

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSOLIDATION OF A CLIENT STATE, 1953 - 1963

8.1. The US-Iran Cliency Relationship

After the 1953 coup the main US goal in Iran was to keep that country from falling under Soviet domination. A National Security Council report approved in December 1953 stated that Iran's Western orientation was of "critical importance" to the United States. According to this report, the loss of Iran to the Soviet Union would: i) threaten the security of the Middle East and South-western Asia; ii) increase Soviet oil resources; iii) weaken the "will to resist" of US allies and damage US prestige in the area; iv) enable the Soviets to deny Iranian oil to the West; and v) "have serious psychological impact elsewhere in the free world". Iran was to be kept out of Soviet hands by creating a strong and stable government under the shah and his prime minister.[1]

This was to be achieved in three main ways. First, a settlement of the oil dispute which would enable Iran to resume its oil exports was to be obtained at the earliest possible date. Toward this end the National Security Council recommended that the president secure participation of the major US oil companies in a consortium arrangement similar to that proposed by Truman in late 1952 by offering to drop anti-trust action then pending against them in federal court. Eisenhower accepted this recommendation and an agreement with Iran was finally reached in August 1954. Second, a large-scale economic aid package was to be made available to the Iranian government to enable it to meet the operating deficit inherited from Mossadeq and instituted social and economic reforms, which were viewed as necessary to achieve long-term stability. Finally, a large military aid package for Iran was recommended.

US military aid was necessary to strengthen Iran against outside attacks and to improve morale in the military, which was recognised as the shah's "only real source of power".[2]

8.1.1. Military and Economic Aid

As mentioned in chapter 6, at least $73 million in economic aid was given to the Zahedi government in the first three weeks after Mossadeq's overthrow. This amounted to over one-third of the government revenue said to have been lost up to that point as a result of the oil blockade. Table 8.1 shows that roughly $1 billion in US military and economic aid grants were given to Iran in the decade after the coup. US loans and grants together totalled over $1.2 billion in this period and accounted for about 21 percent of government expenditures. This percentage is even higher in the years immediately after the coup. US loans and grants in 1954-1958 finance 33 percent of government expenditures, about the same amount accounted for by oil revenues in this period. This figure is 44 percent for 1953-1954. From September 1953 through the end of 1954 it is probably closer to 60 percent, since US aid had been reduced to a trickle before Mossadeq was ousted.[3] This massive influx of aid came at a time when government spending was increased dramatically in an effort to consolidate the regime inaugurated with the coup of 1953.

- Table 8.1 will be seen next page -

Table 8.1: US Aid to Iran and Oil Revenues as Percentage of Iranian Government Expenditures, 1950-1967

Year	(a)	(b)		(c)		(d)	
	Government Expenditures	US Aid (loans and grants)	(b) as % of (a)	US Aid (grants only)	(c) as % of (a)	Oil Revenues	(d) as % of (a)
1950	225.9	11.8	5.2	11.8	5.2	38.5	17
1951	188.3	27.8	14.8	27.8	14.8	19.9	10.6
1952	149.6	44.1	29.5	44.1	29.5	0	0
1953	167.6	52.5	31.3	52.5	31.3	0	0
1954	201.2	110.1	54.7	110.1	54.7	7.4	3.7
1955	285.1	90.7	31.8	58.7	20.6	77.5	27.2
1956	415.3	97.7	23.5	85.3	20.5	131.5	31.7
1957	414	138.5	33.5	115.5	27.9	182.4	44.1
1958	506.8	157	31	117	23.1	211.9	41.8
1959	611.6	132	21.6	94.3	15.4	224.9	36.8
1960	697.9	123.4	17.7	123.4	17.7	244.6	35
1961	721.4	146.8	20.3	94.9	13.2	258.2	35.8
1962	893.3	113.4	12.7	88.5	9.9	286.1	32
1963	1117.6	103.5	9.3	81.8	7.3	329.8	29.5
1964	1185.6	54.7	4.6	49.4	4.2	411.4	34.7
1965	1248.4	101.6	8.1	39.7	3.2	440.2	35.3
1966	1305.9	175.1	13.4	71.9	5.5	498	38.1
1967	1469.3	202.4	13.8	39.8	2.7	637.4	43.4

SOURCES:

(a) Julian Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1070* (London: Oxford University press, 1971), pp. 68, 90-98, 98, 126-127. The values given here include both "ordinary" expenditures and expenditures on the various development plans. Yearly plan expenditures were estimated using the actual outlays Bharier gives for aggregated periods. Bhariers figures were converted into US dollars.

(b), (c) US Department of State, Agency for International Development, unpublished worksheets for *US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organisations* (Washington, 1981).

(d) Bharier, pp. 158, 165. These figures were converted from English Pounds at an exchange rate of $2.40 per Pound.

NOTE: All volume figures are given in million of US dollars.

Real government expenditures grew by an average of 23 percent per year in 1954-1958 and 16 percent in 1959-1963. While reliable figures are not available for 1954 or 1955, about 27 percent of government expenditures in 1956-1962 were for the security forces (military, police, Gendarmerie, and presumably also SAVAK), with about 12 and 33 percent respectively for education and economic development. US loans and grants accounted for 21 percent of government revenues in this period.[4] As will be discussed below, the security forces and economic development were fundamental pillars of the shah's dictatorship. It is evident that, particularly in the 1950s, US aid played a major role in developing these as cornerstones of the shah's regime.

Just under half of the value of US loans and grants given to Iran in the decade after the coup was for military assistance. US military aid to Iran was similar in character to that given to other major US allies in the third world during this period. Equipment ranging from ammunition to tanks and jet aircraft was provided. A Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) unit was stationed in Iran to train and advise the Iranian army. Over six thousand Iranian soldiers (mostly officers) were sent to the United States for training. Further military co-operation occurred under the Baghdad Pact and CENTO. The United States was not a full member of these organisations but was heavily involved in the military matters which took place under their auspices through a liaison office. Although the Iranian military was slow in assimilating the new equipment and tactics provided by the United States, it had improved substantially by the late 1950s. In 1961 US Senator Hubert Humphrey was told by an Iranian general that US aid had been very helpful and the army "was now capable of coping with the civilian population".[5]

The total value of US economic aid to Iran (both loans and grants) in 1950-1967 was $944.1 million. Before 1950 and after 1967 US aid to Iran was almost negligible, amounting to less than $25 million for both periods together. Of the $944.1 million given in 1950-1967, $200.4 million was on export-import bank loans. These loans are

generally used to finance US exports to the recipient country, and must be repaid in full (with interest). Hence their main value lies in easing the recipient through temporary periods of foreign exchange scarcity, such as the period before November 1954 when Iran's oil was kept off the international market. Loans of this sort can thus be quite useful to the recipient government, although their domestic social impact is felt only indirectly.

Of the remaining $743.7 million in US economic aid, $183.1 million came in the form of Food for Peace (or P.L. 480) aid, and the remaining $610.6 million in ordinary foreign aid appropriations. Most, although not all, of the Food for Peace aid was used for the purchase of basic food commodities such as wheat, butter, cooking oil, feed grains, and dried milk. Some $34 million was earmarked for economic development purposes, including highway construction, improvements to the Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, and other public infrastructure projects. Smaller amounts were spent on military construction ($5.9 million) and loans to expand private enterprise ($4.7 million). In addition, $58.5 million in ordinary foreign aid appropriations was used to finance sugar imports. Adding this and subtracting that part not used for commodity imports, some $197 million in US aid during 1950-1967 was spent directly on food supplies.

About one third of the $610.6 million in ordinary foreign aid appropriations came in the form of loans, and the rest as grants. The largest portion of this ($139.3 million, or about 23 percent) was for budget support, which is used directly to underwrite government spending. Another $108.1 million (or 17 percent) was spent on public infrastructure projects such as highway, port, and railroad construction. Spending on economic development projects (including agriculture, mining, industry, and loans to Iran's development bank) took another $53.9 million. The remaining 46 percent of foreign aid appropriations was spread across a variety of smaller areas. Social programmes such as health, education, housing, and disaster relief accounted for $37.3 million. Non-food commodities such as textiles, machinery, and motor vehicles

took $69 million. Public administration and public safety assistance (including the police training programme described below) accounted for $10.8 million. The remainder was either spent in support of the missions which carried out the above activities or cannot be easily identified.[6]

While the US aid programme in Iran appears on paper to have been comprehensive and well-balanced, it was, in fact, the subject of frequent criticism and controversy. A House subcommittee examined this programme in 1957 and found that it was so poorly administered that it could not be determined how aid funds had been spent. Funding levels appeared "to have been picked out of the air," with no apparent regard for Iran's economic needs. Aid given to Iran in 1953 and 1954 was described as "neither technical assistance nor economic development but an ad hoc method of keeping the Iranian economy afloat". The subcommittee criticised not only the relatively high level of budget support given to Iran but specific projects as well. Although it stopped short of charging that US aid had been used in a corrupt manner, the subcommittee report contained clear inferences that US aid had been used by the Iranian government for domestic purposes.[7]

Further evidence that the US aid programme in Iran was used for corrupt purposes by the shah appeared in 1965 when an article in *The Nation* charged that US aid had been used to finance payments of over $40 million to top Iranian and American officials and members of the shah's inner circle. After this article was published a Senate investigation into the matter was abruptly halted and *The Nation* was threatened with a lawsuit. While strong evidence was presented, the charges were never proved.[8] There is also reason to believe that some US military aid was pocketed by Iranian military officers.

8.1.2. Security Assistance

US security assistance to Iran came mainly in two forms.[9] First, Iran's security forces[10] were provided with specialised training and equipment by the United States. The training provided was extensive and quite diverse. In at least one case it involved a US advisor who worked in a top command capacity. Second, a certain amount of intelligence information was exchanged between the US and Iranian security services. As will be discussed below, security assistance of this latter kind was not extensive, and hence is of limited importance in this study.

Large-scale US training and advice for Iran's security forces began in September 1953, within weeks of Mosadeq's overthrow. As discussed in chapter five US advisory missions had been working with the Iranian military and Gendarmeries since the early 1940s. However, other than assistance to military intelligence (or G-2),[11] these missions were not involved in security training *per se.* In September 1953 a US Army officer who had been working with the CIA in the Middle East for several years and who had a background in police and detective work was sent to Iran as a military attaché. His mission was to organise and command a new security force, the main task of which was to seek out and eliminate all threats to the shah. These were expected to come mainly from the Tudeh party. However, challenges to the shah from military officers and even from remnants of the National Front were also regarded as possible sources of threat.

This security force was organised around General Teimur Bakhtiar and three army colonels. It did not, at this time, have a well-defined organisational structure, and apparently was not even given a name. Rather, it operated informally and clandestinely, acting independently of the other branches of the security apparatus and reporting directly to the US attaché, who himself had direct access to the shah.[12] It was built primarily on the military governorship of Tehran (which was put under the command of Bakhtiar in December 1953), but drew resources from a number of existing government facilities, both military and civilian. In addition to commanding this organisation, the US attaché trained Bakhtiar and the three colonels in basic

intelligence tactics. These included surveillance and interrogation methods, the operation of intelligence networks, organisational security measures, etc. This organisation was the first modern, efficient security force to operate in Iran. It eventually evolved into the notorious secret police SAVAK, which served as a primary pillar of the shah's dictatorship. Its main achievement was to break up a large Tudeh network which had been organised in the armed forces. This operation will be described in some detail below.

SAVAK[13] was established in 1957 with Bakhtiar as its first director. The shah had two main goals in creating SAVAK. First, he wanted to establish an efficient security apparatus which could provide the kind of security structure needed to maintain an unpopular dictatorship such as his. The Tudeh military network rolled up in September 1954 had included such high-ranking figures as the head of army G-2 and the prime minister's personal bodyguard. The discovery of this network revealed the incompetence and inadequacy of the existing security forces and convinced the shah that a major restructuring of these forces was necessary. Second, the shah created SAVAK in part to eliminate the overlap and competition which existed between the various organisations which were responsible for maintaining security. SAVAK was created primarily from the organisation which had been developed by Bakhtiar and the US military attaché. However, it also incorporated personnel from other branches of the existing security apparatus. It soon developed operating procedures and recruiting methods which gave it a very distinct and independent character.

After Bakhtiar's association with the US military attaché ended he was sent to the United States to study the US security organisation and examine how their methods and institutions might be adapted to suit conditions in Iran. In 1957, shortly after SAVAK was formally established, a team of five CIA officers was sent to Iran to organise and train SAVAK. This team included specialists in intelligence analysis, operations, and counter-intelligence. According to one of the member of this team, the assistance it provided included "everything from setting up the SAVAK library to how

to set up counter-intelligence files". While the United States provided extensive assistance to SAVAK, it was not modelled on US institutions such as the CIA or FBI. In fact, US advice to the shah that domestic and foreign operations should be handled by distinct and independent agencies (like the FBI and CIA) was rejected.

US assistance to SAVAK included training for SAVAK personnel, both in Iran and in the United States. The training given to SAVAK personnel consisted of standard courses made available by the CIA to "friendly" security services throughout the world. These courses are quite similar to the basic training given to CIA personnel at bases such as Ft. Meade, in Maryland. SAVAK personnel were trained in the fundamentals of spycraft, such as surveillance, interrogation, and personal security. Despite frequent accusations to the contrary, SAVAK personnel were not trained in torture techniques by the CIA (CIA people often argue that SAVAK employees were already adept in these areas.) However, their training included courses on how to resist torture. In this context different forms of torture were discussed.[14] CIA officers were certainly aware of the use of torture by SAVAK, and at least one CIA officer reportedly toured SAVAK torture chambers.[15] SAVAK personnel were also trained in the United States at the International Police Academy and the Internationals Police Services School. These training centres were run by the US Agency for International Development, allegedly with covert CIA sponsorship.[16]

In addition to the CIA training and advisory mission that worked with SAVAK, there was also a certain amount of co-operation between the two agencies on intelligence collection. Some intelligence information was exchanged, primarily material relating to third countries such as the Soviet Union. There was also some exchange of information relating to domestic matters, though this was much more limited in scope. The information provided to the CIA by SAVAK was generally regarded to be of dubious value. For its part, the CIA was reluctant to provide SAVAK with information for fear that its sources would be exposed. In any case, by the mid-1960s SAVAK had became quite sophisticated and presumably had better sources than

the CIA, who by this time almost entirely stopped using agents in Iran.[17] While very little information relating to domestic matters was thus exchanged, the two services frequently discussed matters of concern and co-ordinated policies.

One other area in which the United States contributed significantly to Iran's security capabilities was through a police training and advisory mission administered by the US Agency for International Development. This mission, which was begun in the summer of 1954 and continued at least through the end of 1965, was established to provide training and advice for Iran's National Police. The original agreement covering this mission called for assistance in the areas of headquarters and field organisation, personnel practices, records, motor vehicle maintenance, communications, training, traffic management, identification, and investigative procedures. While much of the assistance provided by this mission involved routine police work and thus is of little interest here, some of its activities were of considerable domestic political importance. These included training in riot control, assistance in restructuring the National Police Academy and Patrolmen's School, the establishment of a nation-wide police radio network with connections to the international Interpol network, and the development of fingerprint and photographic labs.[18]

8.1.3. The Evolution of US-Iranian Relations

The relationship between the United States and Iran remained very close but passed through several phases in this period. As discussed above, the main goal of US policy toward Iran after the 1953 coup was to stabilise Iran around a strong central government led by the shah and his prime minister. This goal, which was explicitly stated in the National Security Council report approved in December 1953, called for an early resolution of the oil dispute and large-scale military and economic aid programmes. It also called for the establishment of a new security apparatus under the

command of a US military attaché and small-scale covert US operations against National Front and Tudeh targets in the fall of 1953 (as described in chapter 7).

By the end of 1954 this goal had largely been achieved. Oil had begun to flow again. The liberal opposition had grown docile and the Tudeh party had been dealt a decisive blow with the rollup of its military network. The picture became even brighter for US policymakers when the shah dismissed Zahedi in April 1955. This was regarded as a sign that the shah was at last ready to assume control over the country and act decisively to stamp out corruption, which had grown rampant under Zahedi. In late April 1955 the US embassy in Tehran stated that the threat of large-scale insurrection which had existed in 1953 had been brought under control. The problem now was to reinforce the regime against the continuing threat of Soviet subversion. This was to be accomplished through continued military and economic aid and further strengthening of the security apparatus.[19]

This new US confidence in the shah and in his ability to maintain control was reflected in the activities of the CIA station in Tehran at this time. Covert US operations against Iranian targets were scaled back greatly by the end of 1954. Both the TPBEDAMN operation (which had provided the two principal US agents used in the overthrow of Mossadeq) and the small operations undertaken in the 1953 against the National Front and the Tudeh party were ended. Similarly, the number of agents used for routine intelligence-gathering in Iran declined steadily after 1953. The new atmosphere of stability and growing US confidence in the shah dictated a new approach. Rather than intervening directly in Iran's affairs, US policymakers increasingly thought in terms of enabling the shah to provide for his own security by giving him aid and building up his security forces. The CIA station busied itself more with cross-border operations directed at the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and with penetrations of the Eastern Bloc embassies in Tehran.[20]

In the late 1950s and early 1960s two additional factors began to emerge which had the effect of further curtailing US activities in Iran. First, due largely to training

and assistance described above, SAVAK was becoming increasingly effective as a security force at this time. It was therefore less dependent on its liaison with the United States and more able to detect and disrupt US intelligence-gathering activities. Second, in 1957 the United States began to install electronic listening devices in Iran. These devices were of critical importance after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik because they were more reliable than satellites and high-altitude aircraft and because no other US allies were close enough to the Central Asian launch sites to provide comparable facilities.[21] A formal agreement for the basing of these devices was never concluded. US policymakers were consequently very reluctant to undertake operations in Iran which might anger the shah and lead him to withdraw their basing privileges.

These factors led to a further curtailment of US intelligence-gathering and other political activities in Iran. By mid-1962 the CIA training mission with SAVAK had been greatly scaled back. Where in 1957 it had been very broad in scope, by the early 1960s its training activities were limited to very specific projects, usually involving sophisticated electronic equipment. In its place the CIA-SAVAK connection had evolved into a liaison mission whose primary purpose was to carry out joint operations, mainly to be directed at the Tudeh party. However, SAVAK officials had become very obstinate by this time and no joint operations of this kind actually occurred.[22] Similarly, the close personal relationships which had earlier been of great benefit to both American and Iranian participants were new replaced by more distant relationships. CIA officers were now routinely followed in Iran and their telephones were bugged. To the extent that when foreign training of SAVAK officers occurred it was now done by Israelis, often in Israel.

For similar reasons the activities of US embassy officials and the Tehran CIA station became more highly circumscribed in the early 1960s as well. Except for one round of meetings with prominent National Front figures in 1962 and 1963, contact between the embassy and the Iranian opposition was forbidden by successive US ambassadors, apparently after complaints by the shah. The CIA station, having dropped

most of its agents, was by this time relying almost exclusively on SAVAK and overt sources (such as newspapers) for intelligence.[23] This situation persisted until 1977, when growing unrest led to renewed contacts with the opposition. This is the main reason why the Iranian revolution caught US policymakers so much by surprise.[24]

The one area of US-Iranian relations which was not greatly scaled back in the early 1960s was the military and economic aid programme. As shown in table 7-1, US military economic aid to Iran remained at high levels through 1967, although it increasingly shifted from grants to loans and declined noticeably as a percentage of Iranian government expenditures. This aid was reportedly used in 1961 to pressure the shah into appointing the reformant Ali Amini as prime minister.[25] US policymakers had been aware of the need for social and economic reforms in Iran for some time.[26] However, it was not until the inauguration of the Kennedy Administration, with its dramatically different approach to the third world, that pressure for reforms was finally exerted on the shah.

This pressure was remarkably effective. Amini and his minister of agriculture Dr. Hasanjani instituted a wide-ranging series of reforms, including land reform, health and literacy programmes, the enfranchisement of women, etc. As will be discussed below, the shah took this programme to be his own, calling it the "white revolution" and the "short-people revolution". Having made the reform programme into a cornerstone of his regime the shah was able to dismiss the pro-American Amini and pre-empt further American pressures. At the same time US aid levels continued to drop off. At the lavish ceremonies marking the 2500th anniversary of Persian monarchy held at Persepolis in 1971 the shah publicly renounced further US aid.

US-Iranian relations by this time had come full circle. With the 1953 coup and large-scale military and economic aid and security assistance in the following years, the United States had played a crucial role in rescuing the shah and making him into a powerful dictator. As the shah became strong and as Iran grew in importance to the United States the US-Iran cliency relationship changed dramatically in character. By

1963 the cliency relationship between the US and Iran had became fully established. Even though, cliency relationship had maintained until Iranian revolution period, thereafter the flow of cliency instruments such as intervention, aid , and security assistance was reduced year by year. However, in contrast, domestical autonomy gradually increased due to the consequences of the White Revolution.

8.2. The Foundations of Shah's Dictatorship

8.2.1. The Security Forces

As in any other dictatorship, the primary pillar of the shah's authoritarian regime was its security apparatus.[27] Before the creation of SAVAK, the security apparatus had had three main components: the National Police, the Gendarmerie, and the armed forces. The armed forces included the military governorship of Tehran, which replaced the civilian administration when martial law was declared in 1953. The military governorship was in turn the main organisation which Bakhtiar and the US military attaché drew upon in establishing the predecessor to SAVAK.

The National Police had been created by Reza Shah to provide a unified, nation-wide structure for law enforcement in the larger cities and towns of Iran. Its primary responsibility was to carry out routine police duties such as criminal investigation and apprehension. However, it also had a secret police division which handled domestic security and intelligence matters. The main responsibility of the secret police was monitor and disrupt subversive elements which posed a threat to the regime. In the late 1940s and early 1950s this meant primarily the Tudeh party and the Fedayan-i-Islam. The secret police had no foreign intelligence capabilities as such. Like much of the government bureaucracy at the time it was extremely corrupt and inefficient. It was no match for the well-disciplined Tudeh party and was not effective in preventing assassination attempts against the shah and his prime ministers.

The Gendarmerie was the rural counterpart of the National Police. It operated the border patrol, policed the small towns and villages, and shared responsibility with the army for keeping track of the tribes. The Gendarmeries had a small intelligence section whose primary function was to maintain security within the Gendarmerie itself. The Gendarmerie also handled cross-border infiltration into Iran, to the extent that these were handled at all. Its main role in providing domestic security was its activities regarding the tribes.

Before the creation of SAVAK the primary responsibility for maintaining domestic security lay with the armed forces, including the martial law administration and the new security force established under Bakhtiar and the US military attaché. The army itself played an important role in maintaining order. It had been deeply involved in the overthrow of Mossadeq and in the widespread arrests which followed the coup. It conducted operations against the tribes and later against the guerrilla bands which began to emerge in the late 1960s. In 1963 the army was called out to put down large demonstrations led by a little-known clergyman named Khomeini. Hundreds were killed in the ensuing confrontation. Even when it remained in the barracks, fear that the military might intervene contributed to the atmosphere of intimidation and alienation which prevailed under the shah. The activities of the armed forces were closely supervised by the shah, and were co-ordinated with those of the other security organisations.

As mentioned above, SAVAK was organised in part to end the competition and redundancy which the system of overlapping security forces entailed. This consolidation process actually seems to have been with the establishment of the organisation headed by Bakhtiar and the US military attaché. This organisation drew from both the military and the secret police. With the exception of military G-2 it appears to have entirely taken over responsibility for domestic intelligence activities from these organisations. G-2 was only peripherally involved in domestic intelligence, being mainly concerned with security in the military itself and with the activities of the

armed forces in neighbouring countries. The National Police, the Gendarmeries, and the military still played important roles in maintaining domestic security. However, they acted primarily in an enforcement capacity, whereas Bakhtiar's organisation and later SAVAK assumed responsibility for domestic intelligence matters.

The manner in which SAVAK and its immediate predecessor carried out the task of maintaining security changed considerably in the twenty-five years after Mossadeq was overthrown. One source of this change lay in the evolution of SAVAK from a corrupt, comparatively backward organisation to a modern, efficient security force which became something of a model for organisations of this kind of the third world.[28] The key role played by the United States in this process of evolution has been described above. A second source of change in SAVAK's mode of operation resulted from to the changing roles it was called on to play by the shah and, by extension, from the different personalities of the men appointed to lead it.

The founder and first director of SAVAK was Teimur Bakhtiar, who remained in that position until March 1961 when he was exiled for plotting to overthrow the shah. After the 1955 coup and throughout the 1950s the shah was in the process of consolidating his authoritarian regime. An efficient security force under the command of a ruthless and determined leader like Bakhtiar was crucial to this process of consolidation. Bakhtiar was a crude and violent man,[29] and the organisation he led took on a character much like his. Although little is written about SAVAK in the 1950s there can be no doubt that it was as brutal as the SAVAK of the 1970s, if perhaps somewhat less effective. Thousands of people were arrested in the period after August 1953, mostly on charges of being members of the outlawed Tudeh party. At least 94 people were executed in this period,[30] and the true figure was undoubtedly several times higher. At least some are said to have been tortured to death. Bakhtiar's security force was responsible for the break-up of the Tudeh military network in September 1954 and closely monitored all political groups. Opposition political parties were illegal at this time, and overt political activity was impossible.

Bakhtiar was succeeded as head of SAVAK by General Hassan Pakravan, a highly cultured man of considerable intellect who stood in marked contrast to his predecessor and successor as SAVAK chief. The choice of Pakravan, who had previously been Bakhtiar's deputy, came at almost the same time that the reformist Ali Amini was appointed Prime Minister. SAVAK is said to have been much more restrained under Pakravan. Torture was apparently stopped.[31] Ironically, Pakravan, who was executed by Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards soon after the revolution, is said to have convinced the shah to spare Khomeini's life after the 1963 demonstrations. In part because of these demonstration, the shah became convinced that Pakravan was too lenient.[32] Pakravan was dismissed in January 1965 after Prime Minister Hassan Ali Mansour was assassinated.

Pakravan's successor as SAVAK chief was General Nematollah Nassiri, who had been serving as head of the National Police. Nassiri was a loyal servant to the shah. The two had been classmates at the Iranian Military Academy. Nassiri had delivered the fir-man dismissing Mossadeq in August 1953 and after the coup had personally arrested Mossadeq. Under Nassiri SAVAK gained a world-wide reputation for brutally and efficiency. Not surprisingly, Nassiri was executed in February 1979, one of four generals who were the first victims of the post-revolutionary regime.[33]

SAVAK was a complete intelligence service, handling both domestic and foreign matters and having access to virtually all aspects of life in Iran. It had approximately 3000 full-time employees, and, according to one source, some 3 million part-time agents and informers.[34] SAVAK had three main parts: a central organisation divided into nine general departments, a branch for monitoring activities in Tehran, and branches for the various provinces. The general departments consisted of units with responsibility for overall command, foreign intelligence-gathering, domestic security, SAVAK security, technical matters, support personnel and equipment, overt intelligence sources, counter-espionage, and overt operations. The most notorious of these was department three: domestic security.

In 1971 department three had 300 full-time employees and was divided into four sections. Section one handled operations and investigations. It had separate branches covering the Tudeh party, the National Front and its associated parties, students and other Iranians living abroad, the Arab and Baluch minorities, the Kurds, and the clergy. Section two seems to have had similar duties, though it was organised functionally rather than by group. It had branches dealing with the press, the tribes, workers and farmers, the official political parties, universities and schools, the legislative houses and ministries, and one branch whose function was "to eliminate the peoples' discontent".[35] Section three managed the elaborate system of archives and records kept by department three. Section four handled enforcement. It had branches for censorship, indoctrination and training, special operations, and judicial matters, including interrogation.

Department three also contained independent branches for translation, finance, and military matters, as well as an additional, independent judicial branch. Most of Iran's prisons were under the direction of department three. The one exception was the dreaded Evin Prison in Tehran, which was operated by department eight (counter-espionage). Finally, department three worked closely (and perhaps commanded) Tehran SAVAK, which had separate branches covering the National Front, the Tudeh party, the clergy, the workers, the universities, and the Tehran bazaar, as well as separate investigation and surveillance units.

SAVAK was an extremely sophisticated and effective instrument of repression. Its tactics ranged from the crudest forms of violence to carefully orchestrated psychological operations designed to disrupt the opposition and promote loyalty to the shah.

The charges of torture by SAVAK are well-known and need not be detailed here.[36] Torture was widespread in Iran under the shah. It was the ultimate recourse of the shah's security forces in dealing with obstinate members of the opposition. It also helped to create a climate of fear and intimidation which, probably more than any other tactic employed by the regime, discouraged opposition to the shah.

Despite the central role played by torture under the shah, which served to break down and undermine opposition groups. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment were commonplace. SAVAK officers were empowered under the 1957 bill establishing SAVAK to act as military magistrates and detain suspects. The usual charge in such cases was "forming or belonging to organisations opposed to the monarchy or having a collectivist ideology," which was illegal under the Iranian penal code. Amnesty International reported in 1976 that there were between 25,000 and 100,000 political prisoners in Iran. Trials for political prisoners were conducted under military tribunals. Investigations for the prosecution were carried out by SAVAK. Defendants were permitted to choose lawyers from short lists prepared by the tribunal, usually consisting of retired military officers. Defence lawyers had no more than ten days to prepare their cases. Trials were held without juries and usually *in camera.* Defendants had no right to call or cross-examine witnesses. Amnesty International knew of no such cases in which defendants were acquitted. In 1975 Amnesty International stated that "no country in the world has a worse record in human rights than Iran".[37]

SAVAK also much subtler ways of promoting conformity. Its networks of informers were so widespread that Iranians were afraid to speak critically about the regime even in their own homes. Using the elaborate filing system maintained by department three, all applications for employment in government-run organisations(including the universities) and in many private organisations were carefully screened by SAVAK. Applicants who had opposed the regime or were even related to someone who had opposed it were not only kept out of sensitive positions in this way but often denied meaningful employment altogether. A similar process was used to deny passports to dissidents. Censorship was extremely tight in Iran. However, SAVAK took censorship one step further by publishing and disseminating information designed both to discredit the opposition and to increase popular fears about its own operations.[38] Another SAVAK tactic was to create organisations which were mildly critical of the shah's regime in order to co-opt and channel dissent and gather

information on the regime's critics. Such organisations included the Iranian Society for Human Rights and an organisation for Iranian intellectuals. An unsuccessful attempt was made to establish a similar organisation for lawyers.[39]

8.2.2. Mechanisms of Co-optation

The shah balanced these repressive capabilities in a carrot-and -stick approach of inducements and reforms designed to buy support for his regime and deflect criticism from the opposition. These measures, which were only partly successful, fell into three main categories: reforms designed and financed by the government, corruption, and corporatist political institutions such as the official parties and branches of the government bureaucracy.

After the 1953 coup the shah and his American advisors came to realise that social reforms and economic development would be crucial if the regime was to last. A major development effort was consequently launched. As mentioned above, government spending increased by an average of 23 percent per year in 1954-1958 and 16 percent in 1959-1963. The percentage of government expenditures which went for economic development rose from 13 percent in 1954 to 39 percent in 1962.[40] Where the First Development Plan (covering 1949-1955) called for (but did not actually spend) 21 billion rials for development, the Second Plan (1956-1962) called for 94.5 billion. This included a 448 percent increase in spending for agricultural programmes over the First Plan levels, a 520 percent increase for transportation and communications, and 220 and 217 percent increases (respectively) for industry and social programmes. These efforts were quite successful. Iran's GNP grew at an annual rate of 7-8 percent in 1955-1960. Manufacturing employment grew by 19 percent in 1956-1960. The number of houses and primary and secondary schools grew by 10.8 percent and 47 percent (respectively) in 1955-1960. The production of livestock in 1955-1959 was 48 percent higher than it had been in the previous five years.[41]

Development efforts continued at a similar pace in the early 1960s. Real government expenditures grew at an average annual rate of 9.4 percent in 1962-1967 and spending for development held steady at just under 40 percent of government expenditures in this period. Average yearly outlays planned under the Third Development Plan (1962-1967) were almost three times higher than under the Second Plan, with the largest increases being in industry (754 percent) and social services (584 percent). Real GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.7 in 1960-1967, and employment in manufacturing grew by 37 percent. The number of houses grew by 37 percent. The number of houses grew by 10.7 percent in 1960-1965, and the number of schools almost doubled. While livestock production remained at about the same levels, domestic per capita agricultural production grew by 4.6 percent in 1960-1967.[42]

In January 1963 the shah announced plans for a series of reforms which came to be known as the White Revolution. By identifying his regime so closely with a programme of reforms the shah sought to portray himself as a progressive, modernising monarch and thus deflect criticism from the liberal and radical opposition. The White Revolution included plans for the nationalisation of forests and water resources, legislation to introduce profit-sharing in private industry, and programs to establish health, education, and development corps. The jewel in the crown of the White Revolution, however, was a large-scale land reform programme.

The land tenure system in Iran had long been a serious impediment to social and economic development. Land reform had been a prominent political issue for years, and the shah had even begun a limited land redistribution programme in the early 1950s. The programme begun in the early 1960s was of a much larger scale, however. By the time the land reform programme was officially ended in September 1971 virtually every village in Iran had been affected. The massive estates of the land-owning elite, and hence their primary sources of political power, were largely dismantled. Ninety-two percent of the peasant sharecroppers eligible to receive land under the programme eventually did. While the grand scale of these reforms cannot be

denied, the programme contained one major oversight: the landless agricultural labourers who constituted almost half of the Iranian peasantry were not only completely excluded from the programme but were, in most cases, forced off the land with the break-up of the large feudal estates.[43] The profound consequences of the land reform programme for Iranian politics will be discussed at some length below and in the conclusion of this study.

A second mechanism of co-optation used by the shah was corruption. While corruption under the shah is hard to document (for obvious reasons), there is no doubt that it permeated the Iranian political process and that much of it originated in the royal court itself.[44] Corruption came in a myriad of forms in Iran. It involved not only the royal family and wealthy businessmen but also tribal and religious leaders, government employees at all levels, and even peasants and the urban unemployed. While its primary motive in most cases was personal greed, corruption also served an important political purpose: it enabled the shah and his allies to buy the loyalty of the people involved and thus exert control over them. This had the effect of eliminating many potential competing centres of power and creating a vast system of patronage which linked the royal court in a personal way to virtually all segments of society. As discussed above, there is some evidence that US foreign aid was used by the shah and his officials for corrupt purposes. Given the secrecy involving these matters, the cases cited may have been only the tip of the iceberg.

A final mechanism used by the shah to coopt the opposition was employment or membership in government-controlled or government-affiliated institutions such as the universities and research institutes, the government bureaucracies, and the legal political parties. Because of the sheer size of the government, much of the most prestigious employment in Iran lay in the public sector. This was particularly true for the secular, well-educated children of the upper and middle classes, who formed the core of the liberal and radical opposition. As discussed above, applicants for government positions were carefully screened by SAVAK. Those who had participated

in opposition political activities were either barred from public service or given unsuitable or temporary employment. This created powerful incentives for students to refrain from engaging in political activity. Government employees were closely watched and similarly found it difficult to be politically active. Much the same situation held in many newspapers, businesses, and labour unions, which often had direct ties to the government or were run by allies of the shah.[45]

A similar role was played by the various government-sponsored political parties, which first appeared in 1957. These parties were in no way popular or representative. Rather, they served mainly as socialisation and recruitment organs for the state, with membership being virtually obligatory for anyone hoping to enter into the highest levels of government. These parties helped to co-opt opposition to the shah in two main ways. First, members of these parties could not, of course, openly belong to other parties or criticise the shah. Hence the official parties had the effect of forcing politically-active Iranians to make a clear choice between the shah and the opposition. Second, since only these parties could nominate candidate for the Majles, the opposition was denied an organisational base for entering this body (Independent candidates were, however, permitted to run for office.) Either the shah himself or a trusted ally always headed the official parties and selected their candidates. Hence there was little chance for the opposition to become a powerful force in the Majles, and this body never regained the power it had held under Mossadeq.[46]

8.3. The Shah and the Opposition

In the years after he was returned to power in 1953, the shah used his coercive apparatus and these mechanisms of co-optation to systematically undermine all sources of opposition to his rule. This meant not only the liberal and radical opposition but also real and potential threats from the military, the clergy, and even from the traditional landed upper class. In the process, state-society relations in Iran evolved from the

pluralism of the late 1940s and early 1950s to the authoritarian, relatively autonomous dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s.

8.3.1. The National Front and the Tudeh Party

The first targets of the shah were, of course, the liberals and radicals of the National Front and the Tudeh party. The National Front suffered a mortal blow with the overthrow of the Mossadeq government in 1953 and the subsequent wave of arrests. It continued to exist under a variety of different names and remained the most vocal opposition force in Iran until the last days of the shah's reign. However, because of its broad popularity and the personal threat it had posed to him in 1953, the shah harassed the National Front more than any other group. The effect of the shah's attacks was already evident by 1963 when the clergy rather than the liberal opposition led the massive demonstrations which occurred in that year.

The shah's main instrument in dealing with the opposition was repression. Virtually the entire leadership of the National Front was arrested in August 1953, and after that arrest and imprisonment became a routine matter.[47] Public meetings and demonstrations by the National Front were banned and frequent raids were made to disrupt planning sessions, seize mimeograph machines, etc. Censorship was used to deny the National Front a public forum. Rigged elections and the ban on independent political parties made it virtually impossible for the National Front to place candidates in the Majles. The powerful Qashqai Khans were exiled in the mid-1950s, denying the substantial resources of the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy to the National Front.[48]

Repression not only made it difficult for the National Front to operate but reduced its public appeal as well. The shah also used the mechanisms of co-optation described above to undermine the popularity of the National Front. Although this co-

optation occurred in a great variety of ways, it was the reform programme of the early 1960s which had the greatest effect on the National Front.

The origins of this programme lay in the events of the mid-1950s. Iran quickly reached a state of relative prosperity after oil started to flow again in late 1954. Rumblings about redistributing this wealth and about land reform were heard. Also in the mid-and late-1950s a growing number of Iranian students began to return from European and American universities with ideas about reform. These factors played into the hands of the National Front, which in early 1960 staged its first public demonstrations since 1953. In 1961 the Kennedy Administration was inaugurated, adding to the pressure for reform.

The shah soon realised that he could harness and channel these pressures for reform for his own political benefit. In 1961 he appointed Ali Amini as prime minister. Amini was a liberal technocrat with no popular following and no real ties to the National Front. Amini launched the programme with help from his very capable minister of agriculture, Dr. Hassan Arsanjani. Amini was forced to resign in July 1962 and Arsanjani followed soon after. Having used Amini and Arsanjani to steal the thunder from his liberal and radical critics, the shah now made the reforms programme his own under the banner of the "White Revolution". The *coup de grace* was administered to the National Front in June 1963, after the large demonstrations led by Khomeini. Hundreds were killed and thousands arrested in these demonstrations, including many National Front leaders and supporters.

Despite the massive arrests which followed the 1953 coup, the Tudeh party emerged relatively unscathed from the overthrow of Mossadeq. It had long since organised itself into clandestine cells and its leadership and cadres had grown adept at operating secretly during the years in which the party was outlawed. However, in August 1954 the security force led by Bakhtiar and the American military attaché managed to come up with a list of the members of the Tudeh military network.[49] This network contained over 600 officers, including Zahedi's personal bodyguard and the

head of army G-2. It had been set up during the Soviet occupation in 1941-1946 and apparently was designed primarily to gather intelligence on the Iranian army rather than to carry out subversive operations.[50] This network had been backbone of the Tudeh party. Its destruction finished the Tudeh as a serious threat to the shah.

The Tudeh party and the various manifestations of the National Front were the only major legitimate representatives of Iran's emerging middle and lower classes. Hence their destruction with the operations carried out in 1953 and 1954 marked the inauguration of an authoritarian regime. These operations and the subsequent combination of repression and co-optation kept the shah's popular opposition effectively under control. However, in the 1950s and early 1960s the shah's autocratic ambitions were still threatened from other sources. The most immediate of these threats came from a series of military officers who attempted to oust the shah.

8.3.2. The Military

The first was General Zahedi's whose ambitions were common knowledge. In 1953 when Zahedi was chosen to lead TPAJAX it was generally assumed by the CIA that the shah would reign rather than rule and that effective control of the country would be in the hands of Zahedi. The shah was evidently concerned about Zahedi's ambitions from the very beginning. When Dennis Wright was sent to Tehran as charge in December 1953 to reopen the British embassy the shah sounded him out about the British attitude toward Zahedi. Throughout 1954 the shah continually asked the British and American ambassadors whether they supported Zahedi. The shah travelled to the United States and Britain in December 1954. When the issue of Zahedi's tenure in office was not brought up the shah apparently believed he had received a green light from these two countries to remove Zahedi. He did so in April 1955.

The second threat from the military came in March 1958. A group of reform-minded officers led by General Garaneh (the head of army G-2) and apparently

associated with Amini and Arsanjani[51] organised a coup which came within two days of succeeding. The shah somehow got wind of the plot and managed to break it up. Garaneh and some of his collaborators were given short prison terms. Amini and Arsanjani were briefly detained but soon managed to fall back into favour with the shah.

The third threat to the shah from the military came from Bakhtiar. As chief of SAVAK, Bakhtiar had probably the second most powerful man in Iran by 1960. The shah was by this time alert to the threat from powerful subordinate, and managed to fire him in early 1961. Bakhtiar then begun to conspire with other retired officers and Iranian political figures. He was forced to flee Iran in January 1962, amid rumours of a coup attempt. From exile in Europe, Beirut, and Baghdad, Bakhtiar apparently continued to plot against the shah. Bakhiar was killed in a hunting accident in 1970. There is little doubt that he was actually executed by SAVAK.[52]

8.3.3. The Land-owning Aristocracy and The Clergy

The reform programme of the early 1960s also enabled the shah to strike at the two remaining sources of potential opposition to his rule: the landed upper class and the clergy. Much of the power of the land-owning class lay in its ability to deliver the votes of the peasantry in the Majles elections. By breaking up the large feudal estates, the shah severed the peasant-landlord relationship and rendered the landowner class largely powerless.[53] In fact, the land reform programme took this process one step further. By decreeing that the large estates should be sold to the government at a reasonable price for resale to the peasants rather than simply expropriated, the shah in effect converted the land-owning aristocracy into a new bourgeoisie. Since the state took a leading role in the economy through the Development Plans, this new bourgeoisie was subordinate to the state and hence to the shah.

The reforms of the early 1960s also singled the emergence of a confrontation between the shah and the conservative clergy. The clergy had traditionally relied on large endowed estates as an important source of revenue. By breaking up these estates the shah seriously undercut the power of the clergy in this regard. A number of other reforms enacted under the White Revolution, including most notably the enfranchisement of women, conflicted directly with Shi'ite doctrine and threatened to undermine the hold of the clergy on Iranian society. It was, in fact, the issues of land reform and the enfranchisement of women that sparked the demonstrations in 1963 led by Khomeini.[54]

Although the clergy were hurt by these measures and the wave of arrests which followed the 1963 demonstrations, there was a limit to the damage which the shah could inflict on it. Short of destroying every mosque in Iran and arresting all of the mullahs (who numbered in the hundreds of thousands), it was simply not possible to eliminate the clergy as a political force. A further impediment to the shah in this regard was the close relationship between the Iranian Shi'ite community and that in neighbouring Iraq. The shah had very bad relations with the Iraqi government throughout much of this reign, and the latter were eager to help religious leaders such as Khomeini who passed a threat to the shah. In the conclusion of this study it will be argued that these unique factors enabled the clergy to assume the leadership of the revolutionary upheaval that emerged in the late 1970s.

Since the land-owning aristocracy and the top layer of the clerical hierarchy had formed the backbone of Iran's traditional ruling class, these measures enabled the shah henceforth to act with virtually no opposition from Iran's upper class. Where the coup of 1953 and the subsequent repression of the National Front and the Tudeh party had marked the establishment of an authoritarian regime, the land reform programme of the early 1960s signalled the relative autonomy of the shah's state from the upper classes. With the inauguration of this programme in January 1963 and the bloody suppression of the June 1963 riots, the shah had eliminated all immediate sources of opposition to

his rule by the end of 1963. The process of transition toward an authoritarian and relatively autonomous client had been completed.

8.4. Cliency and Dictatorship in Iran

This chapter has outlined the steps taken by the United States to secure Iran as a client state and the repressive and cooptative measures used by the shah to neutralise his opposition. It is important now to clarify the relationship between these two basic themes. By summarising how US policy contributed to the establishment of the shah's dictatorship, this section recapitulates the basic argument of this study: that policies designed to promote stability in a client country can instead promote authoritarianism and relative autonomy.

The single most important aspect of US policy toward Iran in this regard was the CIA-led operation to overthrow Mossadeq. The implications of this operation for Iran's domestic politics were discussed at some length in the last section of chapter 6. The overthrow of Mossadeq and the wave of arrests which followed removed the National Front from power and destroyed it as an effective political force. In its place was installed a dictatorship led by Zahedi and the shah. The National Front had emerged in the late 1940s as the democratic movement which first appeared with the constitutional uprising of the early twentieth century. It was the political embodiment of the new middle class which began to emerge in the 1920s and 1930s under Reza Shah. By destroying Mossadeq and the National Front, the CIA-led coup of 1953 cut short a process of transition to democracy and frustrated the political aspirations of this new class.

Within weeks of the coup the United States provided Iran with at least $73 million through the Point Four aid program, the CIA, and through ordinary foreign aid channels. This was followed in the next decade with an additional $900 million in aid grants and $200-300 million in loans, which together accounted for about 21 percent of

expenditures by the Iranian government in that period. Between August 1953 and November 1954 US aid accounted for roughly 60 percent of the expenditures of the Zahedi government. Given the chaos in Iran in this period, the absence of any popular support for the Zahedi government, and the efforts made by it to restore order and solidify its domestic position, this aid program can only be regarded as having played a major role in the establishment of the shah-Zahedi dictatorship.

While US aid declined somewhat as a percentage of government expenditures in the following decade, it continued to play an important role in the shah's consolidation of power. Most of this aid was used to finance economic development projects and the modernisation of the shah's military and security forces. Inasmuch as these development projects and the security apparatus were fundamental pillars of the shah's dictatorship, US aid in this way made an important contribution to the consolidation of this dictatorship. Moreover, the US aid programs in Iran also included substantial technical advice and training. Hence they contributed not only to the financing of the main institutions used by the shah to consolidate his rule but also to the particular form they took and their efficiency and effectiveness as political instruments. Finally, there is some evidence that US aid to Iran was used by the shah to extend his political influence through patronage and corruption.

For the purposes of this study the single most important aspect of the US aid program in Iran after the 1953 coup was the assistance given to the shah's security forces. This began immediately after the coup with the mission of the US military attaché and continued into the early 1960s. The shah's security forces evolved under this program from a poorly-organised and ineffective apparatus divided among the National Police, the Gendarmerie, and military intelligence to the modern, efficient organisation centralised under SAVAK. By the early 1960s SAVAK had become the single most important pillar of the shah's dictatorship. It penetrated and disrupted opposition organisations and undermined their based of support by coopting and demobilising their constituencies. To the extent that US training and assistance for

SAVAK and its predecessors made them more effective, this aspect of US policy toward Iran had obvious and important implications for its domestic politics.

There can be little doubt that the actions just summarised which took place under the US-Iran cliency relationship played a significant role in the establishment and consolidation of the shah's dictatorship. However, a variety of other factors can be mentioned which also contributed to dictatorship in Iran. The British oil blockade created severe economic problems which weakened Mossadeq's base of support. Conversely, the rapid growth of Iran's oil wealth after November 1954 helped the shah finance development programs and other projects which served to coopt unrest. Iran did not have a long-standing democratic tradition. Although there was a emerging modern middle class, social and political conditions such as the low level of literacy, the entrenched power of the land-owning aristocracy, the pro-Soviet orientation of the Tudeh party, the broad appeal of Islam, and the mosaic of tribal and ethnic loyalties hindered prospects for democracy in Iran.

If other factors thus contributed to dictatorship in Iran, can it be said that the role of cliency was crucial? Furthermore, how does cliency compare in importance to these other causal factors?

The evidence presented in this and the previous chapter indicates that cliency did play a crucial role in the establishment of dictatorship in Iran. The CIA planned and carried out the operation that removed Mossadeq from office. Although Iranians were involved in this operation, they were subordinate to the CIA team which implemented it. As the operation unfolded the shah fled the country in panic and Zahedi took refuge in a CIA safe house. The British oil blockade also made a contribution to Massage's downfall. However, as was argued in chapter 5, while Mossadeq may well have fallen in the absence of a CIA coup, the dictatorship that emerged under Zahedi and the shah was probably the least likely alternative to Mossadeq. US economic aid kept the Zahedi government afloat for fifteen months until oil exports were resumed. The

conclusion that the United States was instrumental in installing the shah's dictatorship thus appears inescapable.

Once the shah was firmly established in power, US economic aid and security assistance played an important, though perhaps not crucial, role in keeping him there. Although Iran's yearly oil revenues first surpassed US aid receipts in 1956, they remained of comparable magnitude until 1962 when they finally exceeded twice the dollar value of US aid (see table 8.1). Hence US aid continued to be an important source of funding for development projects and other mechanisms of co-optation through the early 1960s. US training for the shah's security forces certainly made them more effective as instruments of repression. However, it cannot be said with any certainty that they could not have been effective in this regard without US assistance. Hence while US aid was important in maintaining the shah in power in the late 1950s and early 1960s, domestic factors also worked in his favour at this time.

How does cliency compare in importance to other factors which helped to promote dictatorship in Iran? Of the many influences on Iranian politics in the early- and mid-1950s, only three were novel and of sufficient importance to bring about such a dramatic change in the type of regime: the British oil embargo, the renewal of oil exports in late 1954, and the establishment of the cliency relationship.

As discussed in chapter 7, while the British oil blockade undoubtedly contributed to the downfall of Mossadeq, any of a number of other leaders could have emerged in his place as a result. By contrast, the CIA operation TPAJAK which inaugurated the cliency relationship was undertaken not only to remove Mossadeq from power but also to install a particular regime under Zahedi and the shah. Hence while the oil blockade helped undermine Mossadeq, it did not in any direct way lead to the establishment of a dictatorship.

Similarly, the influx of oil revenues after November 1954 certainly helped the shah consolidate his dictatorship. However, this income did not reach high levels until some eighteen months after Mossadeq was ousted. By this time the National Front and

the Tudeh party had been thoroughly crushed (with substantial US assistance) and the shah was firmly in power. Thus while oil revenues helped the shah further to consolidate his regime, much of this process had already taken place by the time they become available.

Other factors, such as Iran's comparatively weak democratic tradition and the social and political conditions mentioned above, also contributed to dictatorship in Iran. However, these factors were not new in the early 1950s. They did not stop Mossadeq from establishing himself firmly in power and had not prevented the emergence in the 1940s of democratic institutions such as representative parties and a free press. Moreover, the social and economic development which occurred in Iran in the 1940s and early 1950s and the experience of the Mossadeq era can only have strengthened the social and political bases for democracy in Iran. Hence while these factors may have contributed in a general way to the establishment of the shah's dictatorship, they can only have played a background role.

The question of whether cliency was more important than other factors as a cause of dictatorship in Iran can only be answered definitively through a detailed analysis of the dynamics of Iranian politics. However, on the basis of this discussion it appears to have played a more important role than any other factor mentioned here. If this is true, what then were the long-term implications of the policy of engaging Iran in a cliency relationship? This question will be the principal issue addressed in the conclusion of this study.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

1 National Security Council, *United States Policy Toward Iran, NSC-175,* December 21, 1953, pp. 1-2, 7.

2 *Ibid.,* pp. 3-7 and Annex pp. 21-22. On the rescinding of anti-trust action to secure participation by the US majors, see John M. Blair, *The Control of Oil* (New York: Pantheon, 1987), pp. 43-47, 71-76. Authorisation to waive anti-trust proceedings came under the Defence Production Act of 1950, which had been used in 1951 and 1952 to help restructure world oil supplies after the British oil blockade was imposed. See chapter 5, footnote 50.

3 The figures given here were calculated from those shown in the table. Note that both military and economic aid are given in table 3, and that transfers from the CIA are excluded. In addition to the $7-8 million given by the CIA shortly after the coup, another $1 million is said to have been given one year later to fund a lavish celebration held by the shah. The aid given in the weeks after the coup was allocated over a period of months, so its full value is not reflected in the figures given in the table for 1953. Since the government expenditure data given here includes military spending, it is appropriate to compare it with U.S. military and economic aid summed together.

4 These figures were calculated from the data given in table 3 and from data on wholesale prices and the distribution of government expenditures given in Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran,* pp. 46-47, 67-68.

5 Quoted in David Horowitz, *From Yalta to Vietnam* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1967), p. 186. On the distribution of U.S. aid to Iran see the source referred to in table 3. Other information cited here is from U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Committee Print,* 94th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1976; Thomas M. Ricks, "U.S. Military Missions to Iran: The Political Economy of Military Assistance," *Iranian Studies,* Vol. XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn 1979, pp. 163-193; U.S. Department of Defence, Security Assistance Agency, *Fiscal Year Series 1980,* (Washington, 1981), p. 83.

6 Data presented here on the U.S. economic aid programs is from AID Affairs Office, American Embassy Tehran, *U.S. Economic Assistance to Iran at a Glance, FY 1950-FY 1967* (Washington: AID Library, date illegible) and U.S. AID Mission to Iran, *A.I.D. Economic Assistance to Iran, 1950-1965* (Washington: AID Library, 1966). The latter source gives good descriptions of the various aid programs carried out in Iran.

7 The text of this House Subcommittee report is reprinted in Yonah Alexander and Allan Names (eds.), *The United States and Iran: A Documentary History* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), pp. 295-298.

8 Fred J. Cook, "The Billion-Dollar Mystery," *The Nation,* April 12, 1965. A careful analysis of this controversy appears in Mark Hulbert, *Interlock* (New York: Reichardson and Snyder, 1982), ch. 2.

9 Unless otherwise noted, the material presented in this section was obtained in interviews with two former CIA officers and a former U.S. military officer who worked closely with the CIA. The military officer and one of the CIA officers headed or participated in the two major security assistance missions described here. All three requested anonymity. The material they provided was corroborated wherever possible with other sources. In the course of my research, nothing has emerged to contradict any information provided by these sources on this or other matters.

10 For the purposes of this study, the terms "Security forces," "security services," etc. refer to government organisations involved in intelligence activities pertaining to the security of the state. These activities include both passive functions such as intelligence analysis and surveillance and active functions such as interrogation, arrest, and assassination. Such organisations are frequently referred to as "the secret police". Specifically excluded here are the military services (other than

military intelligence) and police forces engaged in routine matters such as criminal investigation, traffic control, etc.

11 It can be assumed that some training for military intelligence did occur. However, if this training did occur it could not have been very effective, since the Tudeh party placed an elaborate network in the armed forces. This is described below.

12 Although this organisation evolved into SAVAK, it operated at this time more like the Special Bureau, which was later created by the shah to watch over all the security services, including SAVAK.

13 SAVAK is an acronym for Sazman-i-Etela'at va Amniat-i-Keshvar, the National Intelligence and Security Organisation.

14 Confidential interview, March 26, 1984. A Nazi training manual on torture was reportedly used in this context. See "The SAVAK-CIA Connection," *The Nation,* March 1, 1980, p. 229.

15 *The New York Times,* January 7, 1979, 3:1. In defending CIA acceptance of torture by SAVAK and other "friendly" security services, the usual CIA response is that discouraging its use is a matter for diplomats rather than intelligence professionals.

16 "The SAVAK-CIA Connection," pp. 229-230. On U.S. police training for third world allies see Michael T. Klare, *Supplying Repression* (New York: The Field Foundation, 1977).

17 By the mid-1960s, the main covert source of CIA intelligence on Iran come from intercepted rapid transmissions of the Iranian military and SAVAK. Since much of the communications equipment used by these services had been provided by the United States, the codes used to encipher information were available to the CIA. One source claimed that 100 percent of the transmissions of the armed forces and 80 percent of the transmissions of SAVAK were intercepted. Not only could information from these sources not be made available to SAVAK for security reasons, but it was, in any case, material which had originally come from SAVAK and was thus not of any use.

18 See USOM-Iran, *Review of U.S. Technical Assistance and Economic Aid to Iran, 1951-1957, Vol. 2* (Washington: AID Library, n.d.), pp. 483-486; "Completion of Tour Report of Albert G. Varrelman," June 26, 1956, "Completion of Tour Report of Mr. Frank A. Jessup," July 7, 1959, "Completion of Tour Report, Mr. Michael G. McCann,", September 29, 1959, and "End of Tour Report, Public Safety Advisor," June 12, 1961, all from the AID Library in Washington.

19 Rountree to the Department of State, April 25, 1955 (Carter White Paper). This report and others referenced in this way are contained in a large study of U.S. policy toward Iran compiled by the Carter Administration during the hostage crisis. This collection is available through the Department of State under the Freedom of Information Act.

20 Descriptions of CIA operations given here and below were obtained in confidential interviews with several of the participants.

21 One indication of the importance of these devices is that after the Iranian revolution the Carter Administration was forced to make arrangements to install similar facilities in north-western China. The price of this deal was presumably diplomatic recognition. See James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982), pp 198-201.

22 Joint operations directed at the Soviet Union *did* occur, however. Because of the very nature of these operations, the CIA had no choice but to inform and include SAVAK. SAVAK mainly played a support role in these operations, providing transportation, cover for agents, etc. In return the CIA

provided SAVAK with the information obtained in these operations that was of direct concern to Iran.

23 By the late 1960s the primary CIA source for Iran was the radio intercepts described in footnote 20, above. This include intercepts from SAVAK transmissions. While this information was inadvertently provided by SAVAK, its content was obviously not deliberately slanted for its American audience.

24 Carter White Paper, Section III.D.1, "Contacts with Opposition Elements;" *The Washington Post, October 26, 1980,* pp. 1, 18, 19. The *Post* article is part of an informative series entitled "The Fall of the Shah".

25 In 1977 the shah told a reporter that President Kennedy had used $35 million in economic aid to pressure him into appointing Amini. See Fereydoun Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah* (New York: Wyndham Books, 1979), p. 54.

26 See, for example, Kitchen to Rountree, May 17, 1956 (Carter White paper). There were also debates within the CIA on the need for reform. Several former CIA officers told me that they pushed for reforms in the 1950s. At least two resigned from the Agency over this issue. Further evidence of CIA ambivalence about reforms came in its response to the 1958 coup attempt by Colonel Garaneh. Garaneh was a nationalist and favoured reforms, not unlike Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt. The CIA station in Tehran was aware of his plot and did not warn the shah about it. One officer in the station at the time told me that he had been in favour of a coup by Garanch.

27 Except where referenced in the footnotes, the material presented in this section was obtained in interviews with the sources described in footnote 10, above.

28 Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, *Secret Police* (New York: Doubleday, 1981), use SAVAK as their primary example of a third world secret police organisation.

29 It was rumoured that Bakhtiar kept a bear to maul his prisoners. This was related to me by Peter Avery (Cambridge, England, September 17, 1983).

30 William J. Butler and George's Levasseur, *Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran* (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1976), pp. 7-8.

31 Chapour Bakhtiar, *Ma Fidelite* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), p. 82.

32 Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 85.

33 *Ibid.* Mouvement de la Resistance Nationale Iranienne, *Iran Plaidoire Pour les Droits de I'Homme* (Paris, 1982), p. 14.

34 *Newsweek,* October 14, 1974. This figure is probably an exaggeration. However, it typifies the almost omnipotent reputation SAVAK came to possess, and which it no doubt cultivated. The best single description of savvy's organisation is given in National Front of Iran, "A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organisation (SAVAK)," (unpublished manuscript, May 1971). This source is used for most of the description of SAVAK given here.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

36 See, for example, Reza Baraheni, *The Crowned Cannibals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977); The Iran Committee, *Torture and Resistance in Iran* (date and place of publication unknown); Committee Against Repression in Iran, *Iran: The Shah's Empire of Repression* (London, 1976), ch.

7; Ali-Reza Novari (ed.), *Iran Erupts* (Stanford: Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978), ch. 10.

37 Amnesty International, *Annual Report, 1974-1975,* p. 8; Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Briefing: Iran* (November 1976), pp. 2-5; Butler and levasseur, *Human Rights and the Legal System in Iran.*

38 For example, in January 1978 an article appeared in a Tehran newspaper alleging that Ayatollah Khomeini was a homosexual, that his mother had been a professional dancer, etc. Although this article apparently originated in the Ministry of Information, it is typical of the misinformation directed by the regime against its opponents.

39 This description of SAVAK tactics was obtained in part in interviews with Hedayat Matin-Daftari (Paris, November 2, 1983) and Abdul-Karim Lahiji (Paris, October 26, 1983).

40 Calculated from the sources used in table 3.

41 Jahangir Amuzegar and M. Ali Fekrat, *Iran: Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 40, 43; Bharier, *Economic Development in Iran,* pp. 39, 45, 135, 186, 227.

42 These figures are format he sources cited in footnotes 43 and 44, and from *ibid.,* pp. 26, 60.

43 Eric J. Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran, 1960-1980* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), chs. 4-6.

44 In 1977 corruption in the royal family had made Iran much like "a haunch of meat thrown to an army of starving rats," according to the brother of Iran's prime minister at the time. See Fereydoun Hoveyda, *The Fall of the Shah,* p. 136, and also pp. 90-93 and 144-146.

45 This material was obtained in the interviews mentioned in footnote 42 and with Hormoz Hekmat (Paris, November 6, 1983), Nasser Pakdaman (Paris, October 31, 1983), and Homayoun keshevarz (Paris, November 2, 1983).

46 A useful, but brief, description of these parties is given in George Lenezowski, "Political Process and Institutions in Iran: The Second Pahlevi Kingship," in Lenezowski (ed.), *Iran Under the Pahlevis* (Standford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), pp. 452-454. See also Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran,* p. 86-90.

47 Chapour Bakhtiar, who emerged after 1953 to become an important National Front leader, claims to have kept a special suitcase packed for prison. See *Ma Fidelite* p. 92. This book gives a fairly good inside account of the measures taken by the shah toward the National Front.

48 Lois Beck, "Iran and the Qashqai Tribal Confederacy," in Richard Tapper (ed.), *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan* (London: Croon Helm, 1983), p. 302.

49 It is unclear whether the list was found accidentally or during the course of investigations by this security force. A number of knowledgeable sources have told me that it was found when the police arrested someone in a traffic accident. However, the military attaché involved told me that it had been uncovered in the course of an extensive anti-Tudah operation.

50 This was the conclusion of the CIA at the time. The CIA had had some idea that there was a Tudeh net in the military, and assumed that its main purpose was to stage a coup on orders from Moscow. Fear that the Tudeh might so act was the main reason the CIA decided to implement TPAJAX.

However, in subsequent years when it became apparent that the Tudeh was deeply split and that the military network was primarily engaged in intelligence-gathering, CIA analysts realised in retrospect that their fears of an imminent Tudeh coup had been mistaken. This was related to me by one of the sources mentioned in footnote 10, above.

51 Cottam, *Nationalism in Iran*, p. 362; Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran*, p. 54.

52 *Ibid.*, pp. 47-52.

53 Hooglund, *Land and Revolution in Iran*, p. 78.

54 Shahrough Akhavi, *Religion and Polities in Contemporary Iran* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), ch. 4.

CONCLUSION

1. General

This study examined the characteristics of US security policy. Consequently this study has argued that the key US foreign and security policy makers, by engaging Iran in a cliency relationship, helped undermine a process of transition toward democracy in Iran and helped install an authoritarian, relatively autonomous client state under the leadership of the late shah through security assistance and economic aids. The concepts of great power - small power and patron - client state relationships were introduced in chapter 1. In chapter 2 a theoretical framework was developed for investigating the impact of cliency on the client's domestic politics. In chapter 3 and 4, the characteristics of US foreign and security policy making process were developed for providing general concept of analysis on US and Iran relations. Chapter 5 gave an overview of Iranian politics in the era before the US-Iran cliency relationship was begun. In chapter 6 the history of US-Iranian relations was discussed and US interests in Iran in the late 1940s and early 1950s were examined.

The main brunt of the argument presented here came in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 detailed the US role in the 1953 coup and the implications of this coup for Iranian politics, building on the material presented in chapter 5. Chapter 8 outlined the kinds of assistance provided by the United States to Iran under the cliency relationship and the mechanisms used by the shah to consolidate and maintain his dictatorship. The last section of chapter 8 brought these two themes together by discussing how the assistance provided under the cliency relationship facilitated this process of consolidation.

If the basic argument of this study is accepted, what then were the long-term implications of the policy of establishing Iran as a US client state? The immediate implications for domestic politics in Iran are clear: after Zahedi and the shah were installed in power in 1953 a twenty-five year period of repressive and often brutal

dictatorship ensued as we examined in the case study of US and Iran relations. But what role, if any, did cliency ultimately play in the constellation of social forces that led to the 1978-79 revolution? Furthermore, if cliency did contribute in some manner to revolution in Iran, what general conclusions can be drawn for alternative US foreign and security policy recommendations towards the Third World countries in the new global systems and her national conditions?

Through the case study of US and Iran relations, this study examined several aspects on the US security policy making process. First, US foreign and security policy has been inclined to pursue the national interest rather than American philosophy and ideology. Accordingly the US policy makers regarded the coup of 1953 against Mossadeq nationalist government as a major triumph of covert action in terms of US security interests. They perceived the results of the coup as positive: Iran became unambiguously a client ally of the US: in addition, the coup not only restored power a pro-Western government, but more significantly restored to control over Iran's oil production to the West. Within one year of the coup, a new consortium of Western oil interests was created to manage Iranian oil. This agreement marked the beginning of US economic interests in Iran, interests that would intensify during the next twenty-five years.[1] Second, during establishment procedures of the cliency relationship with Iran, most of the related institutions were involved in developing the policies. As we discussed in chapter 6, in October 1946 and early 1948, JCS and the Department of Defense considered Iran and its oil supplies to be of major US strategic interest. Also in November 1951, NSC expressed the same opinion. Due to these conceptions Truman as a decision maker determined Iran as a strategic position to contain the threat of Soviet Union expansionism. As examined in the chapter 7, although the coup, of 1953 was initiated by the CIA covertly, the planning of the coup was discussed by top diplomats in the State Department and high-ranking CIA officials. After the coup besides the State Department and DOD, key senators in congress also played an active role in developing the cliency relationship via increased military and economic aid as

discussed in chapter 8. Third, even though US foreign and security policy seems to vary with different presidents and public opinions which change according to different circumstances, the policy towards Iran for establishing and maintaining the cliency relationship has remained constant. After the 1953 coup, $73 million in economic aid was given to the Zahedi government in the first three weeks after the event. Also, under the Nixon doctrine, to attempt to establish Iran as 'the policeman of Persian Gulf' some of sophisticated weapons were permitted to the shah. US sales of military hardware to Iran between 1971 and 1977 totalled more than $ 11.8 billion.[2] Even under Carter's 'human rights' administration, and despite his criticism of president Ford's arms sales to Iran during the 1976 nationally televised presidential election debate, after entering the White House the policy towards Iran never changed.

To conclude, US foreign and security policy towards Iran cannot be understood in isolation, but must be considered in the global context. After World War II, the US emerged as the economic military and political dominant superpower. Therefore her interventions toward the Third World countries are inevitable aspects to maintain the global order. However, the key US policy makers in the cold war era have been inclined to pursue US national interest rather than national ideology and her philosophy. The result of the inclination of the US policy makers concentrations on the national interest was the failure of some relationships in the Third World countries. One of the strongest examples is the cliency relationship between US and Iran lasting 25 years after 1953. As examined in the case study, the disregard of the Iranian internal political situation and the consistent support for the shah's dictatorship provoked anti-American emotion. These facts are one of the major reasons which facilitated the Iranian revolution.

Presently the status of the US in world politics can no longer be seen as hegemonic, compared with the previous cold war era. The US security policy towards Third World countries should be changed based on the new global system and her national conditions. Based on this new system and the lessons of the case study, to

avoid re-iterating the failures of the cold war era, the next section will suggest alternative recommendations for US security policy makers. In third section of this conclusion, the impact for Iranian politics will be considered

2. The impact on Iranian Politics

By the early 1960s, the state in Iran had become sufficiently autonomous and authoritarian that it could act against the interests of any group in society without regard for countervailing political pressures. Two profoundly important events occurred in 1963 which made this eminently clear. First, in January 1963 the shah announced plans for a far-reaching land reform program. As discussed in chapter 8, this programme devastated the political base of the dominant, land-owning class by breaking the feudal bonds which had previously linked peasants to their landlords. Second, after the gradual relaxation of sanctions against open political activity beginning in 1960, the shah responded to the June 1963 uprisings by re-imposing the harsh measures which had hitherto prevailed. The ease with which this was accomplished indicated clearly how little power vis-à-vis the state the lower and middle classes actually possessed.

In addition to these dramatic events, the state's autonomy from domestic political pressures had an important bearing on its policies in a variety of other areas. Of perhaps greatest concern was its economic policy. The shah's Development Plans promoted large-scale, capital-intensive industrialisation at the expense of agriculture and basic industry, resulting in the development of high-prestige projects such as nuclear power plants, steel mills, and petrochemical complexes were built. These projects were poorly-suited to Iran's economic conditions. They provided little employment for Iran's large unskilled workforce but required large numbers of skilled technicians and engineers, most of whom were recruited in the United States and Europe. Domestic unemployment was aggravated by the land reform program and by the general neglect of agriculture, which reduced rural employment and led to massive

urban migration. Much of this industrialisation was export-oriented and did little to satisfy Iran's growing demand for cheap consumer goods. These new industries used a relatively small proportion of domestically-produced inputs. The results of these facts was large bottlenecks and imports increasing at a rapid rate.[3]

The relative autonomy of the state enabled the shah to pursue ill-suited and unpopular policies in a variety of other areas as well. Despite occasional opposition from the United States, the shah sought to build up Iran's armed forces to the point where they could credibly engage the Soviet Union. Billions of dollars were spent on weapons each year in the 1970s and tens of thousands of foreign advisors, most of them American, were brought to Iran to provide training and support.[4] The shah also sought to Westernise and secularise Iran. Virtually every aspect of state policy had a Western orientation. Western culture, particularly American culture, became increasingly visible. The shah pursued policies such as land reform and the enfranchisement of women which were an anathema to the orthodox Islamic community. In the late 1970s he withdrew millions of dollars in subsidies which had helped support the Shi'ite clergy. Much of the shah's foreign policy, such as his close relationship with Israel and his support of the Oman government against the Dhofar rebellion, was also quite unpopular.

As in the cases discussed in section 3 of chapter 2, the cliency relationship increased the relative autonomy of the state in Iran which enabled the shah to pursue economic policies and policies in other areas that served neither the interests of the established upper classes nor those of the lower and middle classes. No internal pressures of any kind existed to force the shah to pursue policies that suited Iran's needs. This had ominous long-term implications for Iranian politics.

It is obviously beyond the scope of this study to give a detailed analysis of the origins of the Iranian revolution. Most writers have focused on the unique ability of the Shi'ite clergy to mobilise latent popular unrest.[5] Defenders of the shah speak of communist subversion and suggest that the pace of modernisation was too rapid.[6]

Ironically, the shah himself accused the United States and Britain of fomenting unrest and opposition to his rule.[7]

Regardless of where blame is ultimately laid for the Iranian revolution, there can be no doubt that popular revulsion at the shah's policies played a key role. Despite reports that Iran's oil resources would be depleted by the end of the century, the shah continued to spend heavily on sophisticated military equipment and high-prestige industrial projects. These expenditures increased dramatically after oil prices began to rise in the late 1960s. Corruption among high government officials and members of the royal family grew rampant. The shah and his close associates enjoyed an increasingly extravagant lifestyle, symbolised most notably by the lavish Persepolis celebrations of 1971, which reportedly cost $100 million.[8] However, despite high growth rates, very little of Iran's wealth reached the impoverished majority. The slums of Tehran and other major cities became bloated in the 1970s. Income inequality worsened and the literacy rate remained under 50 percent.[9]

Ironically, Iran's economic situation became worse in the late 1970s, despite the great influx of oil revenues after 1973. The quadrupling of oil prices in that year led the shah to draw up overly-ambitious plans for economic development and modernisation of the armed forces. By 1976 large deficits forced the shah to implement stringent austerity measures and even borrow in foreign capital markets. The shah's elaborate spending plans caused severe economic bottlenecks and a substantial increase in the inflation rate. The continued neglect of agriculture led millions of peasants to migrate to the cities and forced Iran to import growing quantities of food.

These economic problems were a fundamental cause of unrest among Iran's lower and middle classes in the late 1970s.[10] Beyond these economic problems, the continued absence of meaningful forms of political participation and the increasingly frequent human rights abuses further alienated the liberal opposition, which began to agitate against the shah. The growing trends of Westernisation and secularisation outraged the more devout Muslims and led the clergy to become increasingly vocal.

Ultimately, neither the liberal opposition nor the clergy really "led" the Iranian revolution. The inheritors of the National Front were poorly-organised and divided among themselves, as was indicated by their subsequent failure to prevent the conservative clergy from assuming complete control. The clergy was also poorly-organised and divided. Ayatollah Khomeini, whose fiery speeches and role in the 1963 demonstrations made him the most prominent member of the clerical opposition, had not been inside Iran for almost fifteen years. The Islamic Republican Party, which now holds power in Iran, was not even formed until after the revolution.

The liberal opposition did serve to catalyse the opposition by circulating petitions and organising demonstrations in the years before the revolution. The clergy, by virtue of the importance of Shi'a Islam in Iranian culture and the protection afforded it by the mosques (which the shah's forces could not easily penetrate), was able to mobilise certain segments of Iranian society, notably the urbanised peasants who later formed the main social base of the post-revolutionary Islamic regime. However, neither the liberal opposition nor the clergy had in any sense prepared for a revolution. It was only in the fall of 1978 that the anti-shah demonstrations took on the appearance of a revolutionary upheaval rather than simply popular unrest. The Iranian revolution was an outburst from the very belly of Iran, guided but not led by the clergy and the liberal opposition, which expiated the shah but had neither the foresight nor the leadership to replace him with a regime that was more just and forward-looking.

3. Alternative recommendations for US security policy

A fundamental reason for engaging Iran as a US client was to make that country more stable. However, if cliency played a significant role in making the state more autonomous and authoritarian in Iran, and if these consequences in turn set the stage for revolution, then the policy of establishing Iran as a US client created a serious paradox for US foreign and security policymakers: while cliency had undoubtedly made Iran

more stable in the short term, its long-term result was quite the opposite. Furthermore, not only was Iran suddenly unstable after twenty-five years of cliency, it was virulently anti-American as well. A policy that in the 1950s and 1960s seemed beneficial for US security interests to assist the containment policy, appeared by the end of 1979 to have been extremely short-sighted.

If such a paradox is inherent in cliency relationships, are there ways in which the patron can achieve the same general goals without producing these undesirable consequences? Three possible scenarios are discussed below.

The first is to escalate the cliency relationship. After the Iranian revolution, critics of the Carter Administration charged that it had "lost Iran" by failing to provide appropriate assistance to the shah in his hour of need. Similar charges were made with respect to the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. The idea behind these charges was that the governments in question could have been kept afloat if the United States had given them sufficient assistance in the form of military and economic aid, or perhaps by military intervention. While it is possible that US assistance could have saved these governments, it is doubtful that anything short of a prolonged US military occupation would have been adequate. This kind of "Vietnam solution" would have been extremely unpopular in the United States , and hence very difficult to implement. It would not, in any case, have improved prospects for a transition to democracy in these countries.

A second possibility is to cease involvement in cliency relationships altogether. Isolationism of this kind is so unpopular in the United States today that it can be ruled out as a practical alternative to cliency. The global interests acquired by the United States in the post-war era simply could not be maintained without key clients such as South Korea, the Philippines, and Panama. Furthermore, in the absence of concrete measures to build strong democratic institutions, simply abrogating cliency relationships with countries such as these could lead to the collapse of their

governments under praetorian onslaughts such as the one which toppled the shah. A more deliberate and peaceful process of transition is clearly preferable.

A third possibility which may hold more promise involves using the leverage inherent in military and economic aid and other transfers occurring under a cliency relationship to pressure the client government into implementing social and political reforms. This approach was, in fact, pursued for a brief period in the early 1960s in Iran when the Kennedy Administration exerted pressure on the shah to enact certain reforms.[11] Leverage of this kind can be used to force the client government to stop abuses of power, thus directly countering some of the undesirable consequences of cliency. It can also be used to promote democratic institutions such as representative parties and free elections, as well as social reforms such as literacy and public education programs which can enhance the long-term prospects for democracy.

There are some problems in this approach. First, the patron may be heavily dependent on the client for services such as the provision of military and security bases which are of vital importance to the patron. By threatening to withdraw these services, the client can effectively block attempts by the patron to pressure it.[12] Second, in promoting political liberalisation, this kind of pressure may also promote nationalist sentiments in the client country which are opposed to the cliency relationship or in other ways conflict with the interests of the patron. Nonetheless, these problems do not discount the overall value of the third approach. It is a question of balancing carefully the various trade-offs. The third approach is in fact the only alternative to the kind of disastrous long-term consequences of cliency which occurred in Iran.

In conclusion it has become apparent from this study that there are two distinct, but closely related aspects of cliency, the external and the domestic, which evolve differently as the patron-client relationships. This relationship can be seen to have two phases. The first phase when the client became less autonomous in its relationship with the patron but domestically becomes more autonomous *vis-à-vis* society. In this case 1953 to 1963 would cover this phase. In the second phase starting from 1963 Iran is

able to become less dependent on its patron, the US but at the same time losses its domestic autonomy, as seen by the rise domestic.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1 Eric Hooglund. "Iran", Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), *US Foreign Policy in the Third World: Intervention in the 1980s* (Bouldr, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1989), p. 208.

2 Melvin Gurtov, *Roots of Failure: United States Policy in the Third World* (London: Greenwood Press, 1985), pp. 86-88.

3 For critical analyses of the shah's economic policies see Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power* (New York: St. Martin's, 1980), chs. 1, 3; Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), chs. 5, 6; Abol-Hassan Banisadr, "Development de la Consommation Du Futur Et Misere," in Paul Vieille and Abol-Hassan Banisadr, *Petrole at Violence* (Paris: Anthropos, 1974), pp. 69-135.

4 U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Committee Print,* 94th Congress, 2nd Session, July, 1976.

5 For example see Michael M. J. Fischer, *Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); various articles in Nikki R. Keddie (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Iran* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983); and Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 3, May 1982, pp. 265-283.

6 See for example Ashraf Pahlevi, *Faces in a Mirror* (Englewood cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1980), ch. 8.

7 Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, *Answer to History* (New York: Stein and Day, 1980), pp. 14, 23.

8 *The New York Times,* October 12, 1971, 39:2.

9 Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *MERIP,* No. 87, May 1980, pp. 21-26.

10 For excellent discussions of the economic causes of the Iranian revolution see Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power,* and Robert E. Looney, *Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New York: Pergamon, 1982).

11 Many people believe that the shah embraced land reform and the other measures enacted under the White Revolution in order to deflect such pressure.

12 For a discussion of this problem see Robert O. Keohane, "The Big Influence of Small Allies," *Foreign Policy,* No. 1, 1971, pp. 163-181.

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3. Newspapers and Magazines

Alternatives

American Political Science Review, American Quarterly Review

Department of State Bulletin

Foreign Affairs, Foreign Service Journal, Foreign Policy

FRUS

The Independent

International Affairs, Institute of International Affairs,

International Journal, International Journal of Middle East Studies

International Security, Ntational Defense

Iran.

Journal of Political and Military Sociology.

Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies.

Middle East Journal, Middle Eatern Affairs

Middle East International

Latin American Research Review

MERIP

Monthly Review

New York Times, New York, Newsweek

The Nation, The Guardian

The Obserber

The Washington Post

Theory and Society

Times Picayune

World Politics